



Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS)

PROJECT SUMMARY SHEET

Country :	Central African Republic
Project title :	Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Program (ERCS)
Implementing Agency :	UNDP Bangui Avenue Boganda B.P. 872 Bangui – Central African Republic
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National Counterpart :	Ministère de la Défense et de la Restructuration de l'Armée
Project locations:	Prefectures of Ouham, Ouham Pende, Kemo, Nana-Grébizi and Bangui
Number and type of beneficiaries :	Direct and indirect project beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓ A maximum of 7,565 ex-combatants, their families and✓ the communities where these ex-combatants will resettle
Project duration :	3 years
Implementation period :	March 2004 – February 2007
Total project budget :	13,019,493 USD
Total MDRP Funding:	9,818,243 USD
Other Funding:	3,201,250 USD

Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Community Support Program (ERCS)

Central African Republic

Section 1 : Executive Summary

The Central African Republic has experienced over the past ten years recurrent political and military crises, including multiple army mutinies and coups d'Etat. The most recent was sparked by a failed coup attempt on 25 October 2002. Unlike previous crises, its immediate impact was not limited to the capital, Bangui. In their retreat, rebel soldiers occupied about a third of the country. The civil war that ensued was the most violent and dramatic the country had ever known, both in terms of the number of victims and of the scope of destruction. It lasted until 15 March 2003, when General Bozizé finally succeeded in seizing power. About two-thirds of the population, more than 2 million people in all, were affected by this latest conflict, creating a major humanitarian crisis.

The present humanitarian situation of the affected population remains a major concern, and was analyzed in the UN Consolidated Appeal issued at the end of 2003. Production systems as well as health and education infrastructure, were significantly eroded, and in some areas, completely wiped out. Part of the population is still displaced today, both internally as well as outside the national borders. The UNHCR estimates that some 42,000 Central Africans have taken refuge in Southern Chad. On the Central African side, humanitarian agencies put the number of internally displaced people also in the tens of thousands.

The *National Dialogue* that was held from the 6 October to 27 November 2003 was seen as a major step in the search for a consensual way out of the multiple crises the country has experienced. The new Government has prepared a Transition roadmap focusing on economic revival and the preparation of fresh elections to set up new political institutions to take the country forward. The roadmap was the basis for the resumption of dialogue with the European Union within the framework of Article 96 of the Cotonou Accords.

The regional dimension

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Southern Chad, and in the Republic of Congo have significantly impacted on the internal security of the CAR. Due to the permeability of the borders, there is unrestricted circulation of weapons in the country, while armed groups use the border areas as safe havens from where to organize and conduct their operations.

The rapid deterioration of the security situation is also linked to a steady erosion of the capacity of the national defense and security forces, both on the human level, but also equipment and infrastructures, due to continued mono-ethnic recruitment and repeated salary arrears. As a result, the army was greatly demoralized and became disorganized, leading to significant desertions (totaling some 1300 soldiers after the failed coup d'état of May 2001), but also to systematic recruitment of thousands of militia and other unconventional forces by the different actors the crises.

Several paramilitary groups of combatants (militia, rebels and other groups)¹ have therefore been -or are still- active in various parts of the country. Some members of these groups have broken their ties with their leadership, and constitute a major source of insecurity. They operate both in Bangui and in remote areas of the country, with a large number having become highway robbers (“*coupeurs de route*”). These multiple forms of insecurity translate into muggings, armed robbery, rapes, widespread looting, and hostage taking with ransom demands, throughout the country. The most palpable consequence of this high level of insecurity is the inability of CAR authorities to effectively launch and implement their emergency socio-economic recovery programs, especially in the rural areas.

Finding ways to reintegrate these groups of youth who are armed and without employment through sustainable economic activities, while confiscating and destroying their weapons, is thus critical to ensuring durable peace and the security for the population. The stability of the country will only be possible if this youth can be offered viable alternatives to making a living from their guns.

The Global Defense and DDR Policy Letter

The present CAR government has adhered without reservation to the technical and institutional eligibility criteria laid out by the MDRP. This translated into the submission to - and subsequent approval by- the World Bank and the MDRP, of a Global Defense and DDR Policy Letter. Said policy letter defines the peace and reconciliation process the CAR has engaged in, and addresses key security and defense issues, including the strategy for reforming and restructuring of the defense and security forces, as well as the disarmament, demobilization, and economic and social reintegration of some 7,500 ex-combatants.

Given the need to ensure that any decisions made in an area as sensitive as the restructuring of the armed forces had the consensus of all the main actors, the key elements of the Policy Letter were tabled, debated and validated at the National Dialogue. The Global Defense and DDR Policy Letter therefore proposes to reflect a national consensus in this vital area.

Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Community Support Special Program (ERCS)

Creating adequate security conditions throughout the country is a critical pre-requisite to address sustainable human sustainable development in CAR. Without security, all efforts aimed at consolidating democratic institutions, economical reforms and the fight against poverty will fail, as has been proven by the recurrence of political and institutional crises in the country over the past decade.

In line with the consensus reached at national level, the government seeks to initiate a new *integral* approach in the area national defense and security. The present program builds upon this strategy and will focus on four main areas, namely:

- ✓ the disarmament of ex-combatants and other individual who still constitute a serious threat to security and institutional stability;
- ✓ the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities;

¹ Ex-patriots, ex-USP, militia of an ethnic and/or regional nature (Karako, Balawa, Saraoui), elements involved in the events of May 2001, forces of Abdoulay Miskine and Paul Baril, congolese forces of J.P Bemba.

- ✓ the reinforcement of the capacities –and willingness- of the host communities to absorb these ex-combatants; and
- ✓ security enhancement support activities for the most vulnerable communities.

The integrated approach of the ERCS is coherent and consistent with the spirit and the letter of the Government's policy, and has the advantage of focusing attention on the larger issue of establishing links between the reintegration of individual ex-combatants and the broader security of the host communities, without which the sole focus on ex-combatants cannot be viable or sustainable

The present project will concentrate on the regions most affected by the recent crises - and that are still highly vulnerable to continued insecurity and prone to possible recurrence of conflict, and that are likely destinations for significant numbers of ex-combatants returnees, as well as internally displaced and refugee returnees. The Prefectures identified based on these criteria are Ouham Pende, Ouham, Kemo, Nana-Grébizi and the commune of Bangui.

Section II : Context and Problem analysis²

The economical and social context:

With a population of 3.8 million, comprising a majority of youth (50% of the population is under 18 of age) and notwithstanding the presence of significant natural resources (diamonds, gold, timber, uranium, cotton, coffee) the Central-African Republic has been experiencing a chronic economic crisis for the last ten years.

