

**Report of the
Independent Review of the Special Project for**

**Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in
Burundi**

25 September – 30 October, 2005


I - Background

1. Following ten years of civil war in Burundi, it was estimated that thousands of children were associated with all armed parties to the conflict: national armed forces, pro-governmental civil defense militias (*Gardiens de la paix*), and the seven Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). In March 2003, the Government of Burundi, represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed the project Plan of Action for the UNICEF Protection Program which included the child soldier demobilization, reintegration and recruitment prevention project (CSDRRPP). This UNICEF-Government of Burundi document endorsed UNICEF's efforts to seek funding to implement project activities.
2. Under this framework, UNICEF Burundi initiated the development of a funding proposal under the Special Projects category for submission to the Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa (MDRP). The proposal requesting financing for USD 3.7 millions was officially endorsed by the local ad hoc committee of MDRP partners in June 2003. A Grant Agreement was signed between the World Bank and UNICEF in August 2004. UNICEF raised USD 1.5 millions of other funds to cover the pre-financing of operating costs between June 2003 and the first disbursement of MDRP Special Project resources in November 2004.
3. One year into implementation, with a view to reviewing progress to date and enhancing effectiveness for the remainder of project, and with the agreement of the Government of Burundi and UNICEF, the World Bank and the MDRP Secretariat engaged the specialized services of an independent consultant to conduct a review of the Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi.

II - Project Description

4. The Special Project for the Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Prevention of Recruitment of Child Soldiers in Burundi, hereinafter referred to as the project, was designed to assist the Government of Burundi in the provision of assistance to demobilizing child soldiers, increased awareness on the international prevention of recruitment of children and to support the social and economic reintegration of all demobilized child soldiers. The main objectives of the project were to:

- Demobilize 90% (2700) of all (estimated 3000) child soldiers with the Burundian army, the Gardiens de la Paix, and other APPMs, within 12 months of the start of program operations;
 - Reintegrate all demobilized child soldiers into their communities, within 18 months of demobilization;
 - Establish and operationalize mechanisms to exclude children from recruitment by all parties to the conflict, within 18 months of the start of the program.
5. ***Project Components:*** three main components were included in the original project design. These were directly linked to the achievement of the three main objectives of the program, the demobilization of child soldiers, their social reintegration and the prevention of further recruitment.
6. ***Component 1 – Demobilization:*** The project implemented decentralized, parallel, and simultaneous demobilization events where each event targeted child soldiers in a small group of military units. Each demobilization event was carried out by a separate, stand alone, implementation team. The parallel –and sometimes staggered – demobilization events for the removal of all targeted child soldiers from all military formations of the government and of the targeted armed groups was to be completed within 12 month from the beginning of activities. The basic design of the process is shown in the diagram below:



7. *Component 2 - Reintegration*: Reintegration support would be delivered through a reintegration package standardized across all 17 provinces of the country. Elements of the reintegration strategy included:

- Sensitizing communities receiving demobilized child soldiers.
- Supporting vulnerable biological families in receiving their demobilized child soldiers.
- Supporting community-based care arrangements for demobilized child soldiers without primary care givers, such as through foster families and (the construction of small children’s homes.
- Enrolling all demobilized child soldiers in appropriate education and learning pursuits.
- Supporting demobilized child soldiers in need of extra care such as those that are HIV/AIDS-infected, severely traumatized, or pregnant or mother girls.


- Provisioning of community-based psychosocial support to address the mental health problems of demobilized child soldiers and of their families.
 - Supporting quick high impact projects for youth participation such as involvement in community services, apprenticeships, small businesses, sports, cultural activities, and other youth-generated initiatives; and,
 - Extending HIV/AIDS prevention services to communities receiving demobilized child soldiers.
8. *Component 3 – Recruitment Prevention*: The recruitment prevention dimension of the project, which works in synergy with social reintegration, specifically targets the political, military, civil authority, and civil society structures which – by commission and/or by omission – contribute to the recruitment of children. Recruitment prevention activities are directed at all the structures and revolve around the following axes:
- The sensitization and increased awareness of military, irregular forces and critical civilian stakeholders on the international normative frameworks that protect children and criminalize their recruitment and participation in armed hostilities.
 - The formulation by the Government and Armed Groups of credible and enforceable policies – anchored in legislative changes (ratification and harmonization of relevant standards) by the Government and on endorsement of relevant standards by the Armed Groups – for the prohibition of child recruitment and the combating of impunity thereof; and
 - The monitoring of recruitment practices within the National Army, the Gardiens de la Paix, and by any other armed groups, to ensure that children are protected from military duties.
9. UNICEF, the direct recipient of MDTF financing for the activity, has a wide of range of implementation and managerial responsibilities, from work in political spheres down to community level monitoring. UNICEF is responsible for the direct financing and technical assistance to the *Structure Nationale pour Enfants Soldats (SNES)*, the direct financing of ten NGOs for the reintegration of child soldiers, regular monitoring of activities, fundraising, communication, lobbying, advocacy and networking with all major stakeholders including armed groups, ONUB, donors, UN agencies and NGOs in the DDR/SSR framework..

III – Project coverage and Implementation Period

10. *Beneficiaries and Target groups*: The project was designed to assist the following target groups:
- 2700 ex child soldiers and their families;

- an additional 800 children from community youth to benefit from schooling and learning opportunities offered to demobilized child soldiers;
- Military commanders and rank and file (training activities only) who have a role in preventing child recruitment ;
- Community leadership structures in 17 provinces;
- Governmental structures; and
- National and international NGOs.

11. *Geographical coverage.* Demobilization activities were implemented in all assembly areas for armed groups, one Demobilization Center (Gitega) of the national Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (NDRRP) and selected military barracks for the Armed Forces. For reintegration activities, the project targeted all 17 provinces of the country. Implementation responsibilities and coverage by implementing partner are shown in the next diagram.



12. *Duration.* The initial MDRP special project grant agreement for the project was signed on August 3, 2004, valid until June 30, 2005. An amendment to the Grant Agreement has been negotiated to extend program activities for an additional calendar year, until June 30, 2006.

IV – Evaluation Methodology

13. This evaluation was conducted using a wide variety of methods including:

- Interviews and formal discussions (see Annex A)
- Document analysis (see Annex C for a list of documents)
- Field visits (see Annex A)
- Informal discussions
- Follow up meetings for review and discussions
- Cost analysis

V - Main Evaluation Findings

General Findings

14. This project has been implemented against the backdrop of a difficult peace process. The deep mistrust that has plagued relations between the two main ethnic groups and the subsequent evolution of factions within groups had created an obstacle to rational discourse and coloured all attempts to convince the combatants to stop using children in the conflict throughout the period of conflict. Though little progress in demobilising children was made while the conflict continued, the project moved rapidly once a ceasefire was in the offing and began reuniting children with their families some 11 months ahead of DDR of adult forces. So far, the project has successfully facilitated the demobilisation and social reintegration of some 3,000 former child combatants from the Forces Armees Burundaises (FAB), the Gardiens de la Paix (GDP) and Armed Movements; which is 300 more children than had been anticipated. This process included a sustained advocacy process that led to the development of a strong consensus to support demobilisation objectives at every level of every concerned government department. It is fair to say that the project has been very successful at a social level and that its early rapid response to the demobilisation challenge may have been instrumental in helping to push the peace process forward. It has also been successful in creating conditions in which it may now be possible to take the reintegration process to a higher level. While the demobilisation and social reintegration activities worked well for those beneficiaries belonging to groups party to the peace process, the *Front de Liberation National* (FNL) are not party to the (Arusha) process, have not disarmed or demobilised and continue to recruit children into their armed group

