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TECHNICAL ANNEX

FOR A PROGRAM OF US\$ 17 MILLION

FROM THE MDRP MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND

TO

THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO

FOR

AN EMERGENCY REINTEGRATION PROGRAM

December 14, 2005

CURRENCY EQUIVALENT

(exchange rate effective as of January 26, 2005)

Currency Unit = Franc CFA (XOF)
 US\$1 = CFA Francs 554.34

The CFA Franc is pegged to the Euro
 at 656 CFA Franc per Euro.

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine
CONADER	<i>Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion de ex-combattants</i>
DA	Departmental Antennas
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDRP	Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program
FMA	Financial Management Agency
FMR	Financial Management Report
FMS	Financial Management System
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HCREC	<i>Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-combattants</i>
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labor Organisation
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JOP	Joint Operations Plan
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund of the MDRP
MFAP	Manuel on Financial and Administrative Procedures
MIS	Management Information System
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PCF	Post-Conflict Fund
PDR	<i>Projet d'Urgence de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants</i>
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PNDDR	<i>Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion</i>
RCERP	Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program
RoC	Republic of Congo
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TSA	Transitional Subsistence Allowance
TSS	Transitional Support Strategy
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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Republic of Congo

Emergency Reintegration Program

1. Background and Strategy

1.1 Circumstances of the conflict

1. Since its independence in 1960 the Republic of Congo has experienced three decades characterized by civil war, institutional instability, and poor governance. Since the early 1990s, Congo went through three successive rounds of civil war – in 1993, 1997 and 1998/1999. Peace Accords between the main warring fractions were signed in 1999 and enabled the country to embark on post-conflict reconstruction. However with sporadic recurrence of violence, sustained conflict in the southern Pool region, and a culture of violence and militarization coupled with lack of economic opportunities, peace remains fragile.

2. The 1998-99 war ended with the forces of President Sassou Nguesso able to dictate the terms of peace. A cease-fire agreement in late 1999 laid out a plan for a national dialogue, demilitarization of political parties, dismantling of militias, and the reorganization of the army, including the readmission of rebels into the security forces. Building on its significant military gains, the Government granted amnesty to all militia combatants on August 15, 1999. At the end of 1999, cease fire and cessation of hostilities agreements were signed between the Government and key military commanders representing all warring parties, under the mediation of President Bongo of Gabon.

3. The causes of the conflicts of the 1990s can be seen as linked to three key factors: (i) mismanagement of oil revenues; (ii) repressed demands for increased political participation; and (iii) regional instability. The ethnic dimension is not seen as having played a major role (about 70 ethnic groups live in Congo, none representing more than a few percent of the population). However, alliances based on geographic origin remain key to understand political affiliation.

4. Since the signing of the agreements, a tentative peace has been established in the majority of the country. There have been major and visible improvements in public security in Brazzaville, partly due to an effective joint operation by the army, gendarmerie and police (Operation “Espoir”) to root out criminal activities and poor discipline in elements of the security forces.

5. At this stage, the overall trend in Congo can be characterized as positive. Significant progress has been made on the political and security side. The regional situation has improved and political participation has increased. However, general impoverishment and lack of economic opportunities could facilitate mobilization should political frictions escalate to violence. The challenge is hence to focus on the current causes of instability while ensuring that the underlying issues are effectively addressed.

6. *The Pool region.* The lingering conflict in the Pool region has represented a major impediment to national reconciliation. An explosion of violence in the Pool region during 2002/03 underlined the fragility of the recovery process. Sporadic eruptions of violence had a major impact on economic activities in Brazzaville. The Government made a

separate peace agreement with the leader of the rebel group “the Ninjas” lead by Frédéric Bitsangou, better known as Reverend Ntoumi, in March 2003. However, the implementation of this peace agreement suffered significant delays because of additional political demands made by the latter. Negotiations with the government resulted in an agreement in April 2005, which commenced political negotiations, disarmament and preparations for elections to fill the seats designated for the Pool in the parliament, as soon as security allows.

7. *Lack of economic opportunities.* The combination of widespread access to arms, a militant history and few economic opportunities represents risk factor across the country. Young people are particularly affected. During the war of 1998-1999, just as in 1997, the private militias played a central role in the hostilities. Thousands of young people were recruited by the different militias which were officially disbanded in 1998. A recently completed Small Arms Survey estimates that some 34,000 small arms remain in circulation.

8. The challenges for the present regime in their efforts to consolidate peace and reconciliation include the disarmament of the population, a reform of the security sector, a solution to the political and humanitarian crisis in the Pool region, the creation of employment, the reduction of poverty as well as national reconciliation and general economical and social development of the country. The envisaged DDR intervention contained in this proposal, situated within a larger context of improving stability, serves to address both the aftermath of war as well as possible future causes of conflict.

1.2 Economic and Social Impact

9. Large parts of the country were affected by the series of conflict: the 1993 and 1997 civil wars were fought out in the capital, Brazzaville, which is home to about 25 to 30 percent of the population (800,000 people). The 1998/1999 war spread further and affected the most populated Central and Southern regions.

10. Approximately 10-15,000 direct deaths occurred as a result of the 1998-1999 war. Tens of thousands more died from malnutrition and disease. While no data are available, thousands more must have suffered deep physical and psychological trauma during and following the war. Refugee and internal displacement flows were significant. By the end of 1999, more than 60,000 refugees had fled from RoC to DRC and at least 11,900 to Gabon. At one point about one third of the population was internally displaced, having sought refuge in the forest and surviving in miserable conditions. The number of internally displaced in Congo is currently estimated at 100,000.

11. *The Pool region.* According to a recent United Nations humanitarian appeal, the humanitarian situation in the Pool region is bleak. Large numbers of people have fled the region. Poor road conditions and heightened insecurity have severely restricted the access of humanitarian agencies to the population. The farmers of the region have been reduced to subsistence farming and basic health care services are lacking. The overwhelming majority of the children of the Pool region have not attended school since 1999. Traditional coping mechanisms have been weakened significantly. According to the United Nations humanitarian appeal, allowing the current situation to persist unaddressed will result in further deterioration and increasing the risk of a relapse into conflict. In this

regard, the United Nations believes that about US\$ 22 million will be needed to address urgent humanitarian needs.

1.3 Government Response and Strategy

1.3.1 Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Economic Recovery

12. After a fragile peace was restored in October 1997, the new regime set about trying to reestablish the state apparatus. The country entered into a Post-Conflict Program with the IMF in July 1998, and started to pay back arrears to the World Bank. The Bank had just begun implementation of a Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) grant when a new cycle of violence broke out again in 1998.

13. In August 1999, President Sassou Nguesso granted amnesty to all individuals who participated to the conflict. The Government stressed the need to proceed quickly with a DDR program, as many ex-combatants were still armed, and this represented a serious security threat to their communities and the country's stability.

14. Following the cease fire and cessation of hostilities at the end of 1999, the Government approached the international community for emergency assistance in financing a comprehensive 2000-2002 Interim Post-Conflict Program. The program included a demobilization and reintegration program, emergency humanitarian needs, stabilization of the economy, and resumption of reforms that had halted in 1998 due to the conflict. In the last couple of years, Congo has embarked on a larger reform program supported by the World Bank and the IMF, which is focused on macroeconomic stability, budgetary discipline, debt management, increased transparency – particular in the oil sector – and public expenditure management. The Government is also implementing a wider reconstruction program of buildings and infrastructure.

15. *Poverty Reduction Strategy*. The I-PRSP submitted to the World Bank in October 2004 and endorsed by the World Bank Board in December 2004 focuses on five strategic directions: (i) consolidation of peace and support of good governance; (ii) consolidation of the macro-economic framework and promoting key sectors; (iii) enhancing access to basic social services and strengthen social protection; (iv) developing the country's infrastructure; and (v) strengthening the fight against AIDS.

16. A *Comité de Suivi de la Convention Pour la Paix et la Réconstruction du Congo* was established in January 2000 to demobilize ex-combatants from the various militias (Ninja, Cocoye and Cobra) and to collect small arms then in circulation. The *Comité de Suivi* tried to determine the number of ex-combatants to be demobilized and to identify reintegration opportunities, and facilitated the reintegration of a number of former soldiers into the army. The committee also approached the international community for support to a post-conflict rehabilitation program and to the demobilization and reintegration of the estimated (at that time) 25,000 militias who took part in the conflict. However, the *Comité de Suivi* lacked the means to support the demobilized ex-combatants. Some of them received 15,000 CFA (about US\$ 20) after discharge, but no additional support such as counseling or reintegration assistance was given. Hence, the ex-combatants had difficulties finding a livelihood and added to the country's already high unemployment rate. In addition, communities did not receive any assistance to enable them to receive returning ex-combatants.

17. Between 2000 and 2004, two successive programs have addressed the needs of demobilized ex-combatants. The first was an arms collection and Arms Collecting and Reintegration Program implemented by the IOM between July 2000 and December 2002. This program provided reintegration assistance to over 8,000 ex-combatants and collected over 11,000 small arms. However, this program was discontinued for lack of additional funding. The second was the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project financed by IDA and implemented by the *Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants* (HCREC) between January 2002 and February 2005, providing reintegration assistance to some 9,000 ex-combatants, but not dealing with disarmament.

1.3.2 The National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

18. In the course of 2003, the Government of Congo approached donors with a comprehensive reintegration project. The project was proposed for funding by the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). In November 2003, the Government presented its Letter of Demobilization Policy to the partnership and Government prepared a new *Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion* (PNDDR), which was endorsed by the *Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants* (CONADER) on December 31, 2004.

19. The National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (PNDDR) has been discussed and agreed upon by all relevant ministries through a consultative process under the auspices of CONADER. The PNDDR was developed by HCREC, in which all former militias are represented, including the rebel group in the Pool region known as the Ninjas. Consultations have also taken place with members of the international community. The PNDDR describes a comprehensive approach by the Government to consolidate stability in the country, including all the elements of the DDR process as well as certain elements related to the reform and streamlining of the security sector. The MDRP-financed Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration program (RCERP) will not fund disarmament or the reform of the security sector nor will it fund activities listed in the PNDDR that are outside MDRP's funding parameters (e.g. micro-projects for unemployed non-combatants). Within the PNDDR, the RCERP will consist of:

- (i) Demobilization and reinsertion;
- (ii) Socio-economic reintegration;
- (iii) Prevention and reduction of conflict and violence;
- (iv) Reintegration support to special groups, in particular child soldiers and handicapped ex-combatants;
- (v) Institutional development and program implementation support.

20. The PNDDR and those parts of it funded under the RCERP will be implemented by the HCREC under the supervision of CONADER. Several functions of the PNDDR are shared with the RCERP for reasons of complementarity and efficiency, including sensitization and public outreach, information management and monitoring and evaluation. While financial management and procurement services are also shared by both programs, effective measures will be taken to ensure that funds from different sources are kept separate.

21. *Overall estimates of target groups.* A feature of the DDR discussion in the Republic of Congo has been the question of the size of the target population. Estimates have varied widely, from 8,000 in the MDRP regional strategy to over 41,000 as described in the Government's Letter of Demobilization Policy. The Government has explained that as more areas became accessible after the war, more ex-combatants came forward and that therefore, paradoxically, the number of ex-combatants increased over time after the war has ended. One other aspect that needs to be taken into account is that the majority of those who took up arms or supported combat did so by joining militias that did not document their membership. Similarly, demobilization from the militias was not documented either: ex-combatants simply went back home and resumed civilian pursuits.

22. To resolve this key question an independent review was carried out to come up appropriate criteria and more precise estimates of numbers. This review was finalized in April 2004. It concluded that the number of ex-combatants who had yet to receive reintegration assistance stood at about 25,000. However, the Government has maintained that the total number may well be higher, up to or even higher than 30,000. In order to move forward, the Government and the MDRP Secretariat, in consultation with its partners, agreed that the precise numbers will be established in the course of program implementation through the application of strict criteria and screening procedures. If such criteria and procedures are applied credibly and results can be independently verified, the process itself should establish the overall size of the target population.