Ranked 154th place out of 174 countries on UNDP's Human Development Index in 1995, the CAR has occupied the 165th place since 1996. For the period 1990-2001, the growth rate was -0.3%. Negative economic growth appeared in 1992 (growth of -6%) in 1996 (-2.8%) and more recently in 2001 (-0.4%), all years of social and political turbulence brought about by 1992 general strikes, the 1996 army mutinies, and the failed Coups d'Etats of 2001 and 2002. GDP per capita is estimated at USD 263 dollars for year 2000, down from USD 514 in 1990, and showing 1.6 % annual erosion over the last 25 years (1975-2000).

The economy of the Central-African Republic is dominated by the primary sector, whose relative importance has been growing since 1990. With an average of 45% for the period 1990-1995, this sector came to represent 55% in 2001 at the detriment of the secondary sector (on average 21% between 1990-1995 against 15% in 2001) and the tertiary sector (33% during 1990-1995 against 30% in 2001). Notwithstanding the sent-up of a number of new dealerships, and the rise in the sales of high quality diamonds, CAR's mining sector revenues have stagnated over the last ten years.

The public financial management in the CAR is probably the major reason behind the social and political-military crisis that the country has known. Domestic tax revenue is currently estimated at less than 9% of GDP, the lowest in Central African Sub region. The GDP structure, heavily weighted in favor the primary sector (agriculture and livestock), is scantily taxed. During 1996-2001, the State's annual average revenues totaled 50 billion FCFA, against a public expenditure bill of 150 billion FCFA. The stock of debt consists of some 740 billion owed to external and internal creditors, plus arrears ranging from 40 to 60 billion FCFA, depending on the year. During the same period, external assistance accounted for between 85% and 90% of public investments, once again demonstrating CAR strong dependence on outside aid.

The disastrous economic situation has taken a heavy toll on the living conditions of the population. The 2000 Human Development Report estimates that 67% of Central Africans live below the poverty line. Based on available statistics for the 1995-2000 period it is currently estimated that about 45.32% of the population lives in absolute poverty. The 20% richest Central Africans possess 65% of the country's income with the poorest 20% sharing 2% of income. This is proof of the inequalities inherent in CAR's wealth distribution structures. Additionally, chronic governance failures have had serious consequences for the education and health systems, which are constantly paralyzed by strikes, due to irregular (or non) payment of salaries. In addition, the education and health sectors' equipment and

² The information in this section were resumed and consolidated from the following reference documents: General Policy and Economic and Social Restart Strategy Document (Government of Transition, July 2003); World Sustainable Human Development Report (UNDP, 2000); Central-African Republic 2004, Global Appeal Procedure (United Nations, 2003)

infrastructure have consistently worsened due to the weak budgetary allocation to these sectors.

Life expectancy at birth which was 43 years in the mid '70s, today stands at 44.3 years (an average gain of barely a year and a half in 25 years, in contrast with the average developing country gain of 10 years for the same period). Indeed, the under-five mortality rate dropped from 248 to 194 per 1.000, but the CAR remains the country with the highest maternal mortality rate at delivery (948 women per 100,000 live births).

Overall school enrolment rates have dropped sharply over the past 10 years. They dropped from 37% in 1994 to 24% in 1999, thus falling below their 1960 levels. This is clearly the result of several school years entirely lost on account of the conflict. Nearly 60% of children from the ages of 6 to 11 are in classes that do not correspond to their age group due to the insufficiency of schools in their regions and the lack of teachers in sufficient numbers, often forcing communities to resort to a system of "parent-teachers» to avoid having to close down schools.

The impact of the October 2002 events on households in the country is particularly dramatic. Day-to-day activities were brought to a sudden halt due to the fighting that went on for five months. Homes and property were consistently looted in many towns and villages; some families for their part abandoned their property and were forced to flee to the bushes. The revenue from the marketing of local goods dropped considerably, due to the lack of communication through the major roads leading to the capital.

The overall number of IDPs is currently estimated at about 20,000, while UNHCR puts the number of CAR refugees in Southern Chad at about 42,000. A progressive return of IDPs and refugees is anticipated, although it is necessary to do more in order to facilitate and accelerate such a return. The United Nations system issued a consolidated appeal in 2003 for 16,818,752 US Dollars to provide humanitarian assistance. The Appeal aims to target more than one million people, with a clear focus on those zones that have been the hardest hit by the conflict, and that remain highly vulnerable to other crises. It is necessary to ensure that the populations from the most affected areas increase their revenues, improve their access to food and to the basic social services (health, education, water and good sanitary conditions) in an equitable way. For all of these interventions to take place however, adequate security conditions are required.

Political-military context:

The democratic process in the CAR developed within a context that was marked by multiple socio-economic crises since 1996, regularly aggravated by political-military conflicts, of which the most significant dates are as follows:

- April 1996: army mutiny concerning the payment of salaries and the need for improved life conditions;
- May 1996: army mutiny in Bangui with soldiers surrounding the presidential palace;
- November 1996: army mutiny demanding the resignation of President Patassé;
- May 2001: General Kolingba attempted a Coup d'Etat

- October 2002: failed coup d'état by General Bozizé, Army Chief of Staff,
- March 2003: General Bozizé took over power

The efforts made by the United Nations and other regional and international bodies (MISAB, MINURCA, CEMAC, AU, BONUCA) during this period did not bring about the long hoped-for stability and security for the Central-African population. The most recent political and military conflict, that started on 25 October 2002 and lasted until 15 March 2003, was particularly violent and dramatic, resulting in the highest number of victims and the most widespread looting in the country's history. One of the consequences of this violence was the departure from Bangui of important bilateral and multilateral partners, further complicating the country's possibility to resume policy dialogue with external partners.

On the whole, the causes of the CAR situation as it is known today can be attributed to a wide range of factors including the concentration of national power and wealth in the hands of a minority, the erosion of confidence in State institutions, unsolved electoral issues, a stale and personalized political debate, the corrupt and non-transparent management of public funds, the erosion of social and cultural values, nepotism, the decision to involve external actors in the conflict, and a highly politicized army accustomed to Coups d'Etats as the only political alternative to policy disagreements. All these causes need to be taken into consideration to get a clearer understanding of the CAR situation today.

Analysis of the security situation

The security situation in the CAR must first be analyzed within a regional context. The country is situated in a region known for its chronic conflicts, especially over the last ten years. The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in Southern Sudan, in Southern Chad, and in the Republic of Congo have all significantly impacted on the internal security of the CAR. Among the various manifestations of this insecurity is the massive circulation of weapons, which has led to a serious deterioration in public security. This is further compounded by the permeability of the borders, and the consequent use of border zones by foreign armed groups as "safe havens" for military purposes.

