

## **IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION MEMORANDUM (ICM)**

TF Name: Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola  
TF Number: TF052486  
Report Date: December, 31, 2005  
Program:

Net Grant Amount: \$4,335,000

Donor(s): MDTF (TF050574-- Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, EC)  
Approval Date: August, 20, 2003  
Closing Date: June 30, 2005

### **A. GRANT OBJECTIVES**

#### Original Statement of Grant Objectives

*Provide original statement of objectives from the approving grant or cleared IBTF.*

To assist the Government of Angola in Demobilizing and Reintegrating ex-combatants and their families within its territory, into civil society through the provision of social and economic assistance.

The project had three specific components with the following distinct activities:

- a. Provision of basic agricultural assistance for 50,000 ex-combatants and their families for one year including provision of seeds, tools and technical support
- b. Provision of support to enable ex-combatants to carry out income-generating activities including:
  - (i) Provision of business management training and micro-credit,
  - (ii) Carrying out of community works activities such as rehabilitation of infrastructure and provision of public services, and
  - (iii) Vocational training
- c. Capacity building for the beneficiary's "Instituto de Reintegração Socio - Profissional dos Ex-Militares" (IRSEM) through the provision of technical advisory services and training.

Background. This project was launched following the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Angola and UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, i.e., the principal opposition group that had been waging war against the Government for more than 25 years) in April 2002. The trust funded "special" project served to pilot the national demobilization and reintegration program (the ADRP) that was being prepared by the Government with the help of the World Bank, but which was delayed in becoming effective. Therefore, donors to a multi-donor trust fund that was established to finance the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the greater Great Lakes region recommended that the Government make use of the funds available under the MDTF to quickly start reintegration activities for the ex-UNITA combatants demobilized in the first half of 2003. Capacity constraints on the side of Government that were delaying preparation and effectiveness of the national program led the Bank to recommend that UNDP and other UN agencies take the lead in implementing this grant. However, given the larger context in which the project was to work, capacity building was made a key focus of the grant.

### Changes to Grant Objectives

If original objectives have been changed, explain the nature of the revisions and the justification for them.

No changes

### Achievement of Grant Objectives

Discuss and rate the extent to which the activity achieved its relevant objectives.

#### Rating: SATISFACTORY

Of the three stated objectives, the project clearly was successful in achieving the first and third regarding (i) provision of basic agriculture assistance, and (ii) capacity building of IRSEM, as discussed below. Specifically, almost 90% of the target beneficiaries for agricultural assistance were reached, and savings realized in the implementation of the component allowed the project to augment the support to communities thereby enhancing community reception and social reintegration. An independent review of the larger Bank project in which this trust funded activity fits specifically found a high and positive level of community acceptance of returning ex-combatants. Regarding the second objective, the project was also successful in providing income-generation assistance support to more than the planned number of beneficiaries through vocational training, micro-credit and community works. However, it is unclear whether or not all those that participated in these activities were eligible post-Luena ex-combatants. Furthermore, insufficient data exist to say if the income-generation activities have been sustainable.

## **B. OUTPUT**

### Achievement of deliverables

1. Discuss and rate the actual output or deliverables completed, compared to the expected output, for each component of the grant.

Table 1 highlights the planned levels of activity and the actual achievements of the project sub-components.

#### Component 1: Agricultural Reintegration through the provision of agriculture assistance for 50,000 ex-combatants & their families

#### Rating: SATISFACTORY

The agricultural support component, which was carried out by FAO in conjunction with IRSEM and NGO partners, largely achieved its intended results. An agricultural package consisting of maize, beans and vegetable seeds, 1 machete and 1 hoe was procured and distributed to almost 45,000 ex-combatants and families, or