23. Within the target group, two different approaches are envisaged. The first group of beneficiaries will be demobilized from rebel groups in the Pool region or from the national army as a result of a restructuring of the security sector. The second group consists of ex-combatants who voluntarily demobilized after the end of hostilities in 1999. The identification process thus requires vigilance. Similarly, the socioeconomic reintegration needs to take into account the different groups of beneficiaries.

24. In the Pool region, the demobilization and reintegration will directly follow on the ongoing peace process, and has the potential to contribute directly to its success. In the case of the Armed Forces, the program will facilitate restructuring of the security sector by supporting the transformation into civilian life of deflated personnel. The ex-combatants that voluntarily demobilized from the various militias since 1999 still remain a potential threat to security, due to lack of economic opportunities and largely intact militia structures on a community level. A combination of socio-economic reintegration, community support, and strengthened community-level conflict resolution mechanisms aims at supporting the reintegration of both groups into civilian life.

25. The RCERP supports part of the objectives of the PNDDR. The principal objectives of the PNDDR are to: (i) disarm of all weapons in illegal possession; (ii) demobilize and economically and socially reintegrate ex-combatants; (iii) prevent the mobilization of previously demobilized ex-combatants; (iv) promote the development of former child soldiers and handicapped ex-combatants; (v) prevent and manage conflicts to mitigate violence; and (vi) support the reform of the security sector.

26. The PNDDR is composed by five components, notably: (i) disarmament, (ii) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, (iii) support to former child soldiers

and handicapped ex-combatants, (iv) prevention and reduction of conflict, and (v) security sector reform.

27. A Joint Operations Plan (JOP) articulates the necessary coordination mechanisms and responsibilities of the agencies involved in implementing the PNDDR, in the Government and among its partners.

28. *Disarmament.* While the disarmament component of the PNDDR is not part of the RCERP, a short description is provided due to its linkages with demobilization and reintegration. The responsibility for disarmament will be shared between the UNDP and the Government. The UNDP will be responsible for the collection of 10,000 small arms in the Pool region and Brazzaville. This operations funded by the European Commission. The Government will complement the disarmament component to allow nation wide coverage, and will work closely with the UNDP in this operation, both working out of the HCREC and both governed by the same Steering Committee. This close collaboration will ensure equal treatment and effective management. Prior to actual disarmament, it is envisaged that the management and storage of Government-issued weapons will be improved. The collection of weapons will be done through a sensitization campaign and the provision of individual and community based incentives. In addition, ex-combatants who qualify for reintegration benefits and who have also surrendered a functioning weapon will receive priority status in the processing of reinsertion benefits.

29. *Security Sector Reform.* A census of the Public Forces (Gendarmerie, Police, and Army) was finalized in March 2005 and is being validated in view of determining those to be deflated as part of ongoing reform efforts. An estimate of 6,000 will be demobilized and benefit from reintegration support from the program. The total figure may be less after validation of the census. To ensure flexibility, the program is focusing on eligibility criteria rather than absolute numbers. Further, progress in SSR will be closely monitored and no disbursements will be made until it can be confirmed that such demobilization is taking place.

2. International Response and Strategy

2.1 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

30. The MDRP is a partnership of nine regional governments and 42 international partners that serves as a coordination and financing platform for demobilization and reintegration efforts in the greater Great Lakes region. Building on a variety of country level initiatives, and in consultation with governments in the region as well as donors and UN partners, the Bank elaborated a greater Great Lakes regional strategy for demobilization and reintegration for the MDRP. These were endorsed by the Bank's Board in April 2002.

31. The regional approach has several advantages in the Great Lakes region: the ability to address external regional factors associated with some country programs; enhanced transparency of related country programs, and the facilitation of knowledge sharing and training across national programs. The MDRP framework enhances coordination and harmonization of the activities of various donors and UN agencies. National demobilization and reintegration programs are already under implementation in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda,

and Uganda. The MDRP also serves as a framework for a regional multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) for demobilization and reintegration activities in the greater Great Lakes region. The MDTF has become the vehicle to mobilize and channel key donor financing; reduce transaction costs for client governments, donors and the Bank; and enable Governments to complement IDA financing with other grant resources. To date, MDRP donor partners have committed US\$205 million to the MDTF.

32. Within the framework of the MDRP, the Government of the Republic of Congo has asked the World Bank to provide financial assistance and coordinate external partner support for the PNDDR. To this end, the World Bank initiated a project preparation process in July 2004.

33. The PNDDR encompasses security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and involves several international partners supporting the Government's efforts. The UNDP will implement one part of the disarmament component, and will provide technical assistance to the Government for the other part. The European Commission and the Government share the costs of disarmament. The MDRP is financing the demobilization and reintegration components, through the proposed Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program (RCERP).

2.2 Lessons from previous operations

34. The designs of the PNDDR as well as the RCERP have benefited from a number of lessons and good practices. First, previous reintegration efforts in the Republic of Congo have provided useful experience and capacity. Second, the World Bank has gained substantial experience from a number of demobilization and reintegration programs, in Africa and elsewhere.

2.2.1 Lessons from previous DDR operations in the Republic of Congo

35. The implementation of the IDA-funded Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (EDRP) was generally satisfactory, taking into account the limited means it had available. This IDA-funded project closed on 28 February 2005. By and large, the IDA-project met its objectives. 3,222 micro-projects initiated by ex-combatants were approved to the tune of CFA 1,890 million on behalf of 9,000 beneficiaries, which was the expected target at project completion. Project staff indicated an average success rate for micro-projects of about 80%, which will be a very high rate of success as compared to similar exercises elsewhere in Africa. Also, over 80% of beneficiaries have benefited from socio-medical care. Training programs for ex-combatants and for project staff alike have been carried out in line with training plans and the capacity building and utilization activities. Infrastructure rehabilitation was planned to be achieved through 19 projects, including the rehabilitation of water supply, schools and medical facilities of which only six have actually been completed.

36. However, several areas leave *room for improvement* and will be addressed in the proposed project, as follows:

- (i) The demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants needs to be closely linked to an organized collection of weapons;

- (ii) The processing of applications by ex-combatants needs to be streamlined and decentralized to avoid delays in delivery of benefits;
- (iii) Financial management and procurement needs to be improved through a tightening of internal control mechanisms and greater capacity in this area;
- (iv) Verification of ex-combatants' status was based on a single signature and will require an additional layer of screening;
- (v) Non-falsifiable ID cards and diligent screening procedures are necessary to mitigate misuse and ensure accurate targeting.
- (vi) Clear communication and the existence of sanctions must be in place to avoid double-dipping, ie. providing support to beneficiaries of past reintegration programs;
- (vii) Community support needs to be taken more seriously, with clear procedures for their identification and implementation;
- (viii) Coordination with national and international partners needs to be improved to ensure synergy between the fight against poverty, security sector reform, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and political reconciliation;
- (ix) Enhanced disbursement mechanisms from the departmental antennas to the individual beneficiary, to ensure transparency and security.

2.2.2 Lessons learned from IDA/MDRP experience in other countries

37. IDA has acquired substantial experience in this sector through support for DDR programs throughout Africa and in other regions (Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Chad, East Timor). This experience has often taken the form of technical assistance and/or financial assistance through investment credits, programs of balance of payments support or restructuring on-going projects. Building on lessons learned from relevant projects in Africa and on the conclusions of the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, several good practices have been identified and are integrated into the program. These good practices also include preliminary experience from the MDRP region.

38. Genuine *political commitment* from all levels and sides of the political arena is essential. A demobilization and reintegration process by itself cannot solve political issues or create a viable economy, and these should be tackled concurrently. In addition, inclusion of all stakeholders in the design of the program is important to ensure political buy-in and ownership and minimize the threat of spoilers. Hence, international partners, government agencies and representatives from across the political spectrum relevant to the process will have a role to play in the design and implementation of DDR programs.

39. *Demobilization.* Successful demobilization is a necessary first step toward successful reintegration. Among the key actions are the distribution of non-transferable demobilization ID cards, the collection of socio-economic data and the establishment of a comprehensive database of beneficiaries. In addition, regrouping ex-combatants during demobilization provides a good opportunity to give health and HIV/AIDS counseling, voluntary HIV/AIDS testing and information about re-entry into civilian life and the responsibilities of citizenship (voting etc.).

40. *Reinsertion.* During demobilization, ex-combatants lose their source of income (formal or informal). Experience suggests that their financial situation is generally precarious until they can re-establish new revenue generating activities. During this period (the reinsertion phase) they need a transitional safety net (TSN) to cover the essential material needs of their families. The objective of this support is to permit the ex-combatants to return to their communities and to see to the needs of their families in a limited time period following demobilization until reintegration assistances starts.

41. *Economic reintegration.* Ex-combatants are often an economically vulnerable group due to their lack of relevant skills, capital and social networks. In addition, they are often a group at risk because of their familiarity with guns and violence. Targeted assistance is recommended to help them find viable economic strategies. To be cost-efficient and effective, assistance must be adapted to their socio-economic profiles and the economic environment. Female soldiers often require special assistance to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

42. Generally, the assistance received by ex-combatants should not exceed the amount necessary to achieve the average standard of living of the communities in which they are reintegrating. In addition, reintegration assistance must be of limited duration to avoid creating dependency. Information services and counseling can help ex-combatants analyze their options and find employment. Apprenticeships in the informal sector linked to employment are preferred to stand alone training programs.

43. Ultimately, ex-combatants are reintegrated into the general economy. Therefore, creation of long-term employment is closely linked to growth in the private sector and the creation of employment. It should be noted that ex-combatants themselves represent an important source of human resources for the economy.

44. *Social Reintegration.* Social reintegration is often facilitated by the existence of an extended family network. Therefore, ex-combatants should be encouraged to reintegrate near their families. In addition, community structures can help them reintegrate both socially and economically. Support to communities in which ex-combatants settle can encourage acceptance and reinforce social capital. However, the appropriate balance between individual and community support will depend on the socio-economic context, as well as on factors related to political reconciliation. Care should be taken to prevent the stigmatization of ex-combatants as conveyers of disease and violence. The fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed. Community sensitization and information efforts are paramount in this regard as is the protection all medical data.

45. As much as possible, children associated with the armed forces should be reunited with their families and helped to restart their education. Disabled ex-combatants often require special medical and economic assistance. Female ex-combatants have had particular difficulty in re-integrating society and are in need of special consideration.

46. *Institutional issues.* Program coordination by one civilian agency with overall program responsibility, balanced by decentralization of implementation to provinces and communities makes for a powerful institutional arrangement. Where possible, existing implementation capacities should be leveraged. The employment of some ex-combatants as counselors and field staff can facilitate reintegration.

47. *Security sector reform* must be closely coordinated with the DDR program. Close coordination, both at policy and operational levels will be necessary. Both efforts are expected to contribute to meeting the MDRP medium to long term objective of a reallocation of public expenditures from military to economic and social sectors.

3. The Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program

3.1 MDRP eligibility criteria

48. The Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program (RCERP) is part of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the greater Great Lakes Region. Under the MDRP, the following criteria need to be fulfilled for a country to be eligible to receive assistance for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants:

General criteria:

- *Affected by conflict.* Being involved in or directly affected by one or more of the conflicts in the greater Great Lakes region.
- *Participation in the regional peace process.* Demonstrated willingness to contribute to stability in the greater Great Lakes region and to implement relevant provisions of the applicable peace/ceasefire accord(s).

Country-specific criteria:

- (i) *Preparation of a national demobilization and reintegration program.* This will typically be demonstrated by a coherent national program developed in consultation with the international community and national stakeholders. It could also be demonstrated by having a strategic planning and consultation process underway, with a clear roadmap and timetable.
- (ii) *Establishment of a suitable institutional structure.* The government needs to establish flexible implementation arrangements with appropriate planning, coordination and monitoring capacity and with the participation of relevant political and security stakeholders.
- (iii) *A letter of demobilization policy outlining government commitment.* The Government drafts a letter outlining its commitments to the regional peace process, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and fiscal impact of demobilization.
- (iv) *Establishment of appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures.* The government will provide assurances and monitoring measures to ensure consistency with standard environmental and social safeguards. In addition, the government will establish satisfactory financial management and procurement arrangements.