15. However, the project has failed to generate satisfactory results in some of its major areas of intervention. Specifically, it has not delivered adequate vocational training, educational assistance, psychosocial assistance, protection interventions, or recruitment prevention activities. These activity areas are listed in the project objectives above and are laid out in the Logical Framework document, the Project Proposal, Grant Agreement and Operations Manual. Nor has the project made much progress towards assisting the development of government capacity to carry on either reintegration or protection activities beyond the life of the project. Finally, the project has been plagued by administrative and financial delays whose explanations

do little to justify the resulting effects; particularly in the eyes of frustrated child ex combatants. The management processes involved are overly complex and not appropriate for an intervention that requires, above all else, the timely keeping of promises to beneficiaries


16. One of the major difficulties that will be discussed below is directly related to the demographic mix of the beneficiary group and the requirement for economic assistance appropriate to their ages that does not appear to have been appreciated in the project design. Annex B lists the numbers and distribution of beneficiaries by province up to April 2005. Though global data on age distribution was not available at the time of writing, data gathered during field visits to implementing partners in several provinces revealed that approximately 80% of the beneficiaries had reached the age of majority well before the end of the 18 month period of assistance. Further, only a small portion of the beneficiary group was reintegrated into urban settings; over 90% returned to rural residences. 2.6% are attending a secondary school program of some kind while a further 12.7% are attending primary school. Finally, only 68 females were to be found among the beneficiary group. This, according to all sources consulted, was a consequence of the prevailing preference for male recruitment among all the engaged forces.

Project Design, Operations and Output

Demobilisation

17. For political reasons connected with the peace process, the actual demobilisation was staggered and somewhat erratic. Owing to delays in establishing the DDR process for the main body of combatants, child soldier demobilisation preceded adult demobilisation by about eleven months. The procedure depicted in the diagram below was largely successful in moving children through demobilisation centres quickly and reuniting them with their families within a few days of leaving their fighting units.

Demobilization procedures



This seems to have been the most successful part of the project and offers a model whose lessons will be teased out below. However, it should be noted that the decision to avoid the use of transit centres worked in this situation because of specific political and security conditions that made it possible. Though this process allowed for only minimal formal counselling opportunities, it used family and community dynamics very effectively to complement individualized counselling visits conducted after beneficiaries had begun to settle into their home environments.


18. One of the keys to success was an inclusive approach during the planning and development stage of the project. This led to the development of broad consensus among all the main players and a sense of ownership of the process by the implementing agencies. A critical part of this process was the time and energy invested in developing close ties with the FAB. This was followed by appropriate division of duties and responsibilities that put the onus on various government bodies to carry out identification, separation, registration, family tracing and community/family preparation while using resources drawn from implementing partners to meet the logistical needs for family reunification and transport home. Ultimately, 3,000 children were demobilised and reunited with their families without

significant social problems. This is a significant accomplishment by any standard of measure.

19. While not wanting to denigrate the success of the demobilisation effort, it should be kept in mind that nearly half this number had been enrolled in the GDP, which for all practical purposes can be considered a part time militia that generally operated within their own home communities. Family re-unification and social re-integration for this group were not really much of a challenge. It should also be remembered that demobilisation and social reintegration of the remainder of the group was facilitated by the peace process. Basically, Burundians were so fed up with conditions of conflict that they were more than willing to welcome home wayward sons and daughters so long as they could then get on with the business of peace. However, the fact that the social reunification process was prepared and able to take advantage of a window of opportunity and that the demobilisation and reunification processes were implemented aggressively and quickly remains a significant accomplishment.
20. There was a major debate over the issue of transit centres during the development of this project. The argument that rapid family reunification was the best way to reduce the effects of trauma eventually prevailed over the argument that an adjustment period was needed to allow children to prepare for social integration. While the success of the social and family reintegration speaks for itself in this case, the fact that it has subsequently been nearly impossible to arrange cost effective collective training activities or to use the physical security provided by properly guarded transit sites to induce voluntary demobilisation from the FNL remains an issue.
21. The next diagram illustrates the time lines achieved through the first year of the project and the sources of beneficiaries. Because children were demobilised early in the process, there were very few beneficiaries left to join the project in the period since December 2004. The number of expected beneficiaries from the FNL is yet to be determined.

Demobilization process – from January to December 2004

Effectifs des Enfants Soldats Démobilisés par mois (De janvier à décembre 2004)



Reintegration.

22. Reintegration assistance and follow up is delivered through a network of ten implementing partners operating in every province. Implementing partners were chosen on the basis of project proposals submitted and included a mix of international and national NGOs. Most of the latter are church based and operate under the auspices of their Bureau de Development de la Diocese (BDD). Appropriate training was conducted at the beginning of the project and has been complemented with staff assistance visits and periodic workshops. Each partner is responsible to establish and maintain close contact with each beneficiary and his or her family and to assure the flow of basic survival benefits equal to a value of USD 20 per month each. This assistance is to be provided in kind after discussion with the beneficiary and his or her family and is intended to enable the host family to look after the child. Items are purchased on behalf of the beneficiary family by the implementing partner.

23. The reintegration strategy as originally articulated includes emphasis on education and training as well as a separate focus on identifying and dealing with psychosocial problems associated with traumatic experiences. Follow up and monitoring was to

have been conducted by Social Assistants working under the supervision of Provincial Focal Points assigned by the SNES. These front line monitors were to communicate directly with the relevant implementing partner in their area to assist in directing the flow of social, medical and material interventions. As far as could be determined during the course of this evaluation, the social and community dimensions of this project seemed to have been well implemented. Support to biological families has been the most demanding part of the operation as nearly all beneficiaries were successfully placed. Government figures for April 2005 list only 30 beneficiaries living outside family arrangements and approximately 325 living with extended families. The vast majority (over 90%) are with their biological families. While social reintegration has been quite successful insofar as it can be observed that most affected beneficiaries are currently living with their own families, the project has fallen short of its stated reintegration objectives in regards the educational, professional training and psychosocial dimensions outlined in the project documents. The reasons for this appear to be attributable to a combination of factors discussed below but having their roots in the initial project design.

Project Design.

24. **Reintegration strategy.** The fundamental idea seems to have been to return children to their status quo pre-conflict conditions. As explained above, the emphasis has been on social reintegration and the project has implemented a system of social interventions that deliver assistance primarily in the form of counseling. The material dimensions of reintegration and the long term economic needs of its beneficiaries appear to have been addressed as an afterthought. The focus on education and training activities in the project documents did not take into account the lack of educational and training capacity in Burundi and have not so far been implemented because the required capacities do not exist. At the very least, the strategy ought to have included consideration of the back ground economic conditions and ways to get around the lack of existing training and educational facilities in most of the country. Poverty in Burundi is endemic and this project could have helped begin part of a post conflict initiative to reduce poverty by channeling assistance towards economic capacity building for its beneficiaries. The objectives of such a strategy would have been limited to some degree by the potential for jealousy but if fear of jealousy is to constrain all attempts to improve conditions then there is little likelihood of them ever improving. As it is, the economic dimension of the reintegration objective is not clear. This has led to the dissipation of effort in a myriad of small interventions that are hit or miss according to the background conditions of particular beneficiaries. Ultimately, the project delivers 18 months of social assistance without a clear idea of what is to be achieved by the end of the period beyond a vague notion of social happiness. Given that the period of assistance includes a monthly stipend paid in the form of material (described below), there appears to be no strategy to ensure that beneficiaries are cared for or are capable of caring for them selves without this stipend after the end of the period of assistance. What is to happen in the 19th month?
25. **Reintegration assumptions.** There are several problematic assumptions apparent in the design of the reintegration part of the project. The most important is that child

soldiers demobilised as children can be reintegrated as children. While it is generally agreed that the definition of childhood works for protection purposes, it does not follow that appropriate reintegration assistance should be denied on the basis of age. In one province (Rutana), 83% had already reached the age of majority well before the end of the reintegration period and most of the remainder will reach 18 within a few months. This percentage varies slightly from province to province but is roughly accurate across the entire population of beneficiaries. These young adults already have adult concerns and needs and many have responsibilities for younger siblings. A small number (approximately 1.3%) are married. Yet the reintegration strategy ignores the difference between the needs of children and those of young adults and includes no mechanism for transition from the child focussed approach used here to a more appropriate adult focussed project. The majority of beneficiaries of this project need different kinds of reintegration help than that which they are receiving and this suggests a fundamental flaw in project design. Though I have appended a snapshot of the distribution of beneficiaries to activities by province (Annex B) but was not able to find a consolidated data base by age.