Activity	Number of Beneficiaries		
	Planned	Actual	Variance
<b>Agricultural Reintegration</b>	50,000	44,816	-10%
Province	Planned	Actual	Variance
Huambo	12,135	12,135	0%
Benguela	6,658	6,413	-4%
Bie	8,600	8,600	0%
Kuanza Sul	8,402	5,014	-40%
Huila	6,205	5,668	-9%
Kuando Kubango	8,000	2,886	-64%
Lobito (in stores)		4,100	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>44,816</b>	
<b>Economic Reintegration</b>			
Vocational Training	1,200	2,815	135%
Community Works	500	821	64%
Microbusiness	250	-	-100%
Advisory Services	250	334	34%
Job Placement	300	-	-100%
Micro Credit	400	334	-17%
Access to Tool Kits	640	587	-8%
<b>TOTAL*</b>	<b>3,540</b>	<b>4,891</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>IRSEM Institutional Capacity</b>			
Training Sessions	60	96	60%
Technical Assistance	Project Administration & Supervision		
* However, of the total of 4,304 beneficiaries, only 3,117 were post-Luena ex-combatants			

90% of the target. The short-fall in distribution was attributed to difficult access in certain areas particularly in Kuando Kubango and Kwanza Sul, and difficulties in identifying registered eligible ex-combatants. Of the remaining balance of approximately 5,000 kits, most were distributed to non combatant farm families, with approximately 1,000 seed kits being destroyed.

Though the quantity of agriculture kits approached the original plan, the quality changed due to the late arrival of seeds, thus necessitating a shift in the seed mix away from rain-fed crops. Nonetheless, this resulted in savings under the component that were used to buy some 50,000 hoes (of the 20,000 hoes initially planned) that were further distributed in the community receiving the ex-combatants thereby promoting equity and further enhancing the reception of the ex-combatants into the communities of reintegration. The savings was also used to procure 1,200

ploughs. Of these, 700 were assembled and distributed under the project while the balance remains in designated warehouses for distribution during subsequent agricultural campaigns under the IDA-supported demobilization and reintegration project. The project also supported FAO training of trainers in the production and conservation of seeds, production techniques and on the preparation and use of organic fertilizers (see Table 2)

Table 2 – Number of Trainees by Province

Province	Man	Woman	Total
Benguela	14	4	18
Bié	24	2	26
Huambo	21	2	23
Huíla	33	2	35
Kwanza Sul	15	4	19
K. Kubango	23	0	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>144</b>

**Component 2: Economic Reintegration** through the provision of support to enable ex-combatants to carry out income-generating activities

**Rating:** MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY

**Overall.** The Project was designed to provide an estimated 3,500 ex-combatants with some form of economic reintegration support (training, employment support, micro-credit, etc.) and UNDP ultimately reports having reached 4,891 ex-combatants through a total of 48 projects in 6 provinces. However, IRSEM’s management information system (SIG) is only able to match 3,117 of these 4,891 as post-Luena ex-combatants. The difference is made up of (i) participants who did not provide their official ID number (NIP) to the implementing partner at the time that assistance was provided, (ii) a failure on the part of IRSEM to capture the NIPs of all participants as the SIG was not yet established at the time of the special project, (iii) Luena ex-combatants who did not have NIPs at the time of the project, and (iv) ex-combatants from previous demobilization efforts. While not fully consistent with the underlying purpose of the grant—to support the recently demobilized combatants resulting from the Luena MOU—this was not an explicit requirement of the grant agreement.

**Vocational Training.** Vocation training that ranged from 3 to 6 months in duration in areas such as masonry, carpentry, blacksmithing, bicycle repair, etc., was provided to an estimated 2,815 ex-combatants, more than double the original projection. To complement this training, it was planned that 640 toolkits (both individual and collective) would be distributed to some of the trainees. However, only 587 kits were purchased and only an estimated 400 distributed due to delays in procurement.

**Employment Support & Community works.** A total of 584 ex-combatants directly benefited from short-term employment opportunities that ranged in duration from 4 to 6 months and paid between the equivalent of \$1.50-\$2.00 per day of labor. The sub-projects (11) helped in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure in the provinces of Bie, Benguela, Huambo, Huila and Kwanza Sul (Table 3).

Although the total number of individuals directly placed in permanent jobs is not recorded, NGO partners and UNDP report that some beneficiaries who received vocational training ultimately were employed in various institutions especially in the municipalities.