49. The Government of the Republic of Congo has fulfilled all these criteria and is therefore eligible under the MDRP objectives to receive financial assistance from the regional MDTF.

3.2 Objectives

50. The general objective of the Republic of Congo Emergency Reintegration Program (RCERP) is to help consolidate peace and economic stability and support sustainable development in the Republic of Congo and in the greater Great Lakes region. The specific objectives of the program will be to:

- (i) Contribute to the improvement of security through disarmament and demobilization of up to 11,000 combatants;
- (ii) Support social reintegration through rehabilitation of social infrastructure and conflict management and reconciliation; and
- (iii) Support economic reintegration through income generating activities to ex-combatants.

51. The RCERP is fully compatible with the recently finalized Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the World Bank's Transitional Support Strategy. It has been processed within the World Bank under O.P. 8.50 (Emergency Recovery Assistance).

52. The program is expected to have a significant impact on stability and reducing poverty in the Republic of Congo by assisting ex-combatants in resuming productive civilian lives in the rural and urban economy, and investing in the human capital of ex-combatants and communities alike. The RCERP will finance a significant part of the Government's National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (PNDDR) in accordance with MDRP criteria, but will not finance disarmament, security sector reform and expenses for military personnel prior to demobilization.

53. The PNDDR and RCERP follow the IDA funded and Government executed Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP), which has provided reintegration assistance to 9,000 ex-combatants throughout the country. It was deemed important that any benefits provided to eligible ex-combatants under the RCERP be comparable to those given under the EDRP to avoid different groups of ex-combatants receiving different treatment, which may lead to unrest and undermine the objectives of the program.

3.3 Coverage and implementation period

54. *Target groups:* the Government intends to demobilize and reintegrate up to 30,000 ex-combatants, belonging to the following categories:

- (i) 19,000 ex-combatants who have voluntarily demobilized from the various militias at an earlier stage, but many of whom have retained their arms and remain unemployed;
- (ii) 5,000 combatants associated with the rebellion in the Pool region;
- (iii) 6000 former members of the *Force Publique*.

55. Within this target population are also an estimated 3,500 children and youth formerly associated with armed groups as well as handicapped ex-combatants.

56. *Eligibility criteria:* the Government, following discussions with partners and the MDRP Secretariat, has established criteria that will determine ex-combatants eligibility for reintegration assistance. These criteria will be applied to all three categories above, with the exception of children associated with armed groups, as follows:

- (i) Participation in armed combat or sustained logistical support during the civil wars;
- (ii) Having indicated a preference for training and/or a micro-project creating employment or income for the beneficiary (does not apply to those for whom job placement is available);
- (iii) Not included in labor intensive projects or receiving other salaried employment;
- (iv) Not having benefited previously from the UNDP Arms Collecting and Reintegration Program implemented by the IOM between July 2000 and December 2002, or from the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project financed by IDA and implemented by HCREC, or being eligible for Government pension.

57. In addition, the program will take into account whether the ex-combatant has surrendered a weapon in the context of the UNDP-led disarmament program or demobilization from the army. While this is not a necessary condition for reintegration benefits, the surrender of a serviceable weapon will give priority status in the processing of micro-project applications.

58. The verification of eligibility status will be significantly tightened in comparison to the previous IDA-funded demobilization and reintegration program. Ex-combatant status will need to be verified by the regional program representative (*Chef d'antenne*) as well as a leader of the combatant group or his designate, certifying the dates and localities where the ex-combatant has been active as well as that he/she is not currently employed. An internal control mechanism will be established to conduct random audits of eligibility decisions to ensure the strict application of criteria and fairness in the distribution of benefits across regions as well as to determine whether the recipient had previously received benefits under the UNDP/IOM or IDA programs.

59. The estimated 19,000 ex-combatants who have voluntarily demobilized from the various militias at an earlier stage will not be eligible for transitional safety net payments, but will benefit from a socio-economic reintegration package. The 5,000 combatants associated with the rebellion in the Pool region, and the 6,000 expected to be demobilized from the armed forces will benefit from transitional safety net payment as part of their demobilization. Both groups are eligible for a socio-economic reintegration package, along with support to their host communities.

60. *Geographic coverage:* The Program will cover the whole country. Ex-combatants are present in most areas and the PNDDR will maintain or establish seven regional offices where a maximum number of ex-combatants can be reached, including in the sensitive area of the Pool region. As a result, program benefits will be spread throughout the country. It is envisaged that the distribution of reintegration benefits will also be

monitored and shared with other development programs at provincial and community levels to ensure an as equitable distribution of program benefits as possible.

61. *Duration:* Following the date of effectiveness the RCERP will be implemented over a period of three years.

3.4 RCERP program components

3.4.1 Demobilization and reinsertion

62. This process is generally understood to be the legal and practical transition from (para-) military to civilian status. However, in the RCERP, this definition applies only to those still under arms in the framework of the rebellion in the Pool region as well as to the former militia members who had been integrated into the armed forces. Both of these target groups will follow a process of organized cantonment, disarmament, verification and demobilization. In order to cover immediate needs after demobilization, ex-combatants will receive a cash payment of US\$ 150 to cover the three months prior to the receipt of reintegration benefits. The process for the demobilization of armed forces personnel will follow a similar pattern, except that cantonment will take place in army barracks. The last target group (*autodémobilisés*), who demobilized after the end of hostilities by returning home with their weapons voluntarily without any structured or documented demobilization process, will not receive any transitional safety net payment as they are already in their communities. They will however benefit from the larger socio-economic reintegration package.

63. *ID cards and information management:* A proper identification system is essential to ensure target group integrity during program implementation and limit the risk of abuse. Each ex-combatant will receive a demobilization program ID card. These will include photographs, a digital fingerprint or iris identification and will be individually numbered and stamped. All ID card information will be incorporated into the central Management Information System (MIS). Since no such card was used in the previous IDA funded program and eligibility criteria and screening procedures will be tightened in the RCERP, it will be necessary to re-screen all those who were registered (some 18,000) under the IDA-funded program, but who did not received any benefits. In addition, the MIS will be linked to the databases of the previous DDR programs (UNDP-IOM and IDA-funded Government program) to avoid that those who have already benefited from such programs will once again receive benefits.

64. *Socio-medical care and HIV-AIDS Prevention.* As part of the demobilization process, ex-combatants will be provided information on HIV/AIDS and directed to psycho-social counseling, if necessary. A contract will be established with relevant organizations in the field of medical care to provide treatment, including any emergency surgery. HIV testing will be provided and a link will be established with the World Bank's HIV/AIDS program in the Congo to provide care to those found to be sero-positive.

3.4.2 Reintegration

The objective of the economic reintegration is to create durable employment and/or income for ex-combatants and to reintegrate them into their communities. Ultimately, this will render a possible re-mobilization less likely as the ex-combatants will have something to lose. Ex-combatants will be equally eligible for the program irrespective of rank, former affiliation, region or gender and they should be allowed to choose their reintegration destination freely. When applicable, the selection of economic activity will give preference to reintegration assistance that also benefits the ex-combatant's community of return. The total amount available for reintegration support per beneficiary should not exceed US\$400. To the extent possible, the provision of reintegration support will be based on the following criteria:

- (i) lead to durable income for the beneficiaries;
- (ii) use locally available technology and natural and human resources;
- (iii) comply with environmental and social safeguards;

65. Ex-combatants who are eligible for support under the RCERP will be offered a choice of options, to be exercised individually or in groups of ex-combatants:

- (i) placement in existing or future employment;
- (ii) support to ex-combatants who opt to create a micro-enterprise or income generating activities;
- (iii) technical or professional training, possibly in combination with the option above;
- (iv) placement in labor intensive projects.

66. For training and counseling, and other reintegration support activities, NGOs and private firms, to be selected on the basis of criteria specified in the Project Implementation Manual, will serve as "*Agences de Formation*".

67. Local NGOs, to be selected on the basis of criteria specified in the Project Implementation Manual, will serve as "*Agences d'encadrement*" responsible for the initial evaluation of micro-projects and will follow their implementation and provide counseling and advice to ex-combatants where necessary.

3.4.3 Community Reintegration

68. To facilitate social reintegration and local reconciliation, the RCERP will support social infrastructure to communities that have suffered as a result of the war as well as those where ex-combatants settle. Such support will take the form of infrastructure repair, notably in the education and health sectors. Ex-combatants can be used for any employment this creates. Community projects will be selected in coordination with local plans and against guarantees of coverage of recurrent costs, and on the initiative of local decision making structures in communities. These projects will be managed by communities and by *Agences d'Encadrement*. Linkages to other community projects, notably the Emergency Recovery and Community Support Project, and the MAP program, among others, will be sought.

3.4.4 Prevention and Reduction of Conflict and Violence

69. This relatively small component has been included in the program in response to a strong wish by both the Government as well as Congolese civil society to address the cultural and psychological aspects of the conflicts. While several years have passed since the end of hostilities, the potential of violence erupting as a result of poverty, ethnic tension, criminal behavior, as well as the trauma of war remains high. The objective of this component is to promote a national consensus on the need to reduce the potential for violence, and to support reconciliation activities in communities. Activities under this component include seminars and workshops promoting the culture of peace and strengthening traditional community-based methods of conflict resolution.

3.4.5 Special groups

70. *Children associated with the armed forces.* Children have been used in a variety of roles within the armed forces throughout the conflict in Congo. Child soldiers, who had served with the President's private militia during the 1998-99 conflict alongside government forces, were reported to have been disarmed and demobilized. The exact measures undertaken and the number of children demobilized to date has yet to be established. It is estimated that only half of the children returned to their homes and few of these to their parents' home. The Ninjas, led by Reverend Ntumi, are known to have child soldiers in their ranks as well as young adults who have been recruited as children. The number of children associated with the fighting forces and presently in the Pool region is estimated to be between 1,500 and 1,800.

71. Children who were effectively 'self demobilized' but who are reported to be in possession of weapons generally remain marginalized and a potential threat to security as they grow older without any social/economic assistance. The number of children or young adults in this category is estimated to be approximately 2,000.

72. The reintegration process of children formerly associated with the armed forces includes family reunification, and access to basic services, particularly community services, care and nurturing. The interdependent social and economic components of the reintegration of children into their families and communities need particular attention. This aspect will demand creative ways of rehabilitation and at the same time target the children as priority beneficiaries but in a way that does not create further segregation within the community.

73. Because the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of children belongs to their families and communities, family-tracing activities will remain an essential component of the program. The objective is to promote the quickest form of reunification possible of all children associated with fighting forces. These efforts will be combined with family/community reintegration efforts supported by sensitization and community mobilization activities in order to prepare communities for the return of children from the fighting forces. The program will use existing resources and traditional and customary conflict resolution mechanisms. To ensure the effective reintegration of children, families and communities will be sensitized and mobilized as the essential actors in the process. Mainstream programs implemented by the Government will be encouraged to include children associated with the fighting forces as a target group. Agricultural activities, skills training and community reconstruction projects will help

build-up the capacities of communities to cope with the socio-economic dimension of reunification and reintegration.

74. Very little is known about girls with the fighting forces. A sample study estimates that the percentage of girls is about 5%, but experience shows that this percentage is likely to be higher. Girls have been particularly affected by the war due to abductions and sexual abuse, thus their needs will be prioritized during the program implementation. This will be subject to further studies that will feed into operational planning. The Convention on the Rights of the Child will be the instrument for all activities in relation to children.

75. Education and vocational training services will be designed in such a way as to ensure access for the primary beneficiaries of this project without excluding other children who need the same services. The program seeks to identify solutions that will optimize existing financial, human and institutional resources and avoid the multiplication of small scale, high-cost, low-impact solutions. This component will build on lessons from projects already in implementation supporting the reintegration of children and youth. UNICEF will play key roles in the implementation of this component of the program.