26. The above assumption carries over into the design of service delivery. Following the assumption of childhood and the correlative need for special attention to fit children back into appropriate care providing situations, the project was set up to assure a strong capacity for individual attention to 3,000 children. In practice, this meant social support focussed on the immediate needs of beneficiaries *living in a condition of dependency* rather than on developing a capacity for independence so that beneficiaries develop the ability to look after their own economic needs after the 18 month support period. While this is entirely reasonable for a transitional process designed for children, it is not appropriate for young adults and does not meet the long term reintegration goals implied in the project Grant Agreement.

27. **Education.** The primary focus of reintegration described in the UNICEF Project Proposal (2003) and in the subsequent Logical Framework document was supposed to be education. Yet less than 15% of the beneficiaries are attending school (Synthesis of Reintegration Data provided by SNES, dated 12 April 05). While this probably reflects the harsh realities of a rural setting that presents few job prospects for school graduates and an education system that is very weak, it is undoubtedly also an effect of beneficiary demographics. Few older children can allow themselves the luxury of sitting on a school bench when they have responsibilities requiring them to earn an income. This again goes back to the original project assumptions and suggests a weak grasp of both beneficiary demographics and educational capacity. Though the original plan called for an accelerated learning package for those aged 14-16, the package has not been implemented and was still not ready during this evaluation. UNICEF is now working on a basic literacy intervention in collaboration with UNESCO. Some sort of tailored literacy intervention ought to be part of every serious long term reintegration strategy. Once again, the realization of the need for this appears to have come late to the responsible office and is only now being developed.

It ought to have been part of the technical assessment of need at the beginning of the process.

28. **A second design assumption** was that reintegration into families could be done immediately without danger to the beneficiaries if families and communities were properly prepared before children returned. This assumption turns out to have been largely correct but, it must be stressed, had the potential to put children at risk by removing them from the relatively secure environments they inhabited within armies engaged in a peace process (no longer engaged in actual combat operations) and placing them in communities still divided by unresolved issues. Some of these communities are still open to attack from the FNL, who have not engaged in the peace process. That this strategy worked in most of the country was largely a matter of timing. Given that there is a strong possibility that pushing ahead with child soldier DDR before agreements had been reached on the modalities and timing of full scale DDR may have given the peace process added impetus, it is suggested that this aggressive approach needs to be examined more carefully before it leads to simplistic deductions. The context was particular and does not suggest wider application. With only a slight change in the overall environment, it could equally have been disastrous. If there is a lesson here, it is that judgement is required to read the pace and direction of complex political and historical events. Given the lives at stake, it might be more prudent to err on the side of caution in future DDR initiatives and to avoid sending children into vulnerable communities until their physical security can be reasonably assured.
29. Nowhere in the project documents does there appear a clear definition of successful reintegration. The focus has been almost exclusively on the challenge of social reintegration which suggests that the project was only thought through to the point of family reunification and did not take into account the fact that many beneficiaries were already nearly adults and needed economic capacities not provided for in the project plan. The emphasis on family reunification as a measure of success appears to have overshadowed the economic, educational and training needs of its beneficiaries. Though the project documents mention education, professional training and revenue generating activities as contributing to desirable outcomes, the lack of clarity with respect to the ultimate objective to be achieved is apparent in implementation arrangements that focus almost exclusively on social support directed to families of beneficiaries.
30. The project did not allocate sufficient resources to achieve any but the most minimal vocational training or income generating activities. Moreover, the 55\$ per beneficiary amount set aside for this purpose in the budget has not yet been disbursed and has been the object of some confusion among implementing partners. While it is fair to say that little has been accomplished in this area so far, it should also be said that the need for significant action is now much more evident than it may have been earlier. However, there are a significant proportion of young adult beneficiaries of

this project who have been helped to establish income generating activities of questionable sustainability and that hold little real hope of providing a living, such as selling vegetables or cigarettes from roadside stands.

31. The project assumed the same requirement for assistance for all classes of child fighters whether they had been engaged part time, as was the case with *Guardiens de la Paix*, or had been away from their families for years. One of the reasons for the apparent high level of successful reintegration is that a large majority of the beneficiary community had never left home in the first place. This difference has been recognized in the adult program with a resulting significant difference in assistance funding. It is suggested that some of the concerns that dictated the necessity for close follow up of returning child soldiers do not really apply to *Guardiens*. They did not lose their places in school, were not torn from their families, did not experience the same levels of trauma, did not endure long periods of hunger and isolation and did not get dragged away from their communities.
32. **Psychosocial intervention.** Nearly every project document and virtually every credible academic source available today addresses the issue of appropriate psychosocial support as part of a DDR process. Yet for some reason that may ultimately be traced to the complexity of the project implementation process, the implementation of psychosocial interventions has been delayed. The requirement was recognized as a critical dimension of child soldier DDR from the earliest days of the project and is stated as a key element of success in long term reintegration in every project document – but has not yet been implemented. This is one area where the technical competence needed to implement some sort of intervention ought to have been provided by UNICEF. This is a serious failing that needs urgent attention. Ironically, it would appear that the current staff of the SNES may be better qualified to deal with this issue than UNICEF; but it has not been funded to do so. A capacity to identify and assist moderate and severely traumatized ex-child soldiers is urgently required. It is suggested that there may be a correlation between the low attendance at school among the affected population and undiagnosed trauma.
33. Project documents include a budget line to assist up to 30% of the local population of vulnerable children. While the intention of this approach is appreciated, it has been very difficult to apply in practice with some implementing partners not being able to choose beneficiaries. The background problem is that most communities have so many vulnerable children that the small number allowed for in the project really makes no difference to the jealousy factor and has the potential to create more problems than it solves. If the aim of the initiative is to avoid spotlighting ex child soldiers, it needs to be far more aggressive and to have more resources than are currently available. It is suggested that the approach chosen is of little practical value. That said, it must also be mentioned that there have been very few cases reported in which jealousy of the special treatment of beneficiaries has been an issue. This may be a result of relatively small benefits being given or of the skilful way in

which the community communications part of the project has been handled from the beginning. As the level of poverty is such that jealousy can result from very small differences, it is suggested that the latter may be the case and that credit is due to the very good community communications work before, during and after demobilisation.