Business training, advisory services and micro-credit. The project selected 400 women from a group of 600 applicants using an entrepreneurship ability/aptitude test and trained them in basic small business management skills (15 hours total training). Of these 400, 334 applied for micro-credit from existing institutions and 172 were ultimately provided loans. However, a mid-term review of this sub-component in February 2005, indicated that approximately 80% of the borrowers were in arrears on their loan repayments.

Table 3 - Employment Support Subprojects by Province

Provinces	Nr Sub	Nr Benef	Amount USD
Bié	0		
Benguela	3	166	\$31,185
Huambo	2	80	\$29,331
Huíla	3	182	\$54,086
K. Sul	3	157	\$28,763
Malange	0	0	\$0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>584</b>	<b>\$143,365</b>

*Source: Numbers are extrapolated from the combined totals of the Special Project, CIDA and Spain Project*

**Component 3: Capacity Building of IRSEM through the provision of training and technical assistance.**

**Rating: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY**

The results of the third component of the Special Project financed through this trust fund have been the most important in terms of the longer term needs of the national demobilization and reintegration program. The specific and critical areas of capacity building that were facilitated through this project include the systems development and staff training for: (i) the reintegration sub-project review and approval process, (ii) management information system (SIG) for the national program, and (iii) definition of non-farm economic opportunities. The project has carried out over 90 formal, multi-day trainings, with national and regional staff and potential implementing partners, and has also provided support through regional advisors. The project also supported IRSEM in meeting IDA conditions of effectiveness and in launching the national program.

2. Discuss and rate as to how well the grant output met the quality standards of the recipient and the beneficiary.

**Rating: SATISFACTORY**

The assistance and inputs provided under Component 1 met quality standards for similar emergency seed and tool distributions, though logistical difficulties and delays in identifying eligible ex-combatants led to some wastage of seeds. FAO technical support however was of good quality and appreciated by the beneficiary (Government) as indicated in their subsequent memorandum of understanding for the provision of similar support under the national DDR program.

The quality of Component 2 varied by implementation partner who took responsibility for the provision of the economic reintegration assistance. More capable institutions with on-going activities that could be used to complement the project support tended to provide higher quality support. In several instances where the implementation partner was a local-level administrative office for a commune or municipality, quality of support provided suffered from a lack of technical experience and IRSEM's weak supervision of project activities.

The quality of the capacity building support provided under Component 3 exceeded expectations and is credited with establishing a well-running national reintegration program. The extensive materials prepared, trainings conducted, and support provided particularly at the provincial and lower levels is superior and the TA provided in support of the management information system exceeds the MDRP standard for such systems.

In spite of some administrative difficulties, the Government of Angola and IRSEM have expressed overall satisfaction with the technical support provided by both UNDP and FAO.

For activities where the output is a report or a dissemination event such as a workshop, conference, training, or study tour, discuss and rate the following aspects:

3. Quality

N/A

4. Presentation

N/A

5. Dissemination

N/A

6. Overall Success

*Discuss and rate the overall success of the output or dissemination event*

N/A

Attach Report or applicable document

## **C. OUTCOME**

1. Achievement of developmental results

*Discuss and rate the actual developmental results, compared to the expected outcomes, for each component of the grant.*

Rating: SATISFACTORY

Outcomes for the first and second components have not been systematically measured. However, anecdotal information from an independent assessment of the national program, that included ex-combatants and communities supported under this special project with UNDP, suggests some positive results. These include the formation of farmer and micro-credit groups, increased production and sale of vegetables, and a reduction in off-farm migration. The independent review also found a very high degree of satisfaction with project support among the beneficiaries, a high degree of acceptance by communities of returning ex-combatants, and fairly high awareness among ex-combatants of IRSEM's role and responsibility in assisting them.

Regarding the third component, there is clear evidence of the positive result of the capacity building efforts on the part of the special project. Most importantly, the national program is up and running, showing good progress in terms of approving and implementing reintegration

support for the current case-load of approximately 97,000 ex-combatants, and applying the systems and procedures developed under the special project.