76. *Young Adults.* Children associated with armed forces in the past are now part of growing population of those over the age of 18 and thus fall into the adult category. Although this group will benefit directly from reintegration initiatives for adult ex-combatants, experience has shown that if this assistance is not accompanied by a special support program, the risk of fall out is very high. Social and community reintegration of this group continues to be a challenge as they lack the necessary life skills to enable them to adapt to the communities they left as children but return to as young adults. Participation in armed combat has taught them a set of values that are not necessarily beneficial for their lives as civilians. For young adults who have no family to return to, or whose families are not in a position to take them back, the challenges of adaptation are high. Regardless of how they were recruited these young adults are likely to have witnessed or participated in extreme violence, as well as to have been the object of abuse.

77. In order to address the needs of this target group within the PNDDR, the government has set the age limit of young adults at 21 years of age for males and 25 years of age for females. In parallel with the normal reintegration support they will be offered, particular attention will be given to provide this target group with psycho-social counseling and support, life skills, independent living skills, employment orientation and guidance. Based on the individual situation of the females, life skills in child care and reproductive health will be provided. Within the context of the PNDDR, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has undertaken to play a role in the economic reintegration of young adults.

78. *Handicapped and chronically ill.* This group requires specific assistance which will help them adapt to their new circumstance and face the challenges of reintegration. Ex-combatants who are considered handicapped and who are classified according to a recognized deficiency (physical, sensory, mental), resulting from his/her participation in the conflict, or whose health status continues to deteriorate due to his/her participation in the conflict will be entitled to supplementary reintegration support. The level of deficiency will be evaluated by a recognized medical appointee according to an official

approved scale. Ex-combatants in this group will be orientated towards existing specialized structures/programs which can provide the necessary assistance in terms of physical rehabilitation and/or further medical assistance. In line with this supplementary short term assistance provided by the program, this group will receive specific assistance in accessing appropriately adapted reintegration opportunities. In the case where the ex-combatants due to disability or illness cannot avail of the reintegration assistance, they may nominate a member of their immediate family to be provided with the necessary skills to assist the ex-combatants and his/her family in the reintegration process.

3.5 Program cost

79. The Program is estimated to cost US\$ 25 million, to be funded partly through a US\$17 million grant from the MDTF of the MDRP. No parallel IDA funding is envisaged. The European Commission is considering, in coordination with the World Bank, to strengthen its support to demobilization and reintegration in Congo and may finance the current financing gap of US\$8 million. Based on a maximum target group size of 30,000, the average direct benefit to ex-combatants will be US\$ 613, while overall per beneficiary costs are estimated to be US\$ 833.

80. A window will also be left open for a possible small special project to support UNICEF's program for psycho-social activities related to child soldiers. This will be discussed in due course with the Government and local partners through the local ad-hoc committee in accordance with existing procedures.

81. *Government contribution.* Notwithstanding its fiscal constraints, the Government is committed to supporting the program, and is contributing US\$ 2 million in parallel funding to the RCERP. Among the options discussed is Government financing for costs related to program start-up prior to effectiveness to avoid delays and the possible payment of any demobilization premiums to armed personnel. The Government will be requested to waive all taxes levied on works, goods and services for the Program. It will also be expected to contribute land, office space, security and other in-kind support.

Table 1: Demobilization and Reintegration Program Costs

Component	Average Unit Cost (US\$)	Total Program Cost (million US\$)	Percent
1. Demobilization and transition	80	2.4	9.6%
2. Socio-Economic reintegration	550 ¹	16.5	66.0%
3. Reintegration support to communities	33	1.0	4%
4. Assistance to special Groups	33	1.0	4%
5. Prevention/Reduction of conflict and violence	16	0.5	2%

¹ Figure includes payments to *Agences d'Encadrement*, in addition to direct benefits to ex-combatants

6. Program Management	103	3.1	12.4%
Sub-total	800	24.0	98%
Contingencies	17	0.5	2%
Total (estimated)	833	25.0	100%

Table 2: Demobilization and Reintegration Program Financing Plan

Source	Million US\$	Percent
MDTF / MDRP	17	68%
Co-financing	8	32%
Total	25	100%

3.6 Conditions of effectiveness

82. The following conditions of effectiveness have been discussed with the Government and will be included in the Grant Agreement:

- (x) the following staff, with qualifications and experience satisfactory to the World Bank, have been appointed at the coordination level: a project coordinator, a sensitization/communication officer, a financial and administrative manager, a monitoring and evaluation manager, a procurement specialist; a director of demobilization and reintegration, and two financial management specialists.
- (xi) a Financial Management Agency (FMA) for internal audit has been recruited satisfactory to the World bank and a financial management and accounting system for the Program, including the Financial and Administrative Procedures Manual (MFAP), satisfactory to the World Bank has been established with the assistance of the FMA;
- (xii) an independent auditor has been appointed satisfactory to the World Bank;
- (xiii) the Program Implementation Manual (PIM), including a procurement plan, an integrated management information system, and the MFAP, in form and substance satisfactory to the World Bank, have been adopted;

4. Studies and technical assistance

4.1 Studies

83. Several studies have been carried out to support the development and implementation of the program, financed by IDA and other bilateral and multilateral donors, including studies of possible assistance for disabled ex-combatants and management information systems. Nonetheless, the PNDDR will need additional studies to be adequately implemented.

84. *Economic opportunity inventory:* The objectives of this study will be to update and consolidate the inventory of reintegration opportunities already existing such as training, employment, development projects by department and sector. This inventory will be used by the departmental antennas (DA) to inform and sensitize ex-combatants. This and other studies will inform a reintegration strategy with reintegration options and their operational modalities.

85. *Pre-demobilization orientation program:* A program will be developed to provide ex-combatant with information about the program, health issues and the transition to civilian life. Ex-combatants will be briefed about their benefits and the modalities of receiving them; including banking and financial details, civic and community duties, training, employment, access to land and credit as well as income generating activities, family and health issues.

86. *Program of community sensitization and participation:* The objective of the program will be to sensitize the civilian population on the challenges faced by ex-combatants and their families during this process. The program will also address the concerns of the receiving communities and encourage their participation in reintegration activities. The program will be disseminated in various forms of media (e.g., radio, television, brochures and newspapers).

87. *Identification of gender issues and inclusion of these issues in the PNDDR:* The study will identify critical needs related to gender and propose specific actions to ensure that both women and men play a role in the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities.

88. *Identification of questions related to children associated with the fighting forces as well as issues linked to HIV/AIDS:* The study will consolidate the lessons learned from the previous IDA-funded project and initiatives from UNICEF on the demobilization and reintegration of disabled ex-combatants and children associated with fighting forces and define the strategies for continuing these activities. The study will also formulate recommendations on how linkages between the national AIDS program and the DDR program should be established.

89. *Conflict management and resolution.* In addition to capitalizing of the experiences of other organizations in activities related to conflict resolution and management, the HCREC will identify practices from other countries as well as from Congolese communities, in order to strengthen community-level conflict management mechanisms.

90. *Procurement capacity development.* In response to the procurement risk assessment from February 2005, the program foresees technical assistance and capacity development as part of conditions for effectiveness. This assessment was updated in December 2005, and is elaborated in the procurement section.

91. Other studies may be undertaken as needs are identified during program implementation. All consultant recruitment for necessary studies is subject to procurement procedures as specified in the procurement section of this document.

4.2 Technical Assistance

92. Subject to further discussions with the Government, local and/or international technical assistance will be required for long-term and short-term assignments during the program implementation period. Consultancies will be necessary on an on-going basis, including for implementation arrangements, sensitization, and information management, the training of FM staff and for periodic external and financial audits and independent evaluations. Qualified consultants will be contracted by HCREC to undertake activities which are not covered under the MDRP projects or through other agreed bilateral technical support. Technical assistance may also be provided directly to HCREC within the MDRP framework.

5. Institutional Arrangements and Program Implementation

5.1 Institutional structure

5.1.1 Central level

93. The institutional national structure for the program, the National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER), was established on January 2003. It is chaired by the President's chief of staff and includes representatives from relevant ministries and NGOs. Its responsibilities include:

- (i) determining Government policy and strategy for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- (ii) monitoring and guiding the implementation of the PNDDR through its implementing agency, the HCREC;
- (iii) Adopting the HCREC program of activities;
- (iv) Approval of the HCREC budget.

94. *Overall responsibility for implementation of the PNDDR.* HCREC will bear overall responsibility for the implementation of the program, including:

- (i) preparing and costing of detailed implementation plans;
- (ii) implementing the individual PNDDR components;
- (iii) establishing close linkages with other development and reconstruction programs, as well as with relevant government departments, the international community, local NGOs, associations and the private sector;
- (iv) monitoring and evaluating implementation, progress and impact;

- (v) managing program resources with transparency and accountability;
- (vi) coordinating national and international partners in accordance with MDRP principles;
- (vii) consulting and coordinating the steering committee during the implementation of the program.

95. The HCREC will consist of a High Commissioner, who will be politically responsible for the implementation of the PNDDR, a Deputy High Commissioner, four Commissioners, a National Coordinator of the program and nine implementation units (see draft organizational chart in annex):

- (i) an information/communication unit;
- (ii) an administrative and financial unit;
- (iii) a procurement unit;
- (iv) a monitoring and evaluation unit;
- (v) a disarmament unit;
- (vi) a demobilization/reinsertion unit;
- (vii) a child soldiers/special projects unit;
- (viii) a conflict/violence prevention unit; and
- (ix) a security sector reform unit

96. *Coordination arrangements.* The details of the specific implementation linkages and coordination will be further described, in close coordination within the framework of the MDRP partnership in the implementation manual and in the Joint Operations Plan for the PNDDR, as well as in the terms of reference of the units' responsibilities, and reporting and control structures. The Joint Operations Plan will contain the modalities of the division of labor between UNDP, HCREC, the Ministry of Defense as well as other concerned domestic and international partners.

97. In its mandate of coordinating the operational activities of the PNDDR, the HCREC will be assisted by a Steering Committee (*Comité de pilotage*) composed by national and international partners. The steering committee is chaired by the High Commissioner. The main objectives of the committee are to:

- (i) coordinate international assistance to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the Republic of Congo;
- (ii) act as the framework for technical discussions between the Government and international partners on design, preparation and implementation;
- (iii) ensure institutional and programmatic linkages between the PNDDR and other development/humanitarian/reconstruction programs, including necessary correlations between disarmament, reintegration, conflicts prevention and security sector reform;
- (iv) monitor and evaluate the implementation DDR activities

98. The HCREC will house an ombudsman function that provides a feed-back mechanism on the effectiveness of the overall program for target groups as well as for the population at large. This function will be appointed by CONADER, and will investigate and mediate any complaints or emerging conflicts, and report regularly to the Steering

Committee with copy to CONADER. Any complainants will be allowed to remain anonymous.

5.1.2 Provincial level

99. The HCREC has established departmental antennas in seven departments. In the framework of the PNDDR, the antennas will be involved in screening and identification of ex-combatants; administration and financial management; communication, information, and sensitization; as well as monitoring and evaluation. The departmental antennas will be responsible for the following:

- (i) updating the inventory of micro-projects, training and employment opportunities;
- (ii) monitoring of technical and financial reintegration activities;
- (iii) collecting data for monitoring and evaluation purposes;
- (iv) providing relevant information related to the program to ex-combatants and communities;
- (v) coordinating with other Government and non-governmental institutions involved in local reconstruction and development activities;
- (vi) assisting in the identification and organization of local reconciliation activities;
- (vii) reporting to HCREC on a regular basis.