34. **Reintegration choices.** All parties to this project took great pains to ensure freedom of choice for beneficiaries with respect to reintegration assistance. However, given the stark economic realities imposed by post conflict conditions in Burundi, this has proven to be a bit of a deception. Only some of the choices made can actually be delivered and the process required to work through the issue has consumed staff time and resources that ultimately further reduced the choices available. It might have been better to develop a restricted range of viable reintegration choices from the beginning.
35. **Agricultural assistance.** Many of the beneficiaries have land. However, the quality and amount of land varies greatly and there is a pressing need to address the endemically low productivity rates of most of it if agriculture is to serve as the basis for long term reintegration for the bulk of beneficiaries – as it currently does. Almost half (47.8%) of beneficiaries are noted as being engaged in agriculture or herding instead of education or vocational training. Yet there is no apparent strategy to collaborate with FAO or other competent authorities to deliver technical assistance.
36. **Income generating activities.** Income generating activities were introduced to the project as part of the social reintegration activity without apparently having been the object of careful study or analysis. I could find no evidence of an economic capacity study. Nearly 10% of beneficiaries are involved in small business such as trading. In practice, this has resulted in a flood of tiny kiosks selling soap and cigarettes. Few, if any, of these will ever generate more than 50 cents per day. Small business activities require more technical input, planning and follow through than is visible in this project.

Protection

37. The project development process for this project included a vigorous debate over the advisability of using transit centres through which demobilised child soldiers could stage before going home. The argument that early family reunification was the most effective way of reducing trauma carried the day. Subsequently, the security conditions improved to the point that the capacity to provide physical protection in guarded areas was no longer an issue – in most of the country. However, where the FNL continue to operate, the problem of protecting demobilised children from reprisal or recruitment remains. The feasibility of establishing long term transit capacity to address this issue has not been investigated. Though it is true that few children escape service with the FNL once recruited, the project appears to have a role to play in setting up conditions that might encourage more voluntary demobilisation.

38. The protection dimension of the project appears to have taken a back seat to the immense effort required to make the individualized reintegration process function. Efforts to promote respect for child rights in the new National Defence Force through agreed training activities have been stalled for well over 8 months. There appears to have been little effort to coordinate the kind of broad political and diplomatic pressure needed to halt recruitment by the FNL and the pace of FNL child soldier recruitment appears to have increased. This is difficult to understand in the context of a country that has a Peace Keeping force deployed and which therefore should enjoy an enhanced capacity to provide a range of physical protection strategies. What leadership there is on this issue is neither as aggressive nor as well focussed as it needs to be to achieve success. This is puzzling given the vocal role that UNICEF has taken globally on the issue of child soldiers.
39. While there is a reporting mechanism to monitor cases of re-recruitment, there is no data gathering system in place to monitor new recruitment or to track and protect those who escape or are captured from the FNL. Further, there appears to be no real attempt to encourage voluntary demobilisation by putting in place protection or assistance measures that might reassure potential defectors from the FNL that they would be looked after if they escaped. Finally, the idea of preventing future recruitment by ensuring viable economic alternatives for those who have been demobilised seems to have been allowed to lapse. In fairness, it must be stressed that stopping recruitment in an ongoing conflict is far from easy and has a close resemblance to the task of stopping boys in North American cities from joining gangs – and is equally frustrating. However, having accepted money from donors on the promise of action, UNICEF has an obligation to make a serious attempt to stop FNL recruitment of child soldiers.

Policy Issues

40. The policy of treating all child soldiers the same satisfies the requirement for consistency with respect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Capetown Principles but creates considerable difficulties in practical terms when faced with the problem of assigning limited resources according to need. The GDP constitute nearly half of the beneficiary population. They served primarily as local defense militia and normally continued to live within their families and to either attend school or work in their normal civilian jobs when not on duty. Yet they receive the same total benefits package as children who may have spent years away from their families and whose normal development was completely distorted by full time military service. This makes no practical sense and stretches the credibility of the project beyond reasonable limits. However, there is no way to cut benefits now that promises and commitments have been made.
41. It should be noted that the national DRRP, which seems to have been based on common sense, made a distinction between GDP and “professional” (full time) service. The argument advanced, and largely accepted by beneficiaries, is that those who wore uniforms on a part time basis do not have the same problem reintegrating as their full time colleagues because they were, and remain, fully integrated into both

family and community. For the most part, those who served part time had other occupations or, at least, had the option of having another occupation. The separate policy for children is not synchronized and will create problems for any attempt to harmonize benefits.

42. Adults demobilized from full time service under the national DDR project are to receive a different set of benefits that include a monthly survival benefit equal to military pay for their rank for 18 months and a one time economic reintegration benefit equal to a total value of \$600 per beneficiary. The idea of this fund is to provide resources and/or training to enable beneficiaries to acquire skills to earn a living. The amount set aside specifically for training for those demobilized as children is only \$55. As pointed out above, many of those demobilized as children are already adults and may have missed training and educational opportunities because of military service. The need for training is the same and the arguments that could be advanced to justify it are the same and yet the benefits are substantially different. It would appear that policy adapted to align with the Convention of the Rights of the Child has worked to the distinct disadvantage of this particular group of young men and women (As noted above, only 68 females beneficiaries have been identified) The policy not in the “best interest of the child” and needs to be revised.

Capacity Building

43. UNICEF put considerable effort into developing national capacity to coordinate child soldier DDR. Close collaboration began in the early stages of project development with national staff from the Ministry of Institutional Reform, Human Rights and Parliamentary Relations participating in focus groups and advocacy activities aimed at building a coalition against child recruitment. Later, SNES was formed under the auspices of the Ministry for Institutional Reform, Human Rights and Parliamentary Relations. This body is supported through UNICEF using MDRP funds and is responsible for coordination and control of implementing partners with technical assistance from UNICEF.
44. UNICEF conducted four major workshops in 2004 as part of the demobilization process. These were aimed at building and sustaining a consensus and at developing a team approach to demobilization. This activity seems to have been highly successful in establishing collaboration among military, civil government and NGO communities. This led to active community level communications which were critically important to the successful demobilization operation conducted in the same year.
45. The SNES is responsible for coordinating the efforts of implementing partners and overseeing the entire DDR process. The main thrust of the capacity building strategy has been to empower government through ownership of the process. This appears to have worked very well during the first two phases of the DDR process and was of particular value here as both disarmament and demobilization of the 3,000 beneficiaries required political control of various organs of state as well as linkage with the larger political processes that were part of the peace plan. However, the

relative importance of the SNES has been thrown into question during the reintegration and protection phase of the project; perhaps as an unintended consequence of the implementation strategy. Funds flow from the MDRP through UNICEF to implementing partners and the SNES. The SNES has the same financial status as implementing partners and is not in a position of control for the simple reason that all implementation activities are controlled through financial processes that remain firmly in UNICEF hands. Over time, this seems to have resulted in a troubled relationship between UNICEF, the SNES and several implementing partners (see the exchange of letters between UNICEF and the SNES in March/April 2005). Both parties have legitimate concerns but the beneficiaries are not helped by the dispute. Neither is happy with the status quo and both want a better solution to the challenge of completing the DDR process. In theory, it should be possible to shift responsibilities by shifting the funding arrangements to allow UNICEF to continue to contribute technical expertise without controlling the funding for what should be a government controlled process.

Coordination with National Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program

46. The Executive Secretariat for the Commission for National DRR has a full time child protection officer as part of its staff. This person is tasked to maintain close liaison with the SNES. The main problems seem to be those associated with the delay between the startup of the two projects and the amount of reintegration assistance reaching beneficiaries. The children's DDR began some months ahead of the adult project. This led to a divergence that now complicates efforts to rationalize or harmonize levels of support given to the two groups. The primary problem is that all child beneficiaries receive the same benefits but a distinction, discussed in detail above, is made between GDP adults and adult combatants who served on a full time basis. There are also different categories of injury or disability being used to report needs. This has led to a number of delays as data bases are reconciled
47. The differences in data base and policy with respect to the GDP are a direct result of the project being hived off from the DDR process early. UNICEF lobbied hard for early demobilization of children for protection reasons and to align with the Cape Town Principles. Given the practical problems that this has led to and the lack of subsequent action on the protection dimension of the project, there no longer seems a strong reason to prevent the joining of the two projects. This would allow debate over the fairness of treatment given to GDP to take place under the auspices of government – where it belongs.