A further negative impact of the regional dimension of the conflict has been the rapid deterioration of the capacity of the national defense and security forces, both in terms of human resources, and in equipment and infrastructures. In particular, the army (FACA) became completely disorganized and practically non-functional. This led to significant desertions (totaling some 1300 soldiers after the failed coup d'état of May 2001) but also to the recruitment of thousands of militia and other unconventional forces by different actors, especially during the last crisis.

Apart from the remnants of the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA)* diverse forms of armed groups can be thus identified today in the CAR. These include paramilitary groups of combatants (militia, rebels or other groups³) that were, or are still active, in various parts of CAR territory. Certain elements of these diverse groups have broken their ties with their former command, and now constitute a major source of insecurity. They operate both in the

³ Ex-patriots, ex-USP, militia of an ethnic and/or regional nature (Karako, Balawa, Saraoui), elements implicated in the event of May 2001, forced re-grouping around Abdoulay Miskine and Paul Baril, congolese forces of M. Bemba.

capital as well as in the remote regions of the country, with a significant percentage of them operating as highway armed robbers (*coupeurs de route*). These multiple forms of insecurity translate into muggings, armed robbery, rapes, widespread looting, and hostage taking with ransom demands, etc. The most palpable consequence of this high level of insecurity is the inability of CAR authorities to effectively launch and implement their emergency socio-economic recovery program, especially in the rural areas.

The Transition

The political landscape in the CAR has evolved significantly since 15 March 2003. Upon taking power, the new regime suspended the constitution, replacing it with a transitional constitutional framework. For its part, the National Assembly was replaced by a National Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition) while a government of national consensus was appointed and charged with managing a political transition period based on dialogue, political consensus and national reconciliation. The Government's roadmap for the transition period aims to:

- Strengthen the foundations for democracy and consolidate security (return to constitutional rule, organize council, legislative and presidential elections, consolidate social peace and national reconciliation, disarm ex-combatants, restructure the armed forces, and put in place an ethical and competent public administration).
- Strengthen public finance (broaden the public revenue base, improve the efficiency of economic and financial institutions, combat fraud and corruption, and resume policy and resource mobilization dialogue with the Bretton Woods Institutions).
- Revamp production and strengthen the role of the private sector in such key strategic sectors as agriculture and livestock, mining and transport infrastructure.
- Improve access of the population to basic social services.

The overriding goal of this roadmap is to bring CAR out of its current emergency situation, mobilize national actors and partners, and resume policy and resource mobilization dialogue with the international community.

Certain measures taken recently by the Government were seen as encouraging and likely to contribute to a successful political transition. These include: the disarmament of undisciplined militia, the implementation of a night curfew in Bangui, the regular payment of salaries for a number of months, the adoption of a Plan of Action to stabilize public finances, and the Head of State's continued consultations with all political, economic and social actors at national level. The National Dialogue that was held from the 6th October to the 27 November 2003 brought together 350 representatives of political parties, unions, religious denominations, local authorities and civil society organizations and was seen as a significant step towards a peaceful and consensual resolution of CAR's recurring and chronic crises.

The new authorities have also put in place a policy of direct engagement, transparency and reconciliation with neighboring countries, and with regional and multilateral institutions of which it is a member. Thanks to the government's intense diplomatic efforts, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) has been at the forefront of sub-regional initiatives to help restore peace and stability to the CAR. At their April 2003 session, CEMAC Heads of State revised the mandate of the CEMAC force that had initially been brought in to protect the president and patrol the Northern border with Chad. CEMAC also

made available a grant of 5 billion CFA francs as their contribution towards reconstruction effort. For its part, France provided the Finance Ministry with four experts in economic management, while the new government initiated dialogue with the African Union. Finally, the European Union put in place a process of dialogue with the government within the framework of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Accords.

The Government's Global Defense and DDR Policy:

The new authorities have also reaffirmed their commitment to participate fully in the ongoing peace and stability efforts in the Central Africa and Great Lakes sub-region. They have thus committed themselves, without reservation, to comply with the technical and institutional eligibility criteria laid out by the MDRP. This has translated into the submission to -and subsequent approval by- the World Bank and MDRP, of a Global Defense and DDR Policy Letter. Said policy letter defines the peace and reconciliation process the CAR has engaged in, and addresses key security and defense issues, including the strategy for reforming and restructuring of the defense and security forces, as well as the disarmament, demobilization, and economic and social reintegration of some 7,500 ex-combatants.

Given the need to ensure that any decisions made in an area as sensitive as the restructuring of the armed forces had the consensus of all the main actors, the key elements of the Policy Letter were tabled, debated and validated at the National Dialogue. The Global Defense and DDR Policy Letter therefore proposes to reflect a national consensus in this vital area.

Security Sector Reform⁴

Individual frustrations and structural and technical shortcomings within the army and security forces have been greatly contributed to the recurrent crises in the Central African Republic. In order to address these issues in a realistic and integrated manner, the DDR Policy Letter adopts a « Global Defense » approach based on an integrated vision of defense and security issues as tools in the consolidation of national sovereignty. This concept was debated and further clarified at the National Dialogue. It encompasses the whole range of political, social and economic issues underlying military and civil defense. It reflects, not only the necessity to take into account the questions of defense and security in an integrated manner, but also the importance of ensuring that these questions are rooted in a recognition of the need to ensure good governance on all levels.

The proposed plan to reform the defense and security forces (DSF) is thus based on an exhaustive consensus, an evaluation of technical capacities, personal preferences, and the identification of special categories of personnel (those living with HIV/AIDS, handicapped personnel, female soldiers, and retiring soldiers), plus the assessment of technical support needs. The formulation and urgent implementation of this reform plan constitute a prerequisite to addressing all other issues in the field of security in the CAR.

This reform plan foresees the redeployment of the FACA, the training of the officer corps, the recruitment and training of new police and "gendarmes", and the creation of new police stations and prisons. In terms of human resources, this reform plan has the following objectives:

⁴ The information in this section have been extracted from the "Political Letter concerning Global Defense and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, especially of the ex-combatants", sated 5th November 2003 by the Government of Transition

	FACA	Civil Police	Police	Total
2010 Objectives	6,000	4,000	4,085	14,085
Current numbers as of 30/09/03	4,442	1,310	1,600	7,352
Numbers to be trained	1,800	600	600	3,000
Numbers to be demobilized	1,185	306	310	1,801
Recruitment needs	2,500	2,000	2,500	7,0000

Due to insufficient funds, the implementation of this Plan of Action has been fairly slow. The CEMAC force supports the reforms in the area of internal security and lends significant logistical support, while France has been providing vital technical, financial and material assistance through, among other things, the appointment of Military Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and training and equipping of the FACA and the police. This training is targeted at three battalions (1.950 men) for the FACA, a mobile police intervention group, a squadron of civil police, and 45 territorial brigades.