## 2. Relevance

*Rate how well this activity was consistent with the development priorities of the country, the Bank's country assistance strategy (CAS) and the Bank's sector strategy.*

### Rating: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY

This project was and remains fully consistent with the Government's development priorities when it was launched soon after 97,000 ex UNITA combatants were demobilized by the Government in June 2003. The project served as a pilot for a national demobilization and reintegration program that is currently estimated to be worth \$240 million, of which the Government has contributed an estimated \$150 million. The project is also consistent with the Bank's Transitional Support Strategy of March 4, 2003, where support for a demobilization and reintegration project was specifically envisioned. An estimated \$33 million IDA grant was subsequently approved by the Bank's Board in late March, 2003.

## 3. Efficacy

*Rate how well the activity achieved its stated grant objectives.*

### Rating: SATISFACTORY

As previously noted, the project was effective in achieving the first and third objectives regarding the provision of basic agriculture assistance, and capacity building of IRSEM. Specifically, almost 90% of the target beneficiaries for agricultural assistance were reached, and savings realized in the implementation of the component allowed the project to augment the support to communities thereby enhancing community reception and social reintegration. An independent review of the larger Bank project in which this trust funded activity fits specifically found a high and positive level of community acceptance of returning ex-combatants. Furthermore, UNITA representatives at both national and provincial levels express overall satisfaction with the support being provided to combatants demobilized from their military forces under this project and the national program in general.

Regarding the second objective, the project was also successful in providing income-generation assistance support to more than the planned number of beneficiaries. IRSEM's management information system, however, can only record that the component reached around 88% of the intended target, which is still a reasonable level of performance. Insufficient data exist to say if the outcomes of these economic reintegration activities have been sustainable. Nonetheless, lessons have been learned and applied to the on-going national program.

## 4. Efficiency

*Rate the results of this activity relative to its associated costs, implementation times and economic and financial returns.*

### Rating: HIGHLY SATISFACTORY

The costs of delivering the key inputs (agricultural support, economic reintegration activities, and technical assistance) all fall within or below average unit beneficiary costs for comparable inputs under similar regional programs for demobilization and reintegration (see MDRP estimates of DDR project component costs). This is particularly noteworthy given the higher than average cost of carrying out of many goods and services in Angola as compared to other countries in the greater Great Lakes. Delivery was accomplished within the originally agreed-upon schedule though delays in finalizing the original grant agreement forced a shift in the type of inputs for the agricultural assistance component. The special project did, however, close as originally

projected. As noted above, no estimates of financial returns have been done on the economic reintegration investments.

## **D. IMPACT**

### 1. Capacity Building Impact

*Rate how well this activity contributes to capacity building.*

Rating: SATISFACTORY

Overall, as a pilot activity, this trust funded project had a strong and positive impact on building Government capacity and confidence. Besides the explicit component to address this issue, the other two components provided valuable input to IRSEM and the Government as to how best to go about, and not go about, reintegration support. For instance, one result of implementing the agriculture support component has been to add traction animals and complementary veterinarian support (provided through a memorandum of understanding with the responsible Government department) to the standard package of assistance. In the case of economic reintegration activities, micro-credit has been deleted from the eligible activities given the implementation difficulties encountered under the project. Also, the manner in which UNDP implemented the program gave IRSEM control over the design and execution of the economic reintegration component, which enhanced IRSEM's own confidence in managing the program. The independent reviewers of the national program who are familiar with previous reintegration efforts in Angola noted to the task team a significant positive change in the attitude of IRSEM staff toward their responsibilities in managing the national program.

### 2. Sustainability

*Rate how likely the results will be sustained.*

Rating: SATISFACTORY

On two important levels results appear to be well established and likely to be sustained—in terms of the institutional capacity to manage the larger national program, and in terms of the positive impact the program has had on the social reintegration of ex-combatants by affording them an opportunity to assist the community directly and indirectly through community works and an injection of labor, goods and funds.

### 3. Follow-up Activities and/or Investment

*Provide a description of any follow-up activities or investments resulting from the original activity.*

This project served as a pilot for a national program that IDA and the same multi-donor trust fund is financing.