Technical assistance

48. UNICEF has the primary responsibility for providing technical assistance to the SNES and to implementing partners. While this was very useful at the beginning of the DDR process when the composition of national government reflected the power manipulations of a civil war, its value has become more difficult to see in the reintegration and protection dimensions of the project now that the government has

newly acquired legitimacy. Part of this goes back to the obscurity of the reintegration objective. Lacking a clearly enunciated idea of the ultimate reintegration goals to be achieved, the process has been limited to a series of piecemeal interventions focusing more on transitional needs than on long term needs. Though there are plans slowly unfolding to deal with some of the shortcomings noted above, the fact that UNICEF has not yet dealt successfully with psychosocial, educational, professional training or income generating requirements raises questions as to the adequacy and efficacy of its technical assistance contribution. This is particularly the case where there are issues of fairness to be sorted out. The decisions made in respect of these issues should reflect the consensus of the political process that generates them.

49. The main focus of technical assistance provided so far falls under the heading of financial management. UNICEF staff members have expended a great deal of time and effort to improve the financial reporting capacity of their partners. This is a necessary part of any internationally funded initiative but, it is suggested, should not be the main focus of an intervention that plays a critical part in a larger peace process. While it is indeed fair to say that UNICEF has had an uphill struggle to teach its partners how to monitor and report financial activities credibly, it is also fair to point out that the strategy adopted was, from the outset, inefficient and part of the problem. The result has been an overall improvement in financial management that has left serious gaps in technical service delivery.

Monitoring and Evaluation

50. A full monitoring and evaluation system is not yet in place for this project though a series of evaluation workshops have been held as described in UNICEF's Quarterly Report dated April 2005. Quarterly and annual reports are prepared and submitted by SNES and UNICEF though the most recent report available in October was dated April. The budget reports provided relate expenditures to specific activities but do not break down the types of activities in an easily recognizable way.

HIV/Aids

51. The HIV and AIDS awareness program has been implemented in partnership with other national and international initiatives and appears to be working well, though, in the absence of information of the rates of Voluntary Counselling and Testing among beneficiaries, it is impossible to estimate the prevalence rates. Suffice to say that there is a focus on this activity and that there are regular advocacy and educational activities that are reaching beneficiaries.

Cost effectiveness

52. The child focussed social support approach entails a labour intensive process that requires more time, effort and cost than was anticipated in the budget. Of the total project cost of 5.2 million dollars (3.7 million from MDTF plus 1.5 million from

UNICEF), approximately 1.4 million is provided directly to beneficiaries in the form of monthly support payments (20\$/beneficiary/month), start up kits (55\$/beneficiary) and vocational training (55\$). The remaining 73% of the project money has been allocated for demobilisation logistics costs (Including family tracing, community mobilisation visits and transport) and ongoing individual case follow up. Most of this amount is visible as administrative and travel costs. Some of this amount has been earmarked for psycho social interventions, professional training and medical expenses (figures not yet available). The point here is that the basic assumption of childhood apparent in the initial design has had a distorting effect on implementation. This, coupled with an incomplete analysis of time and cost implications and the decision to follow a family focussed social reintegration pattern, has led to the development of an extremely cost ineffective project. The bulk of the money used so far has been spent on staff wages and travel; both of which are essential to meet the family visit requirements entailed by the reintegration strategy chosen. Though the value to beneficiaries of follow up visits from project staff can not be completely negated, it is difficult to measure and nearly impossible to calculate - except as a cost. Moreover, given that the process does not appear to nest within a long term strategy, there is a good chance that the investment of time and money in social reintegration will not repay itself once the assistance stops.

53. The reintegration process includes a requirement to provide monthly support payments equal to 20\$ per month per beneficiary. This is not paid as cash but is used to purchase items agreed after consultation with the beneficiaries' families. These items are intended to make a modest improvement to host family capacity to care for beneficiaries but in practice includes the purchase of such things as bicycles or farm implements. However, given the need to talk each purchase through with the host family, every payment requires: 1) a family visit, 2) a purchasing trip and 3) a second family visit to deliver whatever was purchased. Add to this a requirement to follow up to determine whether or not the purchase achieved the aim. Given that there are approximately 3000 beneficiaries involved, this process entails 3000 repetitions of each of the associated activities for each payment. The workload has been reduced somewhat by instituting a system of periodic instead of monthly payments but still imposes a very heavy workload on implementing partners. Not surprisingly, this creates a requirement for detailed accounting and reporting that consumes a disproportionately large percentage of effort. One result has been frequent delays in providing funds to partners and consequent delays in delivering service to beneficiaries. This has led to a number of demonstrations that included intimidation and threats of violence and ultimately undermined the entire process of winning ex combatant confidence in the peace process. Moreover, inasmuch as demonstrations frequently led to prompt unblocking of funds, the tendency to resort to violence may have been reinforced.
54. It might have been possible to set up a much less costly alternative that would provide training and educational capacity not available in much of rural Burundi had the idea of transit centres not been so vigorously resisted. The early version of the project proposal (June 2002) included an approach that established semi-residential training centres in key areas of the country so that children could attend viable professional,

educational and life skills training activities. This would have entailed setting up training capacity in several main population centres. A cost benefit analysis that assessed competing options of service delivery might have generated a better ratio of resource consumption to direct benefit to beneficiaries. Alternatively, given the predilection for agricultural activities evident here, it might have been possible to set up a system of collective training in agricultural techniques that would have improved the chances that money spent would lead to viable economic activities, that the return on the investment would be improved.

Evolution

55. As mentioned above, both the project and the background conditions in which it operates have changed significantly over the life of the project so far. What began as a project that sought the shortest path to family and social reintegration has now grown into a project that needs to complement its activities with much more aggressive interventions to deal with economic reintegration needs and aspirations of its beneficiaries. With improvements in security conditions, economic, educational and social welfare needs now assume far greater importance than was previously the case. At the same time, the project has become mired in a web of accounting procedures that may have delayed the implementation of complementary activities that were part of its original plan but never fully developed because the relevant staff members were fully occupied with financial reporting problems. It is now past time to implement the educational, professional training and psychosocial interventions that have been waiting attention.
56. At this point, it should also be mentioned that both the context and the evolution of the project has led to a parallel development of a growing gap between SNES and UNICEF. The way the project has unfolded has placed UNICEF in the uncomfortable position of holding the purse strings for government during an historical moment in which government institutions are developing very quickly. The SNES, in particular, has technical competency to rival that of UNICEF in many relevant areas but finds itself limited by their ability to convince UNICEF to release funds for agreed activities, such as Human Rights training for the FAB or social monitoring by Provincial Focal Points. Not surprisingly, this has led to the development of an unproductive relationship that both parties would like to see improved. There is good faith on both sides but both are trapped by current agreements and established procedures that have not kept pace with the development of the overall political, security and economic conditions.
57. Finally, there appears to be a need to develop a plan to cater for the DDR of the FNL, should they ever agree to peace. The numbers of beneficiaries covered by the Grant Agreement for this project have already been surpassed. Given the difficulties encountered so far in reaching a peace deal, it would behoove the community of concerned agencies to have a plan in place that could respond quickly to a breakthrough. Based on the observations in this report, serious consideration should be given to combining responsibility for child and adult DDR for the FNL under the same agency – the National Commission for DRR.