5.2 Staffing, institutional support and capacity building

100. The HCREC will provide the umbrella institutional structure for program implementation and will require to be strengthened at all levels. The Government will recruit staff in accordance with MDRP/World Bank qualifications criteria, taking into account any qualified ex-combatants to fill the vacant positions at the departmental level. Headquarters and departmental offices will be equipped with essential offices equipment as well as vehicles for monitoring and evaluation, outreach and evaluation activities. Staff at the national and departmental level will receive necessary training to ensure the effectiveness of implementation. The training program will start immediately after staff has been recruited. The objectives of the program will be to ensure that all PNDDR staff have the same understanding of the objectives and procedures of the program, as well as their specific responsibilities and reporting lines. A staff development program will include: (i) preparation of a training plan; (ii) development of training materials; and (iii) training activities, including sensitization and conflict/violence prevention. Staff recruitment and training will include measures to enhance the ability of the HCREC personnel to deliver services irrespective of the affiliation of the ex-combatants. Financial management and procurement skills will be included in the training programs.

5.3 Financial management and auditing

101. Based on the country's post-conflict situation and institutional weaknesses in the management of funds, the project financial management design took into consideration ways to facilitate disbursements and ensure effective use of program resources and funds. The financial management arrangements proposed below have been designed to take into

account the risks of the program and the need for monitoring of the performance of the program in order to get sustainable results.

102. The principal objective of the program's financial management system will be to support management in the allocation of resources with the purpose of ensuring economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of outputs required to achieve program objectives. Specifically, the financial management system must be capable of producing clear, timely, relevant and reliable financial information that will enable the program's management to plan, implement, monitor and appraise overall progress towards the achievement of its objectives.

103. Audit reports and SOE review reports related to the IDA funded program revealed several internal control weaknesses, accounting and procurements issues. To tackle these weaknesses, it was agreed that the current financial management unit of the HCREC headed by a Financial Manager, to be recruited on a competitive basis, would be strengthened by the selection of an accounting firm to serve as a Financial Management Agency (FMA) and an auditing firm to strengthen internal controls.

104. The financial management team of the HCREC will have as its main responsibilities (i) to oversee and supervise the overall financial management activities of the program including payments to ex-combatants; and (ii) to draft and submit consolidated FMRs (showing the sources of funding and use of the program funds) as well as audited financial statements to the World Bank.

105. The FMA, to be recruited on a competitive basis, will assist the HCREC financial management team in ensuring adequate and effective use of the program funds. The firm will provide two qualified and experienced staff to (i) monitor and approve payments of any expenditures (Financial Controller); and (ii) carry out regular internal audit controls (Internal Auditor). This will include the verification of eligibility of expenditures ex- post as well as physical inspections of acquisitions of services, furniture and equipments, payments of ex-combatants, funding of micro-projects and use of funds in the antennas. All financial management staff, including those in the regions, will require training in accounting software acceptable to the World Bank.

106. An integrated financial management system will be set up to enable each Departmental Accountant to maintain the program's records for expenditures and payments incurred at national and regional level.

107. Each units and antennas will prepare a budget for implementing its activities taking into account the overall strategy defined by the CONADER. The strategy will identify the activities to be undertaken, the role of different parties and present work plans and budgets. These will indicate the planned activities and related costs. Annual work plans and the budgets will be consolidated into a single document by the HCREC and this will be submitted to the CONADER for approval and thereafter to IDA for no objection. The consolidation will be done after the HCREC ensures, through its technical department that the plans and budgets meet the program objectives. The HCREC will retain a supervisory role over the activities of the antennas and ensure their effective use and management of funds.

108. A qualified, experienced and independent external auditing firm will be appointed on approved terms of reference. The bi-annual external financial audit will cover all aspects of the project activities including eligibility of expenditures, payment to ex-combatants and funding of micro-project and physical inspections.

Disbursement arrangements and financing mechanisms

109. The Bank has recently approved CFPs (Country Financing Parameters) for the Republic of Congo. In agreement with the Government, disbursements will be made by project components. Expenditures under the program will also be financed at 100%. The Government is seeking an exemption from taxes and duties for PNDDR activities. In the eventuality of a future EU contribution to PNDDR through the MDRP, this will also be managed by HCREC and the same financing mechanisms will apply as for the MDRP Grant. Technical, financial and procurement audits of HCREC will be conducted semi-annually.

110. To facilitate project implementation and reduce the volume of withdrawal applications, HCREC will open two Special Accounts in CFA under the MDRP grant on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA. The authorized allocation will be 550 million CFAs for Special Account A and 650 million CFAs for Special Account B. The amounts have been calculated to represent approximately four months of eligible expenditures. Upon grant effectiveness, IDA will deposit CFA 225 million in Special Account A and CFA 350 million in Special Account B representing 50% of the authorized allocation. The balance will be made available when aggregate withdrawals from the grant account plus the total amount of all outstanding Special Commitments entered into by the Association shall be equal to or exceed the equivalent of \$4 million for Special Account A and US\$3 million for Special Account B. The Special Accounts will be used for all payments inferior to 20% of the deposited amount and replenishment applications will be submitted, at least once a month. Additional deposits into the Special Accounts will be made against withdrawal applications supported by appropriate documents. The Special Accounts will be audited semi-annually by external auditors acceptable to IDA as part of the overall project audit.

111. *Direct cash payments for reinsertion to ex-combatants:* In order to improve the financial management of these payments and ensure the timely availability of funds, the project will put in place a dedicated special account to be used only for processing these payments. Payments will be made directly to ex-combatants through a financial institutions channel selected on the basis of their experiences and qualifications.

112. Funds will be disbursed from the Special Account with internal controls provided by the FMA. Eligible ex-combatants will be required to appear for payments at specified times and locations with their ID cards. Payments will be initiated and authorized at the Central level by HCREC. Cash payments to the 11,000 ex-combatants for reinsertion will be made under a services contract signed between a financial agent and HCREC. The financial agent will be required to submit weekly reports of cash payments, as indicated in the Financial Management Manual.

113. Disbursements to the Government will be made in two tranches under categories 1(b) and 1(c) of the disbursement schedule below, respectively subject to disbursement conditions, as indicated in the grant agreement. The tranches will be deposited at BEAC

(Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale) in an account of HCREC for further transfer to the account of the financial agent. IDA will release the second tranche upon receipt of a payment progress report and a list of payments signed by the beneficiaries.

114. For the socio-economic reintegration, ex-combatants benefiting from micro-projects will be encouraged to open bank accounts for the receipt of benefits with a mutual with national presence. Membership in the mutual will enable beneficiaries to future credit on the basis of capital accumulation. This will also limit administrative delays and risks associated with cash transport, and encourage fiscal responsibility. The financial institutions selected for this purpose will sign a services contract with the HCREC.

115. HCREC will open two Special Accounts in order to manage program expenditures, as follows:

(a) Special Account A will be dedicated to payments for socio-economic reintegration. This special account will also finance sub-projects to urban and rural communities. Special Account A will be opened at BEAC for direct transfers to the personal accounts at MUCODEC (Mutuelle Congolaise d’Epargne et de Cr dit), firms or organizations offering employment and training, or *Agence d’Encadrement* accounts. Disbursements will be authorized for micro-projects having fulfilled the eligibility criteria, as specified in the Program Implementation Manual. Second tranche payments will be subject to a technical certificate of progress and a simplified financial report, as per the Bank’s May 7, 2002 FM simplified guidelines for CDD projects. For reintegration support, including micro-projects, evidence of payment will be maintained by the HCREC for review by the external auditors. For community infrastructure sub-projects, evidence of payment will be maintained by each community for review by the external auditors. Payment documentation will not be required by HCREC for the deposit of the second tranche under a sub-project.

(b) Special Account B will finance the required goods, training, works and services under all project components and relevant categories of expenditure. Expenditures financed under Special Account B will relate to demobilization and identification, socio-economic reintegration, reintegration support to communities, Special Groups, Prevention and settlement of conflicts and HCREC management. The seven HCREC local antennas will be receiving monthly advances not to exceed FCFA 350,000, which will also be funded from Special Account B.

116. *Use of Statements of Expenditures (SOEs)*. Disbursements for all expenditures should be made against full documentation except for contracts valued at less than (i) US\$300,000 for works; (ii) US\$200,000 for goods; (iii) US\$100,000 for consulting firms and (iv) US\$50,000 for individual consultants, which will be claimed on the basis of Statement of Expenditures (SOEs). Cash payments, individual or group micro-grants, community sub-projects, training and operating costs will also be claimed on the basis of statement of expenditures (SOEs). All supporting documentation for SOEs will be retained at HCREC, departmental antennas and communities. They will be kept readily accessible for review by periodic MDRP supervision missions and external auditors.

Table 3: Disbursement schedule:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Amount (USD)</u>	<u>% of Expenditures financed</u>
1) <u>Demobilization and Identification</u> (A)		
(a) Goods, training, works and consultant services	500,000	100%
(b) Safety nets to ex-combatants of the Pool region		
(i) Tranche A	300,000	100%
(ii) Tranche B	200,000	100%
(c) Safety nets to former members of <i>Force Publique</i>		
(i) Tranche A	300,000	
(ii) Tranche B	200,000	
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>1,500,000</i>	
2) <u>Socio-economic Reintegration</u> (B):		
(a) medical and psychosocial services	800,000	100%
(b) micro-projects individual and groups	8,000,000	100%
(c) Service from <i>Agences d'encadrement</i>	1,000,000	100%
(d) Professional training for ex-combatants	1,000,000	100%
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>10,800,000</i>	
3) <u>Community projects</u> (C):		
(a) Community sub-projects	600,000	100%
(b) Services of <i>Agences d'encadrement</i>	50,000	100%
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>650,000</i>	
4) <u>Groupes spéciaux</u> (D) (Goods, training, workshops)	665,000	100%
5) <u>Prevention/ Reduction of conflict and violence</u> (E) (Goods, training, workshops)	335,000	100 %
6) <u>Program Management</u> (F) (Consultant services, training)	2,050,000	100%
7) Contingencies	1,000,000	
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>17,000,000</i>	

5.4 Procurement

117. An evaluation has been made of procurement needs and capacities in relation to the project. Procurement for the proposed project will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank's "Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" dated May 2004; and "Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers" dated May 2004, and the provisions stipulated in the Legal Agreement. The proposed general description of various items under different expenditure category are described below. For each contract to be financed by the Grant, the different procurement methods or consultant selection methods, the need for prequalification, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and time frame will be agreed between the Borrower and the Bank project team in the Procurement Plan.

118. The Grant will finance goods required for the demobilization process, including basic needs kits, equipment to prepare ID cards. The Grant will also finance office equipment and vehicles/motorcycles for the HCREC and the departmental antennas, as

well as the rehabilitation and construction of sites, and the purchase of essential equipment.

119. *Procurement of Works:* Civil works contracts will be very limited in both number and value, hence no ICB is foreseen. However, ICB procedures will apply for civil works estimated to cost the equivalent of US\$ 500,000 or more. Civil works estimated to cost between US\$ 100,000 and less than US\$ 500,000 equivalent per contract may be awarded by National Competitive Bidding (NCB) in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of the Guidelines.

120. Given the urgent requirement to rehabilitate demobilization centers on an exceptional basis, civil works estimated to cost less than US\$ 100,000 equivalent per contract may be procured in accordance with the Shopping procedures described in paragraph 3.5 of the Guidelines. A simple format of the invitation with all the subsequent documents (instruction to bidders, model of contract etc.) will be included in the Program Implementation Manual.

121. *Procurement of Goods.* The procurement of goods will be done using Bank's SBD for all ICB and National SBD agreed with (or satisfactory to) the Bank. Contracts for goods estimated to cost US\$200,000 equivalent or more, may be awarded by International Competitive Bidding (ICB). Goods estimated to cost less than US\$200,000 equivalent per contract may be awarded by National Competitive Bidding (NCB) as described in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of the IDA procurement guidelines.

122. Due to the urgency of the Program, and in order to facilitate the speedy procurement of immediately required drugs and other critical items such as reagents and medical items estimated to cost not exceeding the equivalent of US\$ 100,000 per contract as well as other goods not exceeding the equivalent of US\$50,000 may be procured on the basis of Shopping Procedures in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.5 of the Guidelines.