Regarding the non-formal ex-combatant groups, the Governments' Policy Letter envisages the following actions:

Armed Groups	Number of identified soldiers	Soldiers already reintegrated in the FDS	Other soldiers that could be retained for the FDS	DD&R
Ex « Patriots »	1,640	540	150	950
Ex USP	1,345	345	-	1,000
Security Companies SPCS	850	-	-	850
Parallel police	820	-	-	820
Karako Militia	593	-	-	593
Balawa Militia	510	-	-	510
Saraoui Militia	600	-	-	600
Soldiers accused of implication in the May 2001 attempted coup	2,400	408	-	1,992
Identified foreign forces	250	-	-	250
Total	9,308	1,293	150	7,565

National Security Enhancement Strategy

Although security can generally be said to have improved thanks to the presence of the CEMAC force and the support it receives from France, much still remains to be accomplished to achieve significant results in terms of sustainable reduction of insecurity. Murders, rapes, hold-ups, thefts and violent crime in large numbers, are as numerous in Bangui as in the interior of the country. The authorities do not as yet have the resources to ensure proper protection of people and property. Worse still, there have been rumors of incursions by armed groups, requiring appropriate measures.

Many young ex-militia are afraid of returning to their communities of origin, and are finding it difficult to adapt to the end of hostilities since the fighting was their only lucrative activity. Otherwise, they are burdened by a feeling of guilt and lack any social capacity to quickly

adapt to life in the target communities. Lots of economic difficulties await them on their return, and they have no technical skills or work experience to help them settle down economically. Once back home in their communities, they also have to face the distrust of other community members who hold them responsible for past fighting and violence against the civilian population. It is against this background that rumors continue to abound on the violent behavior of ex-militia and other combatants, as well as current members of the security forces.

To reintegrate the jobless youth who are armed, through economic activities, and at the same time collect and destroy their weapons, are a priority for establishing peace and security among the population. The stability of the country is only possible if these youth develop the means to live autonomously, peacefully and sustainably, and their respective host communities accept them. The same applies to those identified for demobilization from the FACA, who will need support to accomplish their economic and social reintegration, to ensure that they do not once again become a source of added insecurity for the country.

The establishment of appropriate security conditions throughout the country is therefore a prerequisite for any subsequent initiatives aimed at strengthening human development in the CAR. As successive past crises have shown, without security, all efforts to consolidate democratic institutions, undertake economical reform and fight poverty will remain vain. It is thus with this in mind that the Government has decided, with initial accord of the MDRP and its Secretariat regarding the objectives set out in its Policy Letter, to formulate the present Special Project for Ex-combatant Reintegration and Community Support (ERCS). The project has been formulated as an integrated strategy that brings together the processes of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants (DD&R), with support for the strengthening of absorption capacities and for security enhancement in recipient communities. The project has four main components:

- ✓ the disarmament of ex-combatants and other individual who still constitute a serious threat to security and institutional stability;
- ✓ the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities;
- ✓ the reinforcement of the capacities –and willingness- of the host communities to absorb these ex-combatants; and
- ✓ security enhancement support activities for the most vulnerable communities

This integrated approach is coherent and consistent with the government's policy of global defense, and has the added advantage of addressing the larger and unavoidable need to establish links between the individual reintegration of ex-combatants and the most important and basic needs of the host committees with regard to security. This vision of DDR can help ensure the sustainable integration of ex-combatants, while facilitating the resettlement and reintegration of other displaced populations that have suffered from the conflict. On the other hand, this approach also helps overcome the apparent contradiction between support to the individual reintegration of ex-combatants at the expense of the numerous basic security needs of host populations. The approach allows each citizen to assume direct responsibility of the resolution of issues touching upon their own security.

It is with this objective that the United Nations Development Programme was approached by the Transitional Government of the CAR, to assist the latter in the formulation and implementation of the above programme, with financial assistance from the MDRP. The

project has been formulated along the lines established by the MDRP for the presentation of “Special Projects”.

Section III. Objectives, Beneficiaries and Areas of Intervention

III. 1) Objective and Results

The overall *objective* of the ERCS is to contribute to the efforts undertaken in the CAR regarding defense and security, and of the disarmament, demobilization, and the social and economic reinsertion of ex-combatants in their host or home communities thereby contributing to stability in Bangui and in rural areas.

The *expected results* of the project are as follows:

- A maximum of 7,565 ex-combatants will be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in a sustainable manner in the economic and social life of their home or host communities;
- The capacities of the communities receiving the largest number of ex-combatants will be enhanced in order to ensure the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Projects improving the security conditions and the capacities for conflict prevention and conflict resolution will be implemented in, and by, the communities that are the most vulnerable from the security view point;

III.2 Beneficiaries

The direct and indirect *beneficiaries* of the project will be:

- A maximum of 7,565 ex-combatants;
- Some 42,000 members of their families;
- The communities identified on a priority basis in the prefectorates of Ouham, Ouham Pende, Kémo, Nana Grébizi and in Bangui, and that will be strengthened to ensure the sustainable reintegration of the ex-combattants.
- The overall population in the targeted prefectorates and communities estimated to be 1,675,912⁵, that will find improved security conditions allowing the restart of their economical, social and cultural activities.

1) ⁵ The total population residing in these areas as estimated by the United Nations in 2003 is as follows:

- Bangui : 759,177 inhabitants
- Kémo: 103,406 inhabitants
- Nana Grébizi: 119,086 inhabitants
- Ouham: 323,230 inhabitants
- Ouham Pende: 381,013 inhabitants

Section IV. Intervention Strategy and Work Plan

The ERCS proposes a new *integrated* methodological approach in providing support to the reinforcement of security from a development perspective. The strategy adopted by the ERCS will enable the establishment of clear links between a personalized reintegration programme for demobilized personnel and their families on one hand and the entire security, reconciliation and recovery issues of the communities on the other hand.

Regarding the *disarmament of ex-combatants and the reduction in SALW*, the elements of the strategy are as follows:

- The availability of weapons is without any doubt, an aggravating factor in the eruption of violent conflict. The fact that weapons are used is clear proof of the presence of an individual ready to use one. Thus, the best approach to the issues of disarmament and the reintegration of ex-combatants consists of adopting *a strategy that links the collection and destruction of weapons to a socio-economic reintegration programme*. In the specific case of the CAR, this combined approach will be effective and efficient in neutralizing the presence and violent use of weapons.
- To avoid the buy-back of weapons (which only promotes the expansion of a weapons black market) and recognizing that simply voluntary disarmament can only produce very limited results, the programme will give priority to supporting the socio-economic reintegration of those who have given up the most weapons in good working condition.
- The disarmament of civilians should result from the process of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and the joint improvement of security put in place by the communities. Disarmament will be encouraged to ensure the progressive restoration of a climate of trust between the security forces and the civilian population. This will be done according to a plan of exchange of « weapons for community development » targeted at individuals that the communities will identify as priority cases.⁶

Regarding the *demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants*, and the *support to communities to enhance absorption capacity* the main elements of the strategy are as follows:

- The targeting of ex-combatants must be seen as an unavoidable investment in the process of creating basic security conditions for all Central Africans. The assistance given to ex-combatants and their families through this program must not be seen as an entitlement, or an earned right or reward. On the contrary, it is important that the program is fully understood to be a tool that aims to stabilize the situation, by providing support to the demobilization of ex-combatants by facilitating the socio-economic reinsertion of those who still have the capacity and potential to block the process of security, peace and reconciliation, simply because they are unable to find a job and a stable source of revenue.

⁶ This disarmament strategy follows the framework of the recommendations of the ECHA, DD&R Working group, July 2000. It is also compliant and consistent with the orientations of the OCDE DAC in the subject of – conflict, the Brookings process, and “the role of the United Nations Peace Keeping in DD&R” presented by the Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly in February 2000. (S/2002/101)

- The selection of direct beneficiaries of the program will be based on the final list of ex-combatants to be demobilized, drawn up with the consensus of all parties involved. The lists will be drafted and agreed upon in a consensual manner by the authorities that directly responsible for the program. The communities of origin or the host communities of the ex-combatants will then validate them.
- To guarantee the sustainability of the process, the economic and social reintegration of the ex-combatants will be based, first and foremost, on the results of market research carried out in targeted areas to identify viable economic options for the beneficiaries, in context that is seriously constrained in this regard.
- The programme will support the creation of (self)employment, and the creation of family production units and/or micro-enterprises in vital sectors of the economy, such as, agriculture (including livestock and fishing) mining, as well as outsourcing services with the respective public institutions involved in areas such as road construction and maintenance, water and electricity distribution, waste management, security in public places, etc.
- It is important to avoid groupings of ex-combatants as much as possible, for the reintegration process. In effect, ensuring the sustainability of the demobilization process requires the independence of the ex-combatants vis-à-vis their former commanders, which implies the dismantling of the hierarchy and the structure of the groups concerned. It is therefore proposed that ex-combatants organize in groups of at most five ex-combatants in order to benefit from assistance for the creation of small businesses. The general rule should be that “groups are formed because of a project, and not that projects are created to suit an existing group”.
- In any case, the beneficiaries will receive personalized support and individual follow-up to ensure the highest degree of success in reintegrating initiatives.
- On the other hand, experience shows that there are important benefits in including *the families* of the ex-combatants in the identification and implementation of reintegration activities. The spouses of ex-combatants will have a crucial role to play in this reintegration process⁷.
- The reintegration projects will be financed in stages to allow for better monitoring and evaluation of how the activities are progressing. In any case, the non-respect of commitments made by ex-combatants will result in the immediate suspension of assistance until an investigation on the improvement of the situation can be done.
- There is certainly some perception of injustice (rewarding lawlessness and violence) on the part of the host communities that will view the support given to ex-combatants as a reward to people known to have perpetrated violence against peaceful citizens. This perception requires that during the design of the intervention itself (definition of criteria, modalities of intervention and implementation) the ultimate aim be the creation of an environment that allows the entire population of the host community to see itself as the ultimate and principal beneficiary of the reintegration process.

⁷ See the evaluations of the programme UNDP/IMO in RC, and the programme UNDP/GTZ in Somaliland.

- Reintegration support activities for ex-combatants will thus be closely articulated with initiatives (or micro-projects) aimed at creating an *enabling environment for rehabilitation, recovery and local reconciliation* for the benefit of the entire population. Over and beyond the reintegration of individual ex-combatants therefore, these activities will also seek to rebuild and strengthen social ties within the host communities whilst ensuring adequate security conditions for recovery and development⁸.

With regard to the *community security* component of the project, the elements of the strategy are the following:

- Local civil society organizations and the local administrations will receive technical, logistical and operational support to diagnose, prioritize, plan and execute jointly, activities that will contribute the most to restoring security in the targeted communities. The nature of such interventions will be determined by the specific milieu, rural or urban, in which they will be implemented. They could consist of projects to support and strengthen reconciliation and dialogue, facilitate exchange between the defence forces and the population on local solutions to local security problems, increase youth involvement in community activities and services, improve communication between the authorities and the population, set up early warning and surveillance systems to improve security incident reporting, offset up conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, train local actors in human rights and civic behavior, et..

The strategy will be implemented at three different levels:

- 1) At host community level, by reinforcing the participatory mechanisms of *ownership*, of *problem identification and joint decision making* including all local actors on all issues of prioritization and resource allocation;
- 2) At the Prefecture level, by reinforcing local capacities for *planning and inter-sectoral coordination*, resource mobilization; and developing local funding mechanisms;
- 3) At the central level, by facilitating frameworks for dialogue and systemization of decision-making and orientation, and stronger coordination and articulation with complementary initiatives developed at the national level in the areas of security and recovery.

This strategy will ensure balance and coherence between the reintegration of demobilized combatants, and that of other groups affected by the conflict. It will also allow for an effective coordination of the international community's response to the needs of the communities that have a high concentration of demobilized and displaced persons. by ensuring proper synergy between the activities of the ERCS with those of other national and international partners such as the Micro-project interventions of the European Union, the UNHCR Quick Impact Projects (QIP), and initiatives in the area of security sector reform

⁸ Each intervention on the support of the ex-combatants will also take into account the possibility of extending the benefits to the whole community: for example, actions to open up the community to outside markets and exchanges in order to make agricultural micro-projects more viable, the generalization of access to training within the framework of training support for ex-combatants, as well as the possibility of implementing micro-finance services which, beyond supporting the reintegration of the ex-combatants, could benefit other community members.

supported by France, etc. This strategy should moreover, allow for the identification of the *bottlenecks and risks of duplication* in the implementation of these diverse initiatives, and should facilitate the *joint evaluation* of different projects as well as provide the flexibility needed to undertake eventual adjustments.