Recommendations

58. Though the current Child Soldier DDR project has achieved remarkable success in the dimensions of demobilization and immediate social reintegration, it has fallen short of its stated goals; particularly in assuring the long term educational and training capacity of its beneficiaries. In addition, the lack of progress in implementing psychosocial interventions and protection activities is a concern. These shortcomings must be considered in the context of a project design that did not address economic needs or cost out project processes. The result is a project that has little likelihood of long term success. However, the project has been extended to end in June 2006 and has financial resources set aside to complete some of these activities. Carrying on business as usual is unlikely to correct the weaknesses observed and commented upon above. If it is agreed that the ultimate purpose of this project is to achieve long term reintegration of its beneficiaries, then it ought to include a more clearly defined economic dimension. The following recommendations are offered:

Project Design and Strategy

- The project needs to be re-designed to meet the full reintegration needs of older beneficiaries. Given the data available on each beneficiary, it should be possible to identify those who should be treated as adults and assisted accordingly. This would entail developing an agreed operational definition of successful reintegration appropriate to the present age of beneficiaries. This definition should address realistic training, educational and economic reintegration needs. Using this agreed definition, SNES, UNICEF and their implementing partners should then develop an operational reintegration strategy and plan to use existing funding to achieve the agreed goal. This is urgent and should be completed soonest for implementation beginning the first quarter of 2006.
- A related issue is the method of controlling and coordinating the project. The present arrangements give UNICEF budgetary control of a project that is supposed to be government led. Given the technical competence resident within the SNES and the need to enhance government capacity to facilitate the assumption of responsibility for social issues as part of their sovereignty, a review of the project objectives recommended above would provide a good opportunity to review the existing control mechanisms to remove existing friction points between the SNES and UNICEF. Without changing the existing Grant Agreement, it should be possible to hive off that part of the operating budget for SNES activities to avoid the need for UNICEF approval of government expenditures.
- A third related point springs from the probable outcome of the review of objectives recommended above and the possibility that the need to extend the economic capacity building dimension of the project will be agreed. Should this come about, it is suggested that the option of incorporating the SNES within the National Commission for DRRP be considered. This would allow better overall

coordination and take advantage of training and income generating opportunities designed for adults.

Technical Issues

- **Educational and Professional Training** opportunities do not exist in some areas or are not appropriate to the age of the beneficiaries. Where more detailed review suggests that participation is important to achieving long term reintegration goals, a practical operational strategy is required to ensure that opportunities are created for those wishing to study. Given the importance placed on this in the project documents produced by UNICEF, the onus should now be on UNICEF to produce a workable educational and professional training strategy in the first quarter of the coming year or to suggest viable alternatives.
- **Psychosocial** monitoring and assistance is critically important to the success of long term reintegration and should be considered a priority for immediate intervention. UNICEF has the technical responsibility, funding and capacity to implement this and should do so urgently.
- **Reintegration** choices are limited by economic, environmental, social and cost factors. The policy of offering an open choice of individual strategies is deceptive and wastes time and energy that could be used more effectively by offering a restricted set of options according to the outcome of an opportunity analysis. While it is understood that most beneficiaries are now past the point of choice, if the review recommended above leads to the development of a more complete income earning dimension, the new process should offer choice from a limited set of opportunities dictated by realistic analysis.
- **Agricultural** intervention requires technical expertise. Given the large number of beneficiaries who are enrolled in agricultural or herding activities, technical expertise should be sought immediately by UNICEF for incorporation into existing interventions.
- **Income generating activities** require more careful study and attention than they have been given. Though this was not the focus of social reintegration, it has been followed as a logical extension of family capacity building. UNICEF should review its current approach urgently with a view to developing strategies that offer hope of viable long term income generating capacity after the end of the period of assistance. This should be done as part of the overall review recommended above and should be ready for implementation using existing funds in the first quarter of next year.

Protection

- The protection dimension of this project needs far more energy, emphasis and attention than it is currently receiving. Given the ongoing combativeness of the FNL, there is a leadership role here for an international agency, such as UNICEF, that has the potential to reach across lines of conflict. This activity needs urgent and serious attention and should benefit from a broad based strategy exercise as part of its process. This could be led by UNICEF or by the SNES but should be initiated as soon as possible and should produce an operational strategy before the end of the first quarter of 2006.
- The use of protected transit centers to encourage voluntary demobilization from the FNL should be reviewed.

Policy Issues

- The thorny issue of the different benefits provided to GDP child and adult beneficiaries is a matter of national concern and ought therefore to be decided by the national government. Since it would appear that the best way to deal with perceived disparities is through political discourse, this issue should be turned over to government authority for resolution. In the interim, the SNES and UNICEF are caught by existing expectations and should move cautiously on any attempt to change current allocations of benefit.

National Coordination of DDR/DRR

- There is no visible advantage at this point to changing the existing relationship between the National Commission for DRR. Grant Agreements have been signed, monies disbursed and budgets approved. However, should the review of strategy and objectives recommended above suggest a requirement to carry reintegration activities forward in time, the idea of combining the two projects should be seriously considered as part of any proposed project extension.

Cost Effectiveness

- The individualized reintegration strategy is extremely expensive and has not produced the complementary activities listed above. Moreover, the budgetary control mechanism generates internal friction that slows down the flow of funds to the point that it has led to violent protest. This is counter productive in the most glaring way and needs to be reviewed urgently. It is strongly recommended that UNICEF be requested to identify and report the costs of its present processes including: a) the cost per beneficiary of delivering converting monthly stipends into material benefits, b) the cost per beneficiary of social assistance visits, and; c) the cost per beneficiary of the expenditure reporting process. These figures should then be reviewed to determine the financial viability of the reintegration strategy they have chosen.

- Serious consideration should be given to funding any additional activities through the SNES. The SNES already has most of the technical competence needed for this project and has qualified staff members who have been associated with the project from the beginning and who consequently have a better appreciation of the requirements than is possible for someone newly arrived in Burundi. This would complete the capacity building process already underway and should as well reduce the overall staff costs by removing the expatriate salary portion cost of the project. Technical assistance, where needed, could still be drawn through the National Program arrangements between UNICEF and the Government of Burundi. The SNES could function as a self standing organization or be integrated into the ES/NCDRR.

Concluding Material

59. DDR processes are as difficult to evaluate as they are to implement. The main reason for this is that criteria of success are generally buried in other political and social layers that make it difficult to separate cause from effect. However, it is clear in this case that the current project has produced some good results while still suffering from a number of evident weaknesses at both conceptual and technical levels. The problem now is to find a way forward. A project that began when the government in power had little credibility with its own people is now moving ahead in the context of a much improved political condition. It ought now to be possible to shift the focus of attention from individual social interventions carried out under carefully monitoring by UNICEF to developing government capacity to handle its own social and economic challenges. UNICEF can still contribute technical expertise but ought not to be holding the purse strings for a government initiative with so much potential to assist in the overall task of enabling the development of sound national institutions. The first step in this process is to encourage the Government of Burundi to review its DDR objectives and to propose new arrangements that do not undermine the successes achieved so far. Though the recommendations above provide some useful guidelines for review, it is further suggested that one immediate goal of a readjustment to favor government control is to separate the SNES budget from the project budget so that UNICEF is no longer in a position to block funds
60. Management modalities are deeply affected by the intervention strategies chosen. In this case, the project deliberately chose to emphasize the social aspect of reintegration and consequently developed a strategy grounded on individualized follow up. While this has the great merit of being decentralized and client focused, the strategy imposed constraints on management time and attention at all levels and has ultimately contributed to a concentration on financial management and reporting that left little time to pursue the educational, training, income generating and psychosocial interventions laid out in project documents. It is suggested that the next step in the development of an exit strategy is to focus on new solutions to the challenge of meeting economic reintegration needs. This should be done in conjunction with the National Commission for DRR, who have already begun their analysis of training capacity and economic opportunities. To avoid repeating management problems, UNICEF and its partners should subsequently consider the time and resource

implications of any strategy chosen. Ultimately, any new plan should state how beneficiaries are to support themselves after the process is complete.