123. Goods including vehicles, motorcycles, computers, drugs and medical items may be procured through United Nations agencies in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.9 of the guidelines. Goods which must be purchased from the original supplier to be compatible with existing equipment or, are of proprietary nature may, with IDA's prior agreement, be procured by direct contracting in accordance with the provisions of the paragraph 3.6 of the Guidelines.

124. *Selection of Consultants:* Consultants' services procured under the Grant will finance the strengthening of local institutions responsible for the execution of the Program: HCREC, Provincial Program Offices, district administrations as well as associations and community-based groups. The Grant will also finance technical studies in support of Program execution, the monitoring of Program components, external financial audits and external Program evaluations.

125. All consultant services estimated to cost more than US\$100,000 equivalent per contract will be selected using the Quality and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) method. For contracts estimated to cost less than US\$100,000 equivalent, the short list may be comprised entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph

2.7 of the Consultant Guidelines. However, if foreign firms express an interest in these contracts, they will not be excluded from the selection process.

126. Consultant services for training, technical advisory services and implementation support for special groups and HIV/AIDS activities estimated to cost less than US\$ 100,000 equivalent for firms may be awarded through the Consultants' Qualifications method in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the Guidelines. Consulting services contracts meeting the requirements of Section V of the Consultants Guidelines may be selected under the provisions for the selection of Individual Consultants, i.e. through the comparison of the *curriculum vitae* of at least 3 qualified individuals.

127. Contracts for consultant services for financial audits and external evaluations, estimated to cost less than US\$75,000 equivalent per contract, may be awarded using the Least Cost Selection Method, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.1 and 3.6 of the Bank's Guidelines for the selection of consultants.

128. UN agencies may be hired as consultants, where they are qualified to provide technical assistance and advice in their area of expertise, according to the provisions of paragraph 3.15 of the Guidelines. UN agencies may be hired on a single-source selection basis if the criteria outlined in Section 3.10 of the Guidelines are fulfilled.

129. For contracts with a commercial bank or other financial firm to handle cash payments, single source selection may be used provided it is done with prior approval of the Bank and according to the provisions of paragraphs 3.8 through 3.11 of the Consultant Guidelines.

130. *Procurement implementation.* Procurement activities under the NPDDR will be handled by HCREC via a procurement specialist based in Brazzaville, recruited for that purpose. He or she shall be primarily responsible for (i) preparation of the General Procurement Notice and its annual update; (ii) preparation of the specific procurement notices; (iii) preparation and update of the six monthly procurement plan; (iv) drafting bidding documents and request of proposals; (v) awarding of contracts and requesting for IDA no-objections when required; and (vi) drafting of contracts and ensuring that contracts are implemented and managed properly.

131. *Procurement Capacity Assessment* A procurement capacity assessment was carried out by a MDRP procurement specialist during the MDRP mission that took place in January and February 2005. The assessment was updated on December 6, 2005. The review addressed the legal aspects, procurement cycle management, organization and function of procurement staff, support and control system, and record keeping. The main risks identified in the assessment are the following: (i) staff not sufficiently familiar with IDA procurement policy and procedures. (ii) deficient procurement planning (not updated since August 2004) and filing capacity; (ii) lack of sound support and control system.

132. The review assessed the risks (institutional, procedural) that may negatively affect the abilities of HCREC to carry out procurement activities as "high". To address these risks, technical assistance was provided to the project procurement officer in preparing the procurement plan prior to negotiations. During the first months of project

implementation, an international procurement consultant will assist the HCREC to provide on-the-job training to the national procurement officer.

133. As a vital tool for project start and implementation, the Government has developed a procurement plan for project implementation, which will provide the basis for the procurement methods. The Procurement Plan will be updated in agreement with the Project Team annually or as required to reflect the actual project implementation needs and any improvements in institutional capacity.

134. A project launch workshop will be organized at effectiveness to familiarize the HCREC staff with the Bank's procedures. The workshop will cover procurement policy and procedures and their application to procurement arrangements planned for project implementation, disbursement, reporting and audit requirements. In addition to the prior review supervision to be carried out from Bank offices, post review of procurement actions will be held frequently.

5.5 Monitoring and evaluation

135. *Monitoring and Evaluation.* A well-developed monitoring and evaluation system, complemented with close MDRP Secretariat/ World Bank supervision, will aim at ensuring that the program reaches the targeted beneficiaries in a timely and efficient manner. It is important that information on the beneficiaries is seized during the demobilization process, stored and utilized to inform program implementation. The monitoring and evaluation system will aim to enable adjustments responding to collected data during the course of the program. Its strategy and design will be finalized after program effectiveness.

136. *Management Information System.* An effective management information system (MIS) is a critical management tool to register and monitor the target group beneficiaries, and the program implementation progress and effectiveness. Furthermore, a solid MIS can provide monitoring data, keep track of the utilization of program funds and improve financial management. In this regard, the Government will work closely with UNDP, which is the executing agency for the disarmament component of the PNDDR and which has developed dedicated software for DDR programs that can be tailor made to fit the circumstances of the situation.

137. Monitoring will be undertaken both at the national (HCREC) and the departmental level. The monitoring and evaluation unit of the HCREC will collect information during demobilization operations stage, to check on the delivery of reinsertion assistance and ex-combatants reintegration/reinsertion assistance. The HCREC will track the provision of assistance to ex-combatants throughout the life of the program. In addition, every six to twelve months starting from the effectiveness date of the program, surveys will be conducted to verify that program beneficiaries have received reinsertion/reintegration benefits and have acquired goods and services intended according to the budget and work plan of the Program. This will be in addition to random spot checks throughout the program to deter abuse.

138. Independent evaluations of the program will be carried out on an annual basis and will consist of quantitative and qualitative elements. Analyses of the databases can monitor progress on the achievements of the Program objectives. Since the integration of

ex-combatants into communities is a major factor for the long term success of the Program, the statistical evaluation will be complemented with beneficiary assessments consisting of participant observations and key informant and focal groups interviews. The interviews will be directed to the ex-combatants and their family as first beneficiaries and to the communities as secondary beneficiaries.

139. The HCREC and departmental antennas will measure the performance of the program against agreed performance indicators described in the table annexed to this document.

5.6 Program sustainability

140. The RCERP is designed to aid the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In this regard, it will make a positive contribution to the socioeconomic status of ex-combatants, their families and their communities of settlement. The program will also foster micro-economic recovery by transforming ex-combatants into positive economic actors and injecting financial resources at the local level. Furthermore, the Program will encourage national reconciliation. Although HCREC itself is a temporary structure, the Program will strengthen Government capacities at the departmental level for developing, managing and monitoring development interventions.

141. The reintegration assistance provided to ex-combatants is short to medium term. Sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants can be achieved through an increased absorption capacity of the Congolese economy, providing jobs for current and future generations. In this regard, a review will be held towards the end of the program to evaluate the program's impact in order to determine how longer term interventions for the reduction of poverty can be used to sustain program results.

6. Benefits and Risks

6.1 Benefits

142. The Program will enable the Government to consolidate the peace process and its social and economic development efforts. It is expected to support consolidation of security by supporting the peace process in the Pool region. It is an integral part of the PNDDR which is further expected to improve security through disarmament and security sector reform. The Program is designed to assist the return of up to 30,000 ex-combatants into productive social and economic life. Increased security following the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should contribute to increased normalcy in agricultural activities, ease transport constraints and provide an enabling environment for the return of displaced populations, and social investments.

6.2 Risks and Mitigation Measures

143. There are four significant external risks:

144. *The Pool:* A failure to politically resolve the situation in the Pool region could undermine the impact of the program, if not halt it completely. This risk is mitigated by the Government's multifaceted strategy to achieve political and social reconciliation in the Pool region. Political negotiations are on-going, and a committee has been established to monitor the peace-agreement signed in March 2003. Partial parliamentary elections to fill the vacant seats representing the Pool district are to be held this year. Other aspects of the strategy include the DDR process which also target the ex-combatants under the command of Reverend Ntoumi and other commanders in the pool, humanitarian and social assistance to entice the populations to go back to their place of origin, and economic reconstruction to ameliorate infrastructure in the Pool region.

145. *Disarmament:* Failure of or delays in the implementation of the disarmament program will, due to the linkages with the Program's demobilization and reintegration components, seriously impede successful implementation of the Program. To minimize this risk, a comprehensive coordination and collaboration mechanism between the different implementing units and partners will enhance adequate synchronization of the different components. Related to disarmament is the risk that the owners of the small arms targeted by the disarmament component will perceive the endeavor as a means for the Government to identify and crack down on any armed dissidents. This can be mitigated by a high degree of transparency, well-planned confidence building measures, as well as a high degree of vigilance on the part of national and international partners.

146. *Regional risks:* A break-down of the peace efforts in the DRC, resulting in an influx of refugees and foreign combatants, could destabilize the country and discourage national disarmament and demobilization. The peace process in the DRC has witnessed considerable progress in terms of both political and security. However, much remains to be done. While the Republic of Congo has previously managed to stay relatively stable during significant instability and conflict on the other side of the river, it can not be excluded that instability in the DRC may negatively impact on the Republic of Congo. The issue of ex-combatants on foreign soil will be addressed separately through an initiative currently being discussed within the MDRP framework.

147. The major program-specific risks and mitigation measures are as follows:

- (i) Program resources will possibly be diverted toward spending on other activities. Appropriate safeguards with respect to financial management, procurement and disbursement have been put in place to avoid such misuse of program resources. In addition, a local steering committee including local and international partners will oversee the implementation of the program.
- (ii) Weak implementation capacity could hamper effective implementation of the program. The program will make full use of the capacities and resources developed during the previous reintegration program, and the HCREC could be reinforced with additional staff and technical assistance as required.
- (iii) Reintegration payments could possibly leak to persons who are not eligible to receive benefits under the established screening criteria or who have already received benefits under previous programs. A significant moral hazard will

exist in the temptation for many to present themselves as ex-combatants, even if they have previously received assistance, in order to benefit from the last and final time such reintegration benefits are available. Safeguards will be in place to tighten the screening procedures, and to introduce verification and audits measures to reduce the occurrence of such leakage.

- (iv) The distribution of program benefits may be perceived as favoring one group over another. Support to community infrastructure and reconciliation, as well as a high degree of transparency on the part of project management as well as frequent supervision and coordination should offset this.

6.3 Environmental and Social Aspects

148. Building on lessons from other reintegration programs for displaced persons and ex-combatants, the Program contains a number of specific elements to identify social and environmental risks and devise appropriate mitigation measures. These procedures and measures will be elaborated in the social and environmental framework developed for the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) by the Africa Region's Social and Environmental Safeguards unit (ASPEN) in collaboration with the MDRP Secretariat. This constitutes a screening mechanism for projects, and is integrated in the program implementation manual.

149. The RCERP is a national project whose activities will focus on small scale infrastructure and employment generation in rural and urban areas. All small scale infrastructure will be in accordance with existing plans and standards. Employment generation will be in areas where ex combatants are resident, and based on an assessment of skills, feasibility, and community impact. All financing will be pre-screened for environmental impact and appropriate mitigation measures will be applied.

150. Measures aimed at mitigating negative social impacts of the Program include: (i) ensuring that there is no involuntary resettlement or displacement and that Ninja ex-combatants have equal access to the Program's benefits; (ii) carrying out specific social reintegration activities and monitoring; (iii) addressing the needs of female ex-combatants and of partners of ex-combatants; and (iv) carrying out activities targeted at child ex-combatants.

151. The program is classified as environmental category B, as it includes support to income-generating activities. Although no adverse environmental impacts are expected, preventive mitigation measures are in place. Building on lessons from other reintegration programs for displaced persons and ex-combatants, the program contains a number of specific elements to identify social and environmental risks and devise appropriate mitigation measures. These procedures and measures are elaborated in the Environmental and Social Screening Procedures developed for the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) by the Africa Region's Social and Environmental Safeguards unit (ASPEN) in collaboration with the MDRP Secretariat. These procedures constitute a screening mechanism for all MDRP projects, and are integrated in the program implementation manual through specific selection criteria and mitigation measures. Furthermore, adequate arrangements for medical waste disposal of HIV/AIDS testing materials will be included in the Program Implementation Manual.