To implement this strategy in all its dimensions and at the three anticipated levels, and taking into account the sensitive nature of the problem as well as the logistical constraints posed by the sheer scope of looting and destruction, the program will initially operate through Project Execution Units (PEU) based in the following sites:

- Bangui
- Bossangoa covering the Prefecture of Ouham
- Bozoum covering the Prefecture of Ouham Pende
- Sibut covering the Prefectures of Kémo and Nana Grébizi

If additional funding is obtained, the programme could then be extended to Bangassou to cover the Prefecture of Mbomou and the East of the country.

IV.2) Work plan

IV.2.1.) Disarmament

The disarmament component will cover the following activities:

- Preparation and approval of the lists of persons to be disarmed
- Rendez-vous at assembly areas for disarmament
- Registration of person disarming and of weapons turned in.
- Stockpiling of collected weapons under program control
- Public destruction ceremonies at regular intervals.
- Preparation for a national plan of action regarding SALW proliferation reduction, and implementation of initial phase of community arms collection.

IV.2.2) Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

The program's DD strategy will target individuals and their families and will be guided by the host communities and will include the following activities:

- Sensitization and information of the beneficiaries – communities and ex-combatants - regarding the program;
- Identification and registration of ex-combatants;
- Advice on reintegration options, individually and with the family, when possible, and evaluation of reintegration micro-project;
- Contracting and funding of reintegration micro-projects;
- Monitoring, technical assistance and supervision of micro-projects;
- Establishment of links with the local technical and financial services to ensure the sustainability of reintegration activities.

IV.2.3) Support to enhance absorption capacity of host communities

The implementation of this component will incorporate the following activities:

- Each ex-combatant shall receive a *reintegration voucher*, to be presented to the corresponding Prefectural Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration (PCDR);
- Once the ex-combatant has returned and resettled in the selected community the local PCDR shall make available to each community the amount of funds equivalent to the number of vouchers collected;
- Through a local consultative process, the appropriate absorption capacity enhancement activities will be designed and carried out with these funds, through micro-projects aimed at creating an *enabling environment for rehabilitation, recovery and local reconciliation* for the benefit of the entire population.

IV.2.4) Support to the re-establishment of security in communities most affected by the conflict and most concerned by returning IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants

The implementation of the *security for development* component will be based upon a participatory, consensual and inclusive approach and will incorporate the following activities:

- Establishment of conditions to improve security at the local level by the implementation of a *local consultative process* concerning the priority security problems of the communities and the definition of how to best address them;
- Implementation of *early warning systems* and security incident surveillance mechanisms;
- Re-establishment of a climate of trust between the population and the security forces. This will require information and training of the different actors to enable them to jointly analyze the mutual benefits accruing from trust and effective cooperation between the population and the forces of law and order. The *specific activities* of this component could include, for example: i) civic training for the police and gendarmerie; ii) joint information exchange sessions between security officials and local community leaders, in particular on the functioning of local *self-defense committees*; iii) sensitization campaigns on the benefits of a responsible partnership on security at the local level and the responsibilities of each actor in this area.
- The involvement of youth in their communities, and support to youth initiatives in areas such as: culture, sport and leisure, counselling, training opportunities for high-risk categories of youth, etc.
- Support to the re-establishment of local access to justice. This could take on different forms, either by enabling the physical reinstallation of regional and/or local legal representatives, or by the promotion of alternative systems of *dispute and/or litigation resolution* – restitution of stolen goods and property, compensation for damages, violence, etc. Mechanisms such as *local conciliation offices* could be put in place as part of overall efforts to grant access to formal legal services for those least able to afford it.

- Support to local *reconciliation* initiatives and the promotion of a *culture of peace and conviviality*.

Section V. Monitoring and Evaluation

One of the first activities to be undertaken within the framework of the ERCS will be to establish, in consultation with the directly concerned partners, and in an inclusive and consensual manner, quantitative and qualitative criteria that will form the basis for the monitoring system. These will consist of:

- Criteria for the selection of ex-combatants that will be short-listed in the final list of the ERCS;
- Socio-economic and family-related criteria that will guide the selection of ex-combatants who could benefit from reintegration assistance;
- Economic criteria to determine the amount and duration of payment of transportation allowances to enable the return of ex-combatants to their home or host communities;
- Criteria to identify the socio-economic reintegration activities that could best benefit ex-combatants in a sustainable manner, as well as the financial value of micro-projects to be allocated to each reintegration activity.
- Criteria to ensure successful reintegration of ex-combatants at the social and economic levels.
- Criteria for the selection of the most vulnerable communities in terms of security and likelihood of receiving high numbers of ex-combatants, refugees and displaced persons;
- Criteria for the selection of micro-projects that will most benefit communities in terms of improving security,
- Criteria for monitoring the improvement of security in the target communities;

A database will be created for individual, socio-economic, family- and community-oriented criteria, defined by consensus, and organized by community and by geographical region. These criteria and indicators will then be systematized and consolidated at the national and regional levels.

The detailed sequence of activities to be undertaken will be defined in such a way as to ensure that both the demobilization/reintegration and the community components of the program can mutually reinforce each other. This detailed sequence of interventions to be undertaken will result in a plan of operation that will be reviewed every three months. The plan will be based on objective indicators that are flexible enough to allow for adjustments, and will provide for the monitoring of progress made during the previous period. These adjustments will be systematically explained and will form an integral part of the progress reports that will be submitted every three months to the MDRP Secretariat by UNDP in its capacity as executor

of the project, including a report on the progress accomplished during the previous period. The UNDP/BCPR will provide technical support for the elaboration of the monitoring system and will perform monitoring missions every three months, especially during the initial phases of mobilization and project start-up

The project will also be subjected to a technical review at least once a year. Representatives of the Government, local actors, the MDRP, concerned donors and UNDP will undertake this technical review jointly. The first review will take place six months after the actual start-up of the project. This first review will have as a principal objective, to review the activities undertaken before and since the commencement of the project, to adjust the timeframe, and to review the efficiency of the monitoring system and the general allocation of resources. The review will issue a progress report that will also analyze the general context in which the project is executed. This report will be submitted to all partners at least 10 days in advance of a monitoring meeting of the partners.

As the estimated duration of the project is 36 months, an independent evaluation will be undertaken after 18 months of actual execution. A final independent evaluation will also be performed and the report of this final evaluation will constitute the final document that will be examined during the final review of the project. The dates of the review meeting will fix in close consultation with all partners.

The submission of financial reports will follow the procedures established by the World Bank for disbursements within the framework of the MDRP. If the duration of the project exceeds 18 months, financial audits will be performed annually. These financial audits will be financed from the ERCS budget and will be performed according to the present procedures agreed by the World Bank and the Agencies of the United Nations. The financial audit reports will be submitted when finalized, but within a maximum deadline of six months after the end of the financial year in which the audit was performed.

A budget provision was reserved in the budget to ensure that the monitoring, evaluation and audit of the project is done in an efficient and regular manner.

Section VI. Institutional Capacity of the Recipient Institution

The joint supervisory mission of the MDRP, which took place from 28 September to 01 October 2003, recommended that the DDR initiative the CAR be placed under the responsibility of the UNDP and in the form of a special project⁹.

All information concerning UNDP, its objectives, its structure, its operations by sector and by region, its administrative and financial systems can be found at www.undp.org. UNDP has been engaged in continuous cooperation with the CAR for several decades. Its office in Bangui placed under the authority of a Resident Representative who is also the Resident Coordinator of operational activities of the United Nations system for development.

Since 2002, the UNDP office in Bangui has benefited from the technical and financial support of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), and more specifically its Small Arms and Recovery Section. UNDP, Bangui also benefits from the technical support of the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS). At corporate level, UNDP has also accumulated vast experience over the past decade in the field of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants with successful experiences in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Mali, Niger, and in more than 65 other countries in crises. The experience accumulated in the area of disarmament and reintegration in the CAR over the last five years, constitutes today, a comparative advantage in assisting the country. The technical knowledge and the positive and negative lessons learnt have been assimilated and integrated into the design and methodology of the ERCS.

Execution modalities

The ERCS will be implemented by UNDP according to its Direct Execution modality under the authority of the UNDP Resident Representative. The modules of the project will be implemented through sub-contracts with local or international NGOs or other relevant execution agencies including UNOPS, as an associated Agency in the execution of the program. The traditional requirements concerning the Terms of Reference (TOR) for sub-contracts are not applied to the project approach. The required flexibility and the participatory approach exclude the pre-definition of systematic TORs for all sub-contracts. Therefore, the TOR of each sub-contract are linked specifically to each project in the framework of annual operational plans. This approach is consistent with the strategy of the program, its efficiency and the sustainability of the proposed activities.

Substantial amounts have been allocated to certain key components. In general, the individual sub-contracts will be small and implemented by the public or private contractors, NGOs, religious entities, local or national contractors. The only exception would be for some contracts that require, according to procedure, international invitations to bid. This method of execution brings added value to the program concerning the reinforcement of local capacities, and can also inject capital in the local economy.

The project will be executed in close coordination with the MDRP in order to harmonize the technical criteria and implementation. Appropriate mechanisms and procedures of

⁹ Joint Supervision Mission Report, 27 September – 15 October 2003 (MDRP Secretariat, The World Bank Africa Region, page 43)

coordination between the project and the MDRP will be elaborated and adopted in coordination with the partners of the MDRP, from the start of the project activities.

The implementation partners

At the national level

A *National Commission of Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDR)* will be the principal national counterpart of the special project. The NCDR will be the main interlocutor in defining the overall orientations of the project. The NCDR will:

- Validate the criteria and procedures of the project
- Analyze and approve the work plans,
- ensure conducive implementation conditions,
- ensure articulation and coordination with other initiatives that could have a direct impact on the smooth implementation of the ERCS,
- co-approve the progress reports as well as any recommendations for project revision; and
- mobilize other national and international resources according to the needs.

The Commission will also facilitate :

- i) The harmonization of the approach and strategy of the ERCS with other program/projects/initiatives in the areas of defense; reintegration, and community recovery ;
- ii) The geographical distribution of the interventions according to the criteria of the « zones of concentration » of ex-combatants;
- iii) The optimization of human, available technical and financial resources ;
- iv) The circulation of information to avoid duplication and to allow for a consensual resolution of problems ;
- v) The links of the project with the MDRP and the CEMAC

The precise composition of the NCDR will be defined at a later stage, but could include the technical ministries directly involved in DDR issues such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Communication and National Reconciliation, the Ministry of the Family and National Solidarity, the Ministry of the Interior, as well as representatives of religious denominations, Chambers of commerce, agriculture an industry, human rights defense organizations, women's Organizations, other civil society organizations, and representatives of the demobilized themselves. The representatives of the MDRP, of the CEMAC, of the European Union and France would be called upon to participate on a consultative basis.

Interventions at the level of the Prefectures

Prefectoral Commissions for Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants (PCDR) will be created at the level of Prefectures and mandated to ensure the coordination and the participation of local individuals by supporting the process of reintegration of the demobilized combatants as well as other project activities. The mandates of the regional Commissions will be inter-sectoral, (incorporating local civil society Organizations, and women's groups, human rights and traditional cultural organizations, as well as local security organizations) would be placed under the authority of a Prefect. The international organizations that have ongoing operations in the Prefectures concerned would be called upon to participate in the work and deliberations of the Commission on a consultative basis.

This mechanism will bring together in one forum , local authorities, the representatives of the different technical services and representatives of civil society organizations in order to develop a capacity for dialogue between different contributors in the same field, and to generate consensus around a common assessment of priority needs in matters of security and the urgent investments required. The implementation of this mechanism is part of a process of strengthening responsibility, accountability and local ownership.

The PCDRs will benefit from the technical support of the project to strengthen their capacity to formulate, implement and manage their own project initiatives and resources, as well as those provided by international partners. They will, among other things be responsible for :

- Coordinating the definition of the strategic reintegration orientation and priorities with specific regard to the restoration of security for development at the Prefectural Level;
- Enable the DDR institutionalization process and facilitate the participation of representatives of Government and civil society organizations and institutions in the reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Ensure, with the technical assistance of the project, the coordination of the project at Prefectural level ;
- Ensure the integration of all other DDR-related activities linked to the establishment of a climate of security for development at the Prefectural level :

At the local level

Committees similar to those at Prefectural level will be created to help identify related urgent activities at their level (sub-divisions, communes, villages, etc), depending on strategic planning and programming needs.

The structure of program execution


Through consensual participation of all actors, partners and stakeholders in all phases of the project, project execution will seek to progressively develop a sense of responsibility and ownership of project activities by the host communities, as well as reinforce the planning and management capacities of the local authorities.

In order to succeed, it is necessary to create a reduced, flexible and effective technical assistance structure. At the central level, under the direct supervision of the UNDP Representative, a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) will be in charge of managing the

implementation of project activities at the national level, and for supervising the Project Execution Units (PEU), based in Bangui and in the Prefectures of intervention. He/she will also be responsible for ensuring the consistency and coherence of the approach and for the entire implementation process in all administrative divisions targeted by the ERCS.

In each targeted Prefecture, a PEU, under the management of a coordinator, will be responsible for implementing, monitoring and supervising program activities for the Prefecture. These activities, which will be identified jointly with local partners and stakeholders in a consensual manner, will be presented in a quarterly workplan. Community agents, assigned to strategic village/community groups will ensure the monitoring of the daily supervision of program activities at this level. Each PEU will supervise community agents.

**Diagramme
 Implementation arrangements**



Section VII. Feasibility and sustainability of the project

The ERCS will conform to the protection policies established by the World Bank that aim to reduce the negative impact risks of the interventions that they finance in the areas of population and the environment. The ERCS will concentrate particularly on ensuring that infrastructure reconstruction, and agricultural development projects do not contain measures that could negatively affect the natural heritage and the bio-diversity of the CAR. The ERCS will request that analysis regarding the social and environmental impact of these interventions be made and reviewed before accepting these projects.

On the other hand, the ERCS will be very careful not to include in its programming and operational plans, measures that could alienate different segments of the population and exacerbate the resentments or perceptions felt. The ERCS will be particularly careful in its understanding and consideration of the resentments and grievances that were manifested during the different crises that the country has known between different population groups on

a tribal, religious or other basis. That is why the ERCS attaches the utmost importance to the setting up of inclusive local mechanisms of all concerned stakeholders, independently of their social, religious or tribal status, and will facilitate the processes of local reconciliation and consensus-building. The lead-time for re-establishing trust and building consensus regarding the decision-making process will be fully integrated in the preparation of the work plans and operations of the project.

The participation of the communities will be equally essential to ensure the transparency and sustainability of the DDR process in particular. In effect, in determining the assistance that will be given on an individual basis to the ex-combatants, great care will be taken not to exacerbate the economic disparities between the ex-combatants and the populations that have been victims of violence, destruction and extortion of all kinds. This is particularly important as no direct aid will be given on an individual basis to the community unless through community projects that will be chosen on the basis of their potential to contribute to the security of the entire local population. Consequently, reasonable measures need to be taken concerning the grants given to the ex-combatants and the average incomes of the inhabitants of home or host communities, in order to discourage any objective discrimination over and above the basic goal of successful and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. It will be essential to ensure transparency and consistency in the consultations being undertaken and the decisions to be made to ensure adequate information of all stakeholders.

The participation of women and family members of the ex-combatants in particular, will be determined in several ways. On the one hand, women are spouses, sisters, mothers of the ex-combatants and their participation from the start in the decision-making process could serve as a guarantee for the effective reintegration of their spouse, brother or son. On the other hand, we must accept that women are often recorded as the first victims of security incidents in their homes, as they go about their daily chores. They are very involved in community life and will have a predominant role in the identification and the implementation of concrete and practical solutions to improve security.

Finally, the local inclusive participation mechanisms that will be put in place will be important instruments to identify the interventions that will be financed by the ERCS, on the basis of the actual local absorptive capacity, and capacity to contribution in terms of effort and commitment and thus ensure ownership and sustainability.

Section VIII. Risks and Risks Mitigation

- Unreliability and irrelevance of the final lists ex-combatants for reintegration: In order to ensure the reliability of the final lists of ex-combatants for the ERCS, a consensual approach will be used in order to obtain the backing of all concerned military, paramilitary and informal groups. Furthermore, the final lists will have to include the place of origin of the ex-combatants and will then be authenticated by their community of origin and presented to the local participatory structures to be validated.
- Delay in the restructuring of the Defense Forces : The restructuring, equipment, training, and re-deployment of the Defense Forces is progressing with the help of France and the CEMAC contingent. The success of these efforts is an essential condition to ensure an enabling environment for the ERCS. The ERCS will establish working and consultative relations with the French authorities and the CEMAC to ensure the adequate and

complimentary interventions in conjunction with the restructuring of the Defense Forces, as supported by France and the CREPAC.

- Coordination of the electoral timetable: The electoral dates in the CAR coincide with the demobilization calendar. Given the influence that these two processes can have on each other, to the detriment of their successful implementation, a close interactive dialogue with the concerned actors will be put in place to ensure the positive outcome of these two processes.
- Delay in the availability of financial resources : the availability of financial resources constitutes a key factor for the success of the ERCS. To avoid delaying the start of the intervention, and to ensure a coherent and consistent start-up after the acceptance of the interventions of the MDRP, the UNDP will advance limited resources to be recovered once disbursements of MDRP funds starts. These funds could be allocated as soon as the written financial agreement of the special project is received from the World Bank.
- Credibility of the approach : it is essential that recovery and development interventions rapidly follow the initial interventions that are supported by the ERCS in the area of community security. To this end, the ERCS will establish working relations with initiatives funded by the key donors in the CAR, and in particular the European Union and France, to support adequate coordination of interventions regarding recovery activities in the target communities of the ERCS where the security conditions are certified to have started improving.
- Transparency of the process : Given the delicate character of the intervention and the risks of pressure to which the members of the project team will be subjected, the ERCS will take all necessary steps to strengthen consultation, consensus-building and participatory decision-making involving the concerned communities. More specifically, the ERCS will put in place systems of internal control that will allow efficient and transparent tracking of commitments made by all concerned actors in the process (including individual consultation systems for ex-combatants and the production of an unfalsifiable registration card, the systematic recording of weapons collected from ex-combatants and weapons destroyed at regular intervals, etc...)
- Exchange rate fluctuations: the current strong fluctuations in the exchange rate between USD and Euros can be a significant factor of distortion, as most expenditures will be done in Euros/FCFA.

Section IX :Budget

The total ERCS budget, for 3 years, is USD 13,019,493.

The amount requested from the MDRP is USD 9,818,243 covering the components of Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants, and the enhancement of host communities' absorption capacities. The specific budget for these two components, whose funding is requested from the MDRP, is included in Annex 1.

The funding for the Disarmament component amounts to USD 400,000 while the Security for Development component is budgeted at USD 3,201,250 ; both of which will be partially funded by UNDP funds and by additional donor funds to be requested.

The respective budgets for these two components can be found in Annexes 2 and 3.

The amounts budgeted for personnel and equipment are justified by specific contextual factors in CAR presently:

- a) the sensitive nature of the intervention;
- b) the need to guarantee neutrality and transparency at all levels of program execution;
- c) the limited capacity of local institutions;
- d) difficult security conditions and living environments;
- e) the level of destruction of infrastructure, especially in-country, and the logistic challenges this presents;
- f) the transitional nature of the present government, and the changes that are to take place within the next 24 months.

In view of the evolution of these factors, the proposed calendar of phase-out of international staff and transfer to local staff may need to be adjusted, after the first 18 months.

Section X : Annexes

Annex 1 : Project Budget for MDRP funding

Annex 2: Disarmament Budget

Annex 3: Security for Development Budget

Annex 4 : Logical Framework of the ERCS