61. The many technical weaknesses in this project noted above are largely a matter of interpretation of the relative importance of what has been achieved so far. While comments about the excessive effort required for small measurable benefits to project beneficiaries are based on quite careful observation, the strength of the counter argument grounded on perceptions of social challenges is also valid. However, the page has turned and there are elements to the DDR challenge in Burundi that may not have been visible to those caught up in day to day administration of such an ambitious project. It is hoped that this document will at least allow some of those elements to be seen in a different light so that discussion towards productive solutions can begin.

Annex A to
Independent Review of the Special Project for
Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in
Burundi

List of Key Persons Consulted

Colonel (retired) **Mbaye Faye**, ONUB, Head of DDR section
Major General **Germain Niyoyankana**, Minister of National Defence, Burundi
Colonel **Antoine Bigayi**, Executive Assistant, Minister of National Defence, Burundi
Gopal Sharma, UNICEF, Protection Program Officer
Laurence Fayolle, UNICEF, Project Officer, DDR
Cherif Benadouda, UNICEF, Program Coordinator
Dieudonne Cirhigiri Zirirana, IRC, Technical Advisor Youth Program
Anna Lucia Mecagni, IRC Protection Officer, Makamba
Victoria Forbes Adam, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
Sue Hogwood, DFID, Burundi Representative
Alice Simbananiye, World Vision, National Advocacy Coordinator (Child and Gender)
Abbe Gilbert Ndayiragije, COPED, National Director
Gelase-Daniel Ndabirabe, Executive Secretariat, National Commission for DDR, Head
of Missions and Special Projects
Liberat Ntunzwenimana, Executive Secretariat, National Commission for DDR
Romain..... Executive Secretariat, National Commission for DDR, Child DDR liaison
Alexandra Boivin, Geneva Call, Child Soldiers Project
Leann Bayer, Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)
Jill Morris, PADCO, Coordinator Community Based Leadership Program
Liliane Bigayimpunzi, UNESCO, National Administrator for Education
Elie Niyonzimana, ILO, National Coordinator
Natacha Meden, ONUB, DDR-SRR Officer
Desiree Gatoto, SNES, Project Director
Prosper Ntaaorwmiye, SNES, Director of HR section
Colonel (retired) **Gideon Karibwami**, SNES, Demobilisation Director
Matt Maguire, DFID
Yusef ElBaroudi, ONUB, Child Protection Assistant
Sophie Habunimana, ACORD, Child Protection Officer
Dieudonne Girukinishaka, ACORD, Field Officer
Joseph Nzorubara, Bureau Diocese Administration Gitega (BDAG), Field Officer
Anne Marie Ndayikeza, SNES, Provincial Focal Point, Gitega
Serge Ruzimana, IRC, Head of Rutana Office
Louise.... BDD, Social Assistant, Muramvya
Jean Francois... SNES, Provincial Focal Point, Muramvya

Field staff meetings

IRC Makamba BDAG Gitega
IRC Rutana BDD Muramvya

Annex B to
Independent Review of the Special Project for
Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi (hereinafter referred to as the Child
Soldier Project)

Page 1

EFFECTIFS DES ENFANTS SOLDATS ORIENTES VERS LA FORMATION SCOLAIRE , PROFESSIONNELLE ET VERS LES METIERS PAR PROVINCE ET PAR PCF AU 20 AVRIL 2005

PCF	Province	Ecole Primaire	Ecole Secondaire	CEM	Formation sur le tas	Yaga Mukana	Agriculture	Elevage	Pêche	Transport	Petit commerce	Menuiserie	Garage automobile	Couture	Coiffure	Autres	Total par Province	Total par PCF
Acord 1	Bujumbura	2	22	24				6	1	31	12		3		3	17	121	419
Acord 2	Cankuzo	44	18	3		7	55	66		10	92			2			298	
ODDBU	Muramvya	33	12	9		14	43	41			10	8	9	3	3	1	168	546
	Buja Rural	41	5		28	3	115	86		10	4		44	3		19	360	
COPEP	Bururi	8	4		1	1		55	2	13	25	1			5	1	116	116
IRC	Makamba	10	2				64	55			1	1	11	21			165	507
	Rufana	19	1	1	1		143	141		1	9	9		17			342	
SOPRAD	Ruyigi	71		9	28	8	12	158		59	27	8	8	16		18	422	422
ODAG	Gitega	72	8	28			82	148		83	32	13	2	4		5	473	501
	Mwaro	6						9		13							28	
World Vision	Karuzi	42	11				1	5			9	14	2	36	3	30	151	154
BDDN	Kayanza	19	3	1	1	19	83	83		21	16	3		11	4	2	266	691
	Ngozi	26	4	1	1	19	135	135		54	28	3		11	6	2	425	
BDDM	Muyinga	18	4	1		1	69	25		1	27	23	4	33	12	2	220	269
	Kirundo	25			1	2	4	4			5	1		3	2	2	49	
BDDBubanza	Bubanza	32	3							61		8	10		1	12	127	193
	Cibitoke	17	4	1	4					36		3				1	66	
TOTAL		485	99	78	65	74	807	1018	3	393	297	95	93	160	39	112	3818	3818

Activités	Ecole Primaire	Ecole Secondaire	CEM	Formation sur le tas	Yaga Mukana	Agriculture	Elevage	Pêche	Transport	Petit commerce	Menuiserie	Garage	Couture	Coiffure	Autres	Activités de formation	Mutabaza
Effectifs	485	99	78	65	74	807	1018	3	393	297	95	93	160	39	112	801	3017
%	12,7%	2,6%	2,0%	1,7%	1,9%	21,1%	26,7%	0,1%	10,3%	7,8%	2,5%	2,4%	4,2%	1,0%	2,9%	21,0%	79,0%

Annex C to
Independent Review of the Special Project for
Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in
Burundi (hereinafter referred to as the Child Soldier Project)

List of Documents

Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (WB) pertaining to the Child Soldier Project dated 24
September 2003

UNICEF Project Proposal to WB, Child Soldier Project (unsigned draft) dated September
2003

Logical Framework Document for the Child Soldier Project (UNICEF) not dated

Special Project Proposal Summary Sheet (WB) for the Child Soldier Project dated 19
July 2003

Child Soldier Project Work Plan (UNICEF), not dated

Manuel Operationnel de Terrain Dated October 2003, Revised July 2004

Grant Agreement TF053856 pertaining to the Child Soldier Project dated 29 July 2004

Technical Annex to Grant Agreement for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration
Program dated 24 February 2004

First Semester Report (GOB), Child Soldier Project, 2005

Mid Term Evaluation Report, Child Soldier Project, 28-30 April 2004

Annual Project Activities Report (GOB) for 2004, Child Soldier Project, dated June 2005

UNICEF Quarterly Report, Child Soldier Project, dated April 2005

Report on Evaluation Workshop for Reintegration (GOB), Child Soldier Project, dated 12
April 2005

Internal Regulations Governing Comportment of Project Personnel (GOB), not dated

UNICEF Child Soldier Project Power Point Briefing dated March 2005

Report of SNES Retreat held 8/9 February 2005-12-09

UNESCO draft Project Proposal for Reintegration and Economic Reinsertion of Ex-
Combatants and Uneducated Youth dated August 2005

Letter of Complaint from Ministry of Institutional Reform, Human Rights and Parliamentary Relations dated 23 March 2005 (concerning funding delays)