152. The RCERP will seek to promote participatory social and environmental monitoring. Annual evaluations will include an assessment of, among others: the procedures to access land; the occurrence of involuntary displacement or resettlement; the degree of community acceptance; the existence of discrimination on the basis of gender or previous military affiliation; the level of personal security of ex-combatants; the inclusion of Ninja ex-combatants in the program's activities; the level of criminal activities undertaken by ex-combatants; and the impact of reintegration on an ex-combatant's family members. These evaluations will help to identify social and environmental impacts, determine the appropriateness of procedures and processes, and make recommendations for improvements where necessary.

153. The MDRP Environmental and Social Screening Procedures discussed above will be publicly disclosed at effectiveness all over the territory and disseminated through national sensitization campaigns by the High Commissariat for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants nationally and from its seven provincial offices.

7. Financial and Economic Justification

154. Consolidation of peace is a necessary precondition for economic development and poverty reduction, as argued in the Transitional Support Strategy.


155. The design of the program aims to keep costs at a minimum without compromising quality. Elements from the structures already in existence from the previous IDA credit will be used to the extent possible rather than recreating a completely new set-up. With cost per beneficiary of approximately US\$ 830, the cost of the PNDDR will be in the lower range of per beneficiary costs established within the MDRP framework.

Annex 1: Key Performance Indicators

Project Development Objectives	Key performance indicators (outcome)
<p>(i) Contribute to improvement of security through disarmament and demobilization of up to 11,000 combatants</p> <p>(ii) Support social reintegration through rehabilitation of social infrastructure and conflict management and reconciliation</p> <p>(iii) Support economic reintegration through income generating activities to ex-combatants</p>	<p>Significant proportions of ex-combatants take part in community wide decision making procedures</p> <p>Beneficiary ex-combatants standard of living at program's end similar to non-combatant community members</p> <p>Ex-combatants able to compete for economic opportunities as other civilians in the community within a year of resettlement</p> <p>30 community infrastructure projects in function and use after one year of being completed</p> <p>Perceived reduction in community-level violence and conflict</p>
Component/ activity	Key performance indicators (outputs)
<p>Demobilization/ Reinsertion</p> <p>(i) Encampment, demobilization and registration of Pool combatants</p> <p>(ii) Information and sensitization of combatants from Pool and <i>Force Publique</i></p> <p>(iii) Reinsertion of combatants from Pool and <i>Force Publique</i></p> <p>Reintegration</p> <p>Social Reintegration</p> <p>(iv) Identification of eligible backlog ex-combatants</p> <p>(v) Rehabilitation of social infrastructure</p> <p>(vi) Conflict management and reconciliation in communities</p> <p>(vii) family reunification and psycho-social support for children ex-combatants</p> <p>Economic Reintegration</p> <p>(viii) Income generation for ex combatants</p> <p>(ix) Special assistance to children and disabled ex-combatants</p>	<p>5000 demobilized from the rebel forces in the Pool</p> <p>6000 demobilized from <i>Force Publique</i></p> <p>Reinsertion pay of \$150/person disbursed to demobilized eligible for reinsertion benefits</p> <p>30,000 beneficiaries identified according to selection criteria and issued non-falsifiable ID cards</p> <p>80% of beneficiaries active in income generating activity within 12 months after receiving ID cards</p> <p>40 community infrastructure projects completed by program end</p> <p>20 communities benefited from conflict management activities</p> <p>Each demobilized child soldier has received targeted reintegration assistance within one year of receiving ID card</p> <p>Each disabled ex-combatant has received medical rehabilitation assistance within one year of receiving ID card</p>
Inputs	Process indicators
Financial agent effectively carries out reinsertion payment	- Financial agent responsible for disbursement of reinsertion pay contracted within 6 months of effectiveness

Demobilization centers provide necessary services	- 2 demobilization centers fully operational within 8 months of effectiveness
Registration team recruited within 3 months of effectiveness	- MIS fully functional in HQ and antennas within 6 months of effectiveness
Eligible combatants identified according to criteria and beneficiary category (reinsertion + reintegration or reintegration only)	- Implementation partner for HIV/AIDS sensitization contracted within 6 months of effectiveness
Support for ex-combatants toward reintegration activities	- Eligible candidates for reinsertion receive support within 6 months of receiving ID card
Community social infrastructure projects identified and selected	- 10 proposals for community infrastructure rehabilitation received with 12 months of effectiveness
Conflict management component operationalized	- Partnerships with experienced organizations in conflict management established within 6 months of effectiveness
	- Partnerships with experienced organizations with children, youth, and disabled established
	- All 7 antennas fully operational within 6 months of effectiveness
	- Conflict management strategy articulated within 6 months of effectiveness

Annex 2: Organigrams of institutional structure



Annex 3: Letter of demobilization Policy

LETTRE DE POLITIQUE GENERALE DE DÉSARMEMENT, DE DÉMOBILISATION ET DE RÉINSERTION

1 EXPOSÉ DES MOTIFS

Depuis 1993, le Congo est le théâtre de nombreux conflits civils armés. Ceux-ci ont eu d'énormes conséquences, entre autres :

- la destruction des structures de production et d'infrastructures diverses
- le déplacement des populations vers les forêts et les pays frontaliers
- l'accroissement du chômage ;
- la prolifération d'armes de guerre et leur circulation illicite ;
- l'existence de nombreux miliciens détenteurs desdites armes.

Le pays vit dans une insécurité permanente, qui freine son développement.

C'est à cet effet que le gouvernement s'emploie depuis 1999 à restaurer la paix par :

- le dialogue;
- l'amnistie ;
- le désarmement
- la démobilisation
- la réintégration dans les forces régulières des militaires ayant servi dans les milices;
- l'incorporation dans les forces régulières d'une partie des miliciens
- la réinsertion socio-économique pour les autres.

Pour ce qui est du dialogue, le Congo en a organisé un de mars à mai 2001. A la suite de cet événement une Convention Nationale pour la paix et la reconstruction du Congo a été mise en place ainsi qu'un comité de suivi. Par ailleurs, un Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants, destiné à créer les conditions de resocialisation des Ex-Miliciens a été institué.

Malgré la relance des hostilités en 2002 dans le département du Pool par Monsieur BITSANGOU Sébastien alias NTOUMI, le Gouvernement est resté constant sur sa logique de Paix en proclamait une amnistie générale, en multipliant des appels à la paix, à la réconciliation ainsi qu'à l'unité nationale.

Le 17 mars 2003 cette volonté s'est réaffirmé à travers la signature d'un accord confirmant les accords de cessez le feu et de cessation des hostilités de décembre 1999.

A la même date un Comité ad hoc et une Commission technique chargés de suivre la tenue des engagements pris ont été institués.

Depuis lors, le Gouvernement s'attelle au désarmement des miliciens, à leur démobilisation et à leur réinsertion avec l'aide de L'OIM/PNUD (Organisation Internationale des Migrations / Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement) et la Banque Mondiale à travers le crédit IDA.

Au 30 mai 2003, l'évaluation suivante peut être faite :

1.1 Sur le plan du désarmement

1. le comité de suivi des accords de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités de novembre et décembre 1999 a ramassé environ 6.550 armes légères et de petit calibre et quelques armes de gros calibre (y compris les munitions) entre janvier et décembre 2000;
2. le programme PNUD/OIM a ramassé et détruit 11.140 armes légères et de petit calibre (y compris des explosifs et des grenades) entre juillet 2000 et décembre 2002;
3. la Force Publique (armée, gendarmerie, police) a ramassé 1.452 armes légères et de petit calibre entre 1999 et 2002.

1.2 Sur le plan de la réinsertion

1. le programme PNUD/OIM a permis la réinsertion d'environ 8.000 Ex-Miliciens, grâce à un financement à hauteur de 4.505.000 USD de plusieurs bailleurs ⁽²⁾
2. le Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants a déjà subventionné des micro-projets d'activités génératrices de revenus au profit de 6.150 ex-combattants pour un objectif de 9.000 ex-combattants fixés dans l'accord de crédit de 5 millions de dollars US signé avec la Banque Mondiale.

Comme on le constate, on peut dire que d'énormes efforts sont faits, même s'ils restent encore insuffisants. On évalue à plus ou moins 42.000 armes légères et de petit calibre encore en circulation, de nombreux miliciens restent à démobiliser, à réinsérer ou à reconverter dans des secteurs productifs tant sur le plan économique que sur le plan social.

L'importance des tâches a conduit le Gouvernement à prendre les engagements suivants :

- reformer et restructurer la force publique pour bénéficier, dans le cadre du processus régional de Paix, des arrangements du programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réinsertion ;
- poursuivre le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réinsertion ou la reconversion des Ex-Combattants ;
- promouvoir et consolider l'Etat de droit, la bonne gouvernance et la transparence dans la gestion des affaires publiques ;
- adhérer résolument au processus régional de paix par la production du programme national de démobilisation, de désarmement et réinsertion (PNDDR).

2 DES PROGRES

2.1 Au plan national

Au sortir du dialogue national sans exclusive et de la convention nationale tenus en 2001, le peuple congolais a réaffirmé son engagement à bâtir un Etat de droit fondé sur :

- 1) la séparation des Pouvoirs ;

² Le financement de ce programme a été assuré par:
PNUD: US\$ 1,300,000; Gouvernement congolais: US\$ 400,000; Gouvernement de la Norvège: US\$ 600,000; Gouvernement suédois: US\$ 955,000; Gouvernement des Etats-Unis: US\$ 500.000
Union Européenne : \$US 750.000

- 2) le pluralisme politique ;
- 3) les élections démocratiques comme unique moyen d'accès au pouvoir d'Etat, la bonne gouvernance et la transparence dans la gestion des affaires publiques.

Au travers du processus électoral, le Congo s'est doté d'une constitution qui consacre les principes ci-dessus évoqués.

Un régime politique de type présidentiel est instauré. A ce jour, toutes les institutions prévues par la constitution sont installées et fonctionnent régulièrement. Il s'agit :

- du Sénat ;
- de l'Assemblée Nationale ;
- de la Cour Suprême ;
- de la Cour Constitutionnelle ;
- de la Cour des Comptes ;
- du Conseil Economique et Social ;
- du Conseil Supérieur de la Liberté de la Communication et de l'audio visuel ;
- la Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme.

Tout ce qui précède permet d'éviter l'arbitraire et consolide l'Etat de Droit, la bonne gouvernance et la transparence.

2.2 Au plan international

Au triple plan régional, sous régional et international, la République du Congo est l'un des pays africains qui soutiennent le projet de création d'une année interafricaine de maintien de la paix. Le Président de la République a, par ailleurs, présenté à l'Union Africaine, lors de sa deuxième session ordinaire de Maputo (Mozambique) en juillet 2003, un projet de « pacte panafricain de non-agression » qui a suscité l'intérêt de ses pairs. Ce projet est actuellement en étude.

Par le passé, la République du Congo a participé à plusieurs missions humanitaires ou de maintien de la paix sous l'égide d'organisations internationales. On pourrait citer les cas suivants :

- 1979 : Tchad, sous mandat de l'OUA.
- 1989-1993 : Angola, sous mandat de l'ONU (UNAVEM I, II et III).
- 1990 : Mozambique, sous mandat de l'ONU.
- 1991 : Namibie, sous le mandat de l'ONU.
- 1994 : Rwanda, mission Turquoise France-Afrique.
- 1995 : Rwanda, sous le mandat de l'ONU (MINUAR 1).
- 2002-2003 : Centrafrique, sous le mandat de la CEMAC.

Le Gouvernement congolais participe aux travaux du Comité Consultatif Permanent des Nations Unies pour les questions de sécurité en Afrique Centrale. Il a signé et ratifié le protocole relatif au Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique Centrale (COPAX) ainsi que le pacte de non-agression et l'accord d'assistance mutuelle en matière de défense.

Il a par ailleurs signé le protocole relatif au Conseil de paix et de Sécurité de l'Union Africaine, texte qui se substitue au mécanisme de l'OUA pour la prévention, la gestion et le règlement des conflits en Afrique.

Tout récemment, le Congo s'est joint au Gabon, à la Guinée Equatoriale et au Tchad pour déployer une force multinationale de la CEEMAC en République Centrafricaine afin de maintenir et consolider la paix dans ce pays.

Avec les Gouvernements de l'Angola et de la République Démocratique du Congo, le Gouvernement du Congo a mis en place une commission tripartite de sécurité pour veiller à la sécurisation des frontières communes.

Comme on le constate, le Gouvernement de la République du Congo a fourni beaucoup d'efforts sur le plan international pour renforcer la sécurité dans la sous-région. Il s'engage à poursuivre cet effort dans les perspectives du PNDDR et du Programme Multinational de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion (PMDR).

3 STRATÉGIES DE MISE EN OEUVRE DU PNDDR ET GESTION INSTITUTIONNELLE

3.1 Stratégie de mise en oeuvre du PNDDR

La mise en oeuvre du PNDDR comprend trois volets :

3.1.1 Stratégie de désarmement.

Le désarmement poursuit les principaux objectifs ci-après :

- retirer les armes de guerre des mains des détenteurs non autorisés
- améliorer le niveau de sécurité sur le territoire national et dans la sous-région ;
- enrayer la prolifération et le commerce illicite des armes de guerre au Congo et dans la sous-région.

Les opérations de désarmement se dérouleront dans les casernes sous la responsabilité des autorités militaires en ce qui concerne les ex-combattants des forces armées régulières, et dans les centres d'accueil avant démobilisation en ce qui concerne les groupes armés rebelles du Pasteur NTOUMI. Bien que démobilisés depuis 2000 et en cours de réinsertion, certains ex-combattants possèdent encore des armes. Leur désarmement et celui des civils détenteurs d'armes se feront sous la responsabilité du Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants avec l'assistance de la Force publique et de la communauté internationale.

Le processus de désarmement se fera en deux étapes :

- i) le désarmement volontaire ;
- ii) le désarmement forcé.

i)- Le désarmement volontaire concerne les ex-combattants des forces irrégulières et les civils détenteurs illégaux d'armes de guerre. Pour les ex-combattants en cours de réinsertion ou à réinsérer, le désarmement sera précédé d'une déclaration volontaire, individuelle ou collective, d'armes détenues. Les détenteurs d'armes, éligibles au PNDDR, seront traités en priorité dans le cadre du financement de leurs activités génératrices des revenus. Un bonus de « bonne volonté » ou de « participation au processus de paix » leur sera accordé sous forme de financement supplémentaire de leurs micro-projets. Les civils sans emploi et non ex-combattants qui déclareront volontairement les armes détenues seront considérées comme éligibles au PNDDR dans le volet réinsertion économique. Les autres civils, ayant des emplois ou des sources viables de revenus et détenteurs d'armes qui manifesteront la volonté de les remettre, bénéficieront d'une

«prime de participation au processus de paix » sous forme de kit de travail de leur choix pour leur permettre de développer des activités complémentaires.

Le résultat attendu à l'issue du désarmement volontaire est le ramassage d'environ 30.000 armes légères et de petits calibres, sans compter les explosifs, les grenades et les munitions.

ii)- *Le désarmement forcé* est une étape qui ne pourra intervenir que si les résultats du désarmement volontaire sont jugés insatisfaisants. Il sera réalisé par la Force Publique selon les procédures réglementaires dans les zones cibles préalablement identifiées par les services spéciaux.

3.1.2 Stratégie de démobilisation

La démobilisation à mettre en oeuvre dans le cadre du PNDDR concerne la force publique et les miliciens ninjas du Pasteur NTOUMI, les autres ex-combattants étant déjà démobilisés par le comité de suivi depuis la signature des accords de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités de novembre et décembre 1999.

Les opérations de démobilisation des miliciens ninjas du Pasteur NTOUMI s'articuleront autour des activités suivantes :

- sensibilisation des populations cibles et des populations d'accueil sur le PNDDR et incitation au retour dans les villages et localités des populations déplacées ;
- cantonnement des ex-combattants dans des centres de démobilisation (Mindouli - Kibouendé - Matoumbou - Mbanza-Ndounga - Kindamba - Vindza et Brazzaville) ;
- vérification d'identité, recensement/enregistrement et orientation avant le départ: information sur le plan national de DDR, éducation civique et morale, information sur le VIH/SIDA, conseil psychosocial, etc. ;
- collecte des données socio-économiques des ex-combattants ;
- fourniture d'un kit de biens et d'une prime frictionnelle pour la satisfaction des besoins immédiats des ex-combattants (alimentation, santé, habillement, couchage) en attendant leur réinsertion sociale et économique ;
- transport et installation des ex-combattants dans leur localité d'origine ;
- orientation et conseil après installation dans les communautés d'accueil.

La démobilisation des combattants des forces régulières se déroulera selon le schéma ci-dessus, mais le cantonnement aura lieu dans des centres spécifiques, créés à cet effet par la force publique avec l'assistance de la Communauté Internationale.

3.1.3 Stratégie de réinsertion sociale et économique

Dans le cadre du PNDDR, la réinsertion se traduit par un nouvel équilibre socio-économique ; par l'acceptation d'un ex-combattant et de sa famille dans la communauté d'accueil et par la participation aux activités communautaires. La réinsertion économique est alors le processus à l'issue duquel un ex-combattant sans emploi ou ayant perdu un emploi, est intégré dans la vie active par l'acquisition de moyens de subsister sans faire appel aux armes, et acquiert une indépendance économique et financière à terme, grâce à la pérennité de ses activités génératrices de revenus.

3.1.4 Stratégie de réinsertion sociale

D'une façon générale et dans le cadre du PNDDR, la réinsertion sociale consiste en la prise en charge médico-sociale des ex-combattants afin de leur assurer un équilibre social, psychologique et sanitaire. Il s'agira donc de leur faire subir des examens psychologiques et para cliniques, et de leur apporter des soins médicaux et psychothérapeutiques.

Un programme spécifique de prise en charge psychosociale des enfants soldats développera des activités de rescolarisation, d'alphabétisation fonctionnelle, de formation qualifiante et de soutien aux familles d'origine (ou d'accueil pour les enfants-soldats orphelins).

Par ailleurs, les activités de réinsertion sociale consisteront en un appui aux communautés d'accueil sous forme de réalisation des projets communautaires pour améliorer les conditions de vie des communautés d'accueil et des ex-combattants.

3.1.5 Stratégie de réinsertion économique

Le succès à long terme du PNDDR sera fonction de la pérennité des solutions de réinsertion économique et sociale qui seront retenues.

Dans cette optique, la stratégie de réinsertion économique adoptée consiste à appuyer les bénéficiaires directs dans la création par eux-mêmes des micro-entreprises et/ou des activités génératrices des revenus. S'il est de la responsabilité du bénéficiaire de choisir le type de micro-entreprise à créer ou d'activités à mener ainsi que le secteur d'activité, il reviendra au Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des ex-combattants de leur apporter des services d'appui (études, conseils, suivi, etc.), directement ou par le truchement des organismes spécialisés dans les études de faisabilité et le développement des micro-projets et avec qui le Haut Commissariat signera des accords de sous-traitance.

Les bénéficiaires recevront un appui personnalisé par le biais de discussion et de conseils individuels ou collectifs avec les organismes spécialisés retenus par le Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des ex-Combattants afin de retenir les micro-projets adéquats avec leurs capacités de mise en oeuvre des projets.

Pour garantir la bonne mise en oeuvre des micro-projets, il sera organisé à l'attention des bénéficiaires des formations destinées à renforcer leurs capacités individuelles ou collectives ; un appui leur sera aussi apporté pour faciliter les importations des matériels et consommations intermédiaires dont ils auront besoin. Tous les projets seront financés par étape, afin de mieux suivre et évaluer l'évolution des activités programmées. Si le bénéficiaire ne respecte pas les engagements pris (utilisation de la subvention à des fins économiques réalisation des activités génératrices des revenus, respect du calendrier de mise en oeuvre ...), les décaissements des autres tranches seront immédiatement suspendus.

3.2 Mécanismes institutionnels de mise en oeuvre

Les mécanismes institutionnels de mise en oeuvre du PNDDR sont déjà créés. Ils comprennent :

Une instance d'orientation et de coordination placée sous l'autorité du Ministre, Directeur de Cabinet du Chef de l'Etat. Cette instance, dénommée Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion (CONADER) est composé des représentants des pouvoirs publics, des représentants de la société civile. (ONG), des personnalités retenues en raison de leurs compétences diverses en rapport avec la mission de la CONADER.

Une instance de gestion opérationnelle du PNDDI~, placée sous la tutelle du Cabinet du Président de la République, administrée par la CONADER et dirigée par un Haut Commissaire. Cette

instance, dénommée Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants (HCREC), a été créée par décret présidentiel n° 2001-427 du 10 août 2001.

Il est également prévu une instance de concertation, dénommée Comité de Pilotage, créée par décret présidentiel n° 2003-3 du 21 janvier 2003.

Le Comité de Pilotage « est un organe consultatif qui émet des avis sur les questions relatives à la démobilisation, au désarmement et à la réinsertion sociale et économique des ex-combattants ». Sa fonction est de faciliter les échanges d'informations sur les activités de démobilisation, de désarmement et de réinsertion en cours dans le pays, qu'elles soient du fait du HCREC ou de tout autre intervenant, gouvernement ou non. Si nécessaire, le Comité de Pilotage cherchera, à travers des échanges de points de vue entre ses membres, à harmoniser les différentes interventions dans un but de recherche d'un maximum d'efficacité et de cohérence.

Présidé par le Haut Commissaire à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants, le Comité de Pilotage comprend le Haut Commissaire Adjoint, les Commissaires, les représentants de l'administration publique et les représentants des institutions de la société civile spécialisées dans les problèmes de réinsertion et les organisations internationales intervenant dans la réinsertion..

Au plan territorial, des comités départementaux de mise en oeuvre du PNDDR sont institués aux chefs lieux des départements. Ils aident les antennes du Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants. Ces comités sont présidés par les Préfets et ont pour membres les chefs traditionnels et religieux, les représentants des administrations intéressées aux problèmes de la réinsertion des ex-combattants.

4 POPULATION CIBLE

4.1 Catégories des populations cibles et critères de sélection

Sont éligibles au PNDDR :

- les personnels de la Force Publique ne remplissant pas les conditions réglementaires de recrutement ;
- les ex-combattants ;
- les ex-miliciens et les militaires réguliers congolais réfugiés dans les pays étrangers ;
- les ex-combattants étrangers réfugiés au Congo.

Ces deux dernières catégories d'Ex-combattants ainsi que ceux d'entre eux qui remettront une arme seront pris en charge par des programmes spéciaux.

Les critères de sélection et de reconnaissance du statut d'Ex combattants sont :

- Avoir pris part directement (en manipulant les armes au front) ou indirectement (éclaireur, agent de renseignements, membre de l'intendance ou personnel de soutien) aux différents conflits armés,
- Faire partie des forces régulières, mais sans réunir les conditions réglementaires de recrutement en leur sein.
- Estimation de la population cible.

Le PNDDR prendra en charge entre 2004 et 2006 environ 42.277 ex-combattants dont :

- 16.277 ex-combattants déjà démobilisés depuis 2000 et en attente de réinsertion (hors programme financé par la Banque Mondiale) ;
- 8.500 ex-combattants ninjas des groupes rebelles du Pasteur NTOUMI dont 1.700 enfants-soldats ;
- 6.000 hommes de la Force Publique ;
- 5.500 ex-miliciens et militaires réguliers congolais réfugiés dans les pays étrangers, notamment dans les pays voisins ;
- 6.000 ex-combattants étrangers réfugiés au Congo.

Brazzaville, 12 novembre 2003
Denis SASSOU NGUESSO

Annex 4: Map

IBRD Map # 33390