*Check, if applicable:*

Investment:

\_\_\_\_\_ Recipient/Other Investment; X Grant Project/Program; X Bank Project; \_\_\_\_\_ IFC Financial Project/Activity

Other Results:

X Transferability of Know-How, Knowledge Base/Key Concepts; \_\_\_\_\_ Replicability, Modeling, Best Practices; \_\_\_\_\_ New Sectors or Products; \_\_\_\_\_ New Forms of Cooperation with Other Development Institutions/NGOs

## **E. PERFORMANCE**

### *1. Bank*

*Discuss and rate how well the Bank carried out specific responsibilities assumed by the Bank for this trust funded activity.*

#### Rating: SATISFACTORY

The Bank had normal supervision responsibilities for this project, which it carried out more regularly than is standard practice (at least 3 times per year). The Bank and the MDRP Secretariat also formally reported on performance of the project to the MDRP partners (donors and UN agencies) every quarter and sought their input at the country-level during each supervision visit.

### *2. Recipient*

*Discuss and rate how well the Recipient fulfilled the different tasks that were expected as part of the trust funded activity.*

#### Rating: SATISFACTORY

The recipient, UNDP, carried out its responsibilities under the project reasonable well, in particular on the technical side. A high degree of cooperation was received from both the project manager and the chief technical advisor for the project who were clearly committed to making the project a success. FAO as a sub-recipient was also a technically strong and efficient partner. Both institutions completed their intended tasks and subsequent bilateral arrangements between Government and project consultants and institutions (in the case of FAO) suggest satisfactory performance. However, follow-up analysis of the outcome and impact of the economic and agricultural activities was lacking. Finally, greater difficulties were experienced with certain administrative aspects of project implementation on the part of UNDP including procurement of key inputs and final accounting under the project that remains outstanding.

## **F. LESSONS LEARNED / RECOMMENDATIONS**

*Discuss the most significant positive and negative lessons learned from the success or failure of the grant activity and make recommendations for different stakeholders.*

### Recommendations for the Bank

- Trust funds can serve a catalytic role in support of a national programs;
- UN agencies as recipients can help accelerate program implementation especially in post-conflict settings;
- Apply precedents for legal agreements with UN agencies to other post-conflict contexts (Sudan, etc.);
- The MDRP Secretariat should disseminate the positive lessons learned from this special project for others in the region;
- The MDRP Secretariat should analyze with UNDP the financial management reporting difficulties encountered to avoid similar problems with other special projects;
- The Bank should disseminate the institutional lessons learned regarding Bank-UN relations to facilitate similar projects in other particularly post-conflict countries.

### Recommendations for the Recipient (Client)

- Value of external assistance that is placed within an institutional framework that can take advantage of the support;

- Additional support is required to allow local level administrative offices (commune and municipal administrators) to implement such program activities;
- Implementing partners would benefit from clearer technical and administrative guidelines for the implementation of support activities;
- Provincial IRSEM offices need to enhance monitoring efforts and would benefit from the same technical and administrative guidelines;
- Agricultural assistance support should include enhanced extension services;
- Project time frames should be made more realistic taking into consideration inevitable start-up delays and shifts in the agricultural calendar.

Recommendations for the Donor(s)

- In addition to above under Bank, also important to note that the Bank does not serve to deliver project financing as quickly as other agencies in post-conflict settings, but can help ensure (i) quality and cost-effectiveness of program strategy, and (ii) better integration of international efforts with national actors and programs

Recommendations for the Development Community

**G. PROCESSING**

Prepared by: Sean Bradley (AFTS4) and Steve Mbangi (AFMAO)

Task Team Leader: Sean Bradley (AFTS4)

Date Submitted: January 13, 2006

Comment :

Manager : Rick Scobey, Sector Manager, AFTS1

Date Approved: January 13, 2006

Comment:

This special project filled a key gap at a critical point in the Angola peace process and served as a model for others in the MDRP portfolio both from a technical standpoint and in terms of the institutional arrangements between the Bank and the UN partner. Despite the challenging implementation environment, the project fully realized most of its intended objectives. Most importantly, this project is considered a model for capacity building of the national counterpart agency that has paid off immediate dividends through the IDA and MDRP Trust Fund financed national program. The lessons learned should be disseminated to other operations in the greater Great Lakes region and beyond wherever the Bank is working directly with UN agencies.