Letter of Explanation from UNICEF to Ministry of Institutional Reform, Human Rights and Parliamentary Relations dated 13 April 2005 (response to complaint)

Annex D to

Independent Review of the Special Project for

Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi (hereinafter referred to as the Child Soldier Project)

Lessons Learned

56. There are a number of important lessons that can be teased from this evaluation:

- Quick family reunification can be achieved if enough time and effort is put into preparation and where adequate security is in place in areas of return. The main requirement is broad and effective advocacy with all concerned parties including the combatant forces leaders, political leaders, community leaders, families and the combatants themselves.
- The dangers of quick family reunification must be considered carefully in the context of a developing peace process. Where it can be reasonably assumed that hostilities are winding down, it may be safe to begin child soldier DDR ahead of a peace agreement. However, this must be very carefully considered and children should not be sent back to vulnerable family contexts unless it is reasonably safe for them.
- The value of separate child soldier DDR is not always clear and should not be driven by ideology. While current international thinking is that children should be separated from adult combatants as soon as possible it is not always in the best interests of particular groups of children to do so, especially in the reintegration phase. In this particular case, the risks of continued service were minimal given that hostilities had virtually stopped some months before DDR began. The fact that child soldiers were put through a DDR process ahead of the adults led in this case to children receiving far less training and assistance benefits than they would have had they been demobilized with the adults. The driving criterion should be the best interest of the child.
- The use of the Cape Town definition of child soldiers resulted in a decision to demobilize and reintegrate children as a separate class of combatants with rights to special treatment. This effectively cast all beneficiaries in the role of dependent children. But because many of the children were nearly adults when the process began, it resulted in young people being demobilized and reintegrated as children when they had reintegration needs more appropriate to adults. Because of the mistaken attribution of childhood, social needs trumped economic needs in the development of reintegration strategy. The consistency of the Cape Town definition for demobilization need not be thrown into question so long as it does not result in inappropriate reintegration programming.
- The inclusiveness of the Cape Town definition of child soldiers also blurs the legitimate distinctions between those who served in local defense forces (GDP) and those children who found themselves attached to military forces on a full time basis. The former required disarming but may have done without

the reintegration assistance they received. There are distinctions here that make important differences and that have serious resource implications.

- The strategic orientation of this project suggests a pre-occupation with the first two phases of DDR. This is a common problem that reflects the difficulties of reintegration. There is little point in going through disarmament and demobilization if there is not a feasible plan in place to assure long term reintegration. One way of dealing with this common problem is to begin the planning process by developing a reintegration plan first and then working back to demobilization and disarmament.
- Reintegration is a difficult objective to achieve. It is made more difficult when there is no clearly understood definition of success. While much can be achieved during the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the true test of a DDR process is its capacity to promote social and political stability over a long period. Given the importance of economic capacity to social stability, it follows that a reintegration project should have key components aimed at providing a capacity to earn income to former combatants.
- The end of conflict brings with it the chance to correct structural and social faults that contributed to conflict in the first place. The attempt to reintegrate former combatants into the *status quo ante bellum* falls short of what might be achieved with a more political and socially grounded notion of the overall objective. Child soldier DDR has the potential to draw international resources to generate hope for the future by imaginative and aggressive use of the opportunities presented by the end of conflict.
- Ownership of a DDR process is an important element of its overall success. The current arrangement between UNICEF and the SNES in Burundi leaves both sides frustrated and distracts management from focusing on beneficiary needs. While international agencies may provide important technical and management capacity at the beginning of a DDR process, there should be some transitional plan in place that includes handing over control of finances as part of the DDR process.
- Process costs should be included in the cost and time calculations of a DDR project. Overly elaborate plans impose too many points of friction as each associated and generally result in delays. These delays eat away at the credibility of the peace effort and the effort to rebuild trust in the institutions of state that are one of the main objectives of DDR. In this case, a disproportionate share of project resources have gone into the task of generating and managing the residual benefits that ultimately reach beneficiaries. DDR is not a black art and need not be complicated by modes of implementation that consume the lion's share of its resources.
- The nascent post conflict reconstruction boom does not seem to have had an impact on planning for the CSDRRPP. It presents an opportunity for employment and training that should not be missed.
- Reintegration interventions that rely on agricultural assistance need expert input. FAO and other relevant partners should be invited to participate.
- Income generating activities require technical expertise to develop. Trying to muddle through without adequate planning or resources doesn't help anyone.

Annex E to
Independent Review of the Special Project for
Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in
Burundi (hereinafter referred to as the Child Soldier Project)

Partial Terms of Reference

–Objectives of the Assessment

The MDRP Secretariat intends to commission an independent consultant to critically assess the performance and results achieved by Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) financed component of the Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention Project in Burundi. Additionally, the activity will establish lessons learned and derive recommendations for use in second year of the activities, as well as to document the experience of program implementation and sub-project level outcomes. The focus of the evaluation will include, but will not be necessarily limited to:

- Document the design, operational arrangements and outputs of project activities, including the mechanism for selection, training and supervision of local contractors;
- Assess the outcomes of program interventions, immediate impact in the target group and external factors affecting project performance, including the relationship between interventions targeting child soldiers and programming for other vulnerable children;
- Assess the performance of UNICEF in the establishment of national capacity for the implementation and supervision of activities in support of child soldiers and the results achieved up to date;
- Assess the performance of the National Child Soldier Structure in the implementation and supervision of activities in support of child soldiers and the results achieved up to date;
- Assess the level of support provided by the special project to the National Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program, including the role of the National Structure for Child Soldiers, the effectiveness of coordination, reporting and supervision mechanisms, transitional arrangements and exit strategy;
- Recommend and justify the need for continuation (or termination) of current program activities, proposed future roles and responsibilities for the different institutions and agencies involved in the child protection activities and propose phase out strategies;

- Establish lessons learned and derive recommendations from the project experience that can document the experience and inform other programs in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere.

V – Issues to be considered by the assessment

62. To fulfill the assessment objectives, the following issues should be assessed by the selected consultant:

- *The policy and security framework as it relates to the Program.* Especially consider the security framework for the implementation of child demobilization activities in an insecure environment and its implications for reintegration support.
- *The Program's design.* How appropriate has the design been in enabling activities to meet the stated objectives? Especially consider the reintegration and recruitment prevention components implemented through national NGOs within the framework of the assistance to other vulnerable and war-affected populations.
- *The demobilization component.* How effectively has the design contributed to the stated objectives, and how the implementation of demobilization activities differs from other regional child protections activities in the MDRP sphere? Specifically, look at the modality for child demobilization as an independent process from adult demobilization.
- *The reintegration component.* What are the reintegration achievements up to date and how can the component be strengthened? Was the selection of implementing partners adequate? Was the technical assistance and supervision of the implementing partners appropriate? What can be improved?
- *Technical assistance program.* Assess how the TA program has contributed to attainment of the reintegration objectives, the creation of national capacity and the promotion of high and consistent standards among all implementing partners.
- *Creation of National Capacity.* Critically assess the results achieved through the creation of the National Structure for Child Soldiers, its performance, its role in relationship to the National Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program and the advantages and disadvantages of the current institutional arrangements.
- *Cost effectiveness: Critically review the budget in relation to the deliverables/outputs and desired outcomes. In addition, the consultants should*

assess how much of the financing funding is benefiting the children directly, what percentage is consumed by overhead costs, and should suggest ways of improving cost efficiency and value for money.

- *The evolution of the Project.* Examine the achievements up to date vis-à-vis the expected results and the needs on the ground. Assess the need for continued support and specifically examine and recommend possible institutional arrangements to effectively support the role of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration.