

Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Joint Supervision Mission

September 23 – October 4, 2002

Aide-Mémoire

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint donor/agency supervision mission visited Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda from September 23 to October 4, 2002. The mission objectives were to: (i) assess MDRP implementation progress to date; (ii) explore opportunities to enhance coordination within the MDRP framework; and (iii) identify activities that should be considered for MDRP financing.

2. The joint mission provided a valuable opportunity to strengthen the MDRP partnership. The mission also afforded partners as well as national stakeholders concerned an opportunity to deepen their shared understanding of DDR issues on the ground and to strengthen the effectiveness of coordination at both national and regional levels. The attached mission report and annexed country reports present the mission's findings and recommendations.

1. Regional context

3. Since the launch of the MDRP in April 2002, there has been a significant improvement in relations between key belligerents, including the termination of the civil war in Angola, the signing of the Pretoria and the Luanda Agreements, and the subsequent withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the DRC. However, there have also been some negative developments, such as the intensification of the conflict in Burundi, the uncertainty about the security framework for the eastern DRC following the withdrawal of foreign forces, and continued instability in northern Uganda. In this context, implementation progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities has been limited. With the exception of Angola, where a national program is expected shortly, and Rwanda, where a national program is ongoing, initiatives have been manifold but small-scale.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

4. The mission found the *general and country-level eligibility criteria* appropriate. All countries visited fulfill the general criteria, and most are at different points with respect to fulfilling the national criteria. However, it has become apparent that the geographical coverage of the greater Great Lakes region does not do full justice to all participating countries' security concerns. In particular, the mission recommends that the MDRP framework help the government of the CAR to engage with Chad, and to assist Uganda vis-à-vis the Sudan, without however extending the MDRP's geographical coverage or enabling other countries to access MDRP funds. Furthermore, the mission

notes that the letter of demobilization policy, which enables governments to access MDRP funds, should be shared upon finalization. Partners with a strong appreciation of political and security matters in a given MDRP candidate country should be consulted prior to its finalization.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

5. All governments strongly emphasized the need for national ownership and the development of comprehensive frameworks for DDR. The mission thus reaffirms the importance of the core MDRP principle of *national ownership*. The governments of CAR, the DRC and Uganda have indicated their intention to launch preparation of national programs in the near future. The mission recommends that MDRP partners support these efforts within the MDRP framework.

6. Regarding *confidence building* and *knowledge sharing*, the MDRP framework recently enabled the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to undertake a bilateral technical meeting in Nairobi to explore the possibility of cross-border technical planning of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation activities envisaged under the Pretoria Agreement. The mission recommends that the MDRP continue to support such initiatives as and when relevant opportunities arise, including for other countries such as Burundi.

7. The mission reaffirms the MDRP principle that no other trust funds be established to finance DDR activities in the Greater Great Lakes region. Furthermore, in countries where a national program is in place, there should be no *special projects*. Nevertheless, the mission noted that an expansion of the definition of special projects may be justifiable in certain situations in order to enable the MDRP to respond flexibly and to seize windows of opportunity in advance of the finalization of a national program framework. The mission endorses such an expansion.

4. Efforts complementary to demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration

8. In many cases, the long-term impact of a DDR program upon security sector governance may be limited without complementary *security sector reform*. The mission encourages bilateral partners to advance the dialogue on security sector reform where feasible, and encourages the MDRP to explore synergies as appropriate.

9. *Involuntary disarmament* of foreign armed groups will probably become an important challenge for the peace process in the DRC. The mission notes that the current mandate and capacity of MONUC are strictly limited to voluntary disarmament. As MDRP support is contingent upon the disarmament of combatants, the mission thus recommends that the parties to the peace process and the international community develop robust contingency plans for forcible disarmament of the foreign armed groups in the DRC through MONUC or other means.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

10. The risk of a *reversal of the peace process* in the region is significant. In view of the absence of effective governance and security structures in the eastern DRC, there is a substantial risk that the vacuum left by the withdrawing forces could lead to large-scale insecurity in the eastern DRC that could also impact neighboring countries.

11. *Effective coordination* of all DDR activities at both national and regional level in MDRP countries is critical to DDR planning and implementation. However, it remains a major implementation challenge. In particular, the mission concluded that MONUC's substantive policy and technical engagement with MDRP partners and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda should be enhanced to ensure effective financial and operational harmonization of MONUC disarmament, demobilization and repatriation activities of foreign armed groups in the DRC with demobilization and reintegration activities supported by the respective governments. In addition, the mission agreed that ongoing DDR activities in several countries (including Burundi, CAR, Congo, the DRC and Uganda) would henceforth be fully integrated in the MDRP framework.

12. The mission strongly recommends that MDRP partners and the MDRP Secretariat seek to strengthen coordination with UNDPKO/MONUC and the UN Department of Political Affairs. At the same time, the mission remains concerned that the international community has not yet provided MONUC with the human and military resources to deploy effectively in the eastern DRC, and has not begun to address the question of involuntary disarmament of foreign armed groups in the DRC.

6. Key Next Steps

- (i) The MDRP Secretariat will seek to enhance coordination with UNDPKO/MONUC. A planned briefing to the UN Security Council on October 22, 2002, will afford an important opportunity to strengthen collaboration.
- (ii) The findings of the supervision mission will be reviewed by the MDRP Advisory Committee and Trust Fund Committee (TFC) in the Hague on November 8, 2002.
- (iii) The next MDRP supervision mission is tentatively scheduled for March 2003.

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Attachment 1

Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Joint Supervision Mission

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Mission Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint supervision mission comprising four teams visited Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda from September 23 to October 4, 2002.¹ The MDRP is a joint coordination and financing framework for demobilization and reintegration activities in the greater Great Lakes region comprising over thirty donor and United Nations (UN) partners.² The objectives of the mission were to:

- (i) assess MDRP implementation progress to date;
- (ii) explore opportunities to enhance coordination within the MDRP framework; and
- (iii) identify activities that should be considered for MDRP financing.

2. This report is an output of the joint mission wrap-up workshop in Entebbe, Uganda, and summarizes the findings and recommendations of the first joint supervision mission since the launch of the MDRP in April 2002. The annexes in attachment 4 provide a summary of the findings and recommendations of the respective country teams. It should be noted that this mission did not set out to complete technical assessments of specific national demobilization and reintegration activities per se, but rather reviewed them in relation to the principles, objectives and mechanisms of the MDRP framework. The mission's terms of reference and attendance at the wrap-up workshop are attached. The mission would like to thank the respective governments, donors, UN partners and other stakeholders for the generous time and assistance provided during its visits.

1. Regional context

3. Since the launch of the MDRP in April 2002, there has been a notable improvement in relations between key belligerents in the Great Lakes conflicts. At the same time, there have been both positive and negative trends regarding the effective resolution of the conflicts in the region. The situation has markedly improved in Angola with the cantonment of UNITA forces and their subsequent administrative incorporation into the Angolan armed forces. The internal security of Rwanda continues to be stable. The withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the Democratic Republic of

¹ In Namibia and Zimbabwe, the remaining countries covered by the MDRP framework, no disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities are currently planned.

² Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, World Bank, March 2002.

Congo (DRC) following the signing of Luanda and Pretoria agreements is a promising indicator of these governments commitment to recent agreements.

4. Elsewhere, developments have been less encouraging. Although the government of Burundi and rebel factions who did not sign the Arusha accord have met to discuss a ceasefire, political violence has intensified considerably in Burundi. There are indications that Rwandan armed groups in the DRC are now operating alongside Burundian rebel groups, raising the prospects of a further escalation of the conflict in Burundi. Localized insecurity in the CAR persists, and border tensions with Chad have increased.

5. The Ugandan government is intensifying its military offensive against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has recently stepped up its destabilization of northern Uganda. Congo has witnessed fighting in the volatile Pool region. Finally, the security and humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC continues to deteriorate following the withdrawal of the troops of the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) and the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF), which is leaving a security vacuum that irregular national and foreign armed groups are exploiting.

6. Against this background, progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities has been limited. With the exception of Angola, where a national program is being finalized, and Rwanda, where implementation of a national program is ongoing, initiatives have been manifold but small-scale. However, in the event of the emergence of a credible security and governance framework in the eastern DRC, the mission considers it likely that large-scale DDR implementation could commence soon. Therefore, the mission encourages MDRP partners to support joint planning, confidence-building and capacity-building efforts in a strategic manner where appropriate.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

7. So far, only one country, Rwanda, has become eligible for MDRP assistance, having fulfilled all general and country-level criteria. Appraisal for the Angola DRP is currently under way. Angola may be eligible for MDRP assistance before the end of 2002. All seven countries visited fulfill to a reasonable degree the general criteria, i.e., being *affected by conflict(s)* and *participating in the regional peace process*. Progress has in particular been achieved in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda with the recent Pretoria and Luanda agreements. These agreements confirm these governments' commitment to conflict resolution in the region. These and other peace and/or ceasefire accords form the internationally recognized basis for DDR activities in the region.

8. Since the launch of the MDRP it has become apparent that the geographical coverage of the greater Great Lakes region does not do full justice to all participating countries' security concerns. In particular, the mission recommends that the MDRP framework help the government of the CAR to engage with Chad, and to assist Uganda vis-à-vis the Sudan. Such engagement should encourage cross-border confidence-building measures related to demobilization and reintegration. However, it should not

involve the formal extension of the MDRP's geographical coverage nor enable Chad and the Sudan access MDRP funds.

9. Although only one national program is so far benefiting from the MDRP, the mission believes that the country-specific eligibility criteria are appropriate. The *preparation of a national demobilization and reintegration program* is deemed especially important in order to address DDR needs in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. Nonetheless, it has become apparent that under certain circumstances, a more flexible approach may be justified.

10. By way of example, the government of Uganda has so far adopted a two track strategy for the demobilization and reintegration of rebels and soldiers, respectively. The mission found the situation sufficiently stable to allow for the preparation of a comprehensive national program upon a request from the government of Uganda. Donors in Uganda have established a Donor Technical Group (DTG) on the North, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict. The DTG has supported small-scale demobilization and reintegration activities for, among others, rebel "reporters", and could address urgent small-scale demobilization financing needs while a national program is being developed.

11. In the absence of national programs, the government's DDR institutional capacities remain relatively weak in all countries. Extensive capacity building efforts, as well as the provision of targeted technical assistance, will likely be required during the preparation phase in most MDRP countries. It is worth noting, however, that a *national institutional structure* may quickly gain the required capacities once a national program gets off the ground, as has been observed in the case of Rwanda.

12. When preparation for the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) started in July 2001, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) was poorly staffed, organized and equipped. Today, the Commission is dispensing its duties efficiently, and is actively coordinating the contributions of national and external partners such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The mission recommends that a similar approach be taken in all MDRP countries in order to encourage and facilitate national ownership.

13. A *letter of demobilization policy* is considered a central element of any national program. A generic structure has been developed that includes issues such as the socio-political context, the government's commitment to the peace process, security sector governance, the government's DDR strategy, guiding principles, target groups and program sustainability. MDRP partners, in particular MDTF donors with a strong appreciation of a given country's political and security environment, need to be consulted before the finalization of this letter in order to provide assurances that a demobilization and reintegration program can achieve its objectives within the broader policy and security context.

14. The mission noted that the government of Rwanda, the only government having prepared a letter of demobilization policy so far, has not yet shared this letter with MDRP partners. (Key partners had been consulted before finalizing the letter.) The mission

expects that in future, DDR lead agencies work with governments so as to consult MDRP partners about the contents of this letter, and to share it promptly.

15. If standard World Bank procedures were applied to devise and implement *environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* before a program started, substantial delays could be expected. For this reason, the World Bank is applying streamlined procedures which allow for the completion of social and environmental assessments after Credit effectiveness wherever possible. Regarding financial management and procurement, MDRP partners may deem that special arrangements are necessary in order to ensure the transparent use of funds.

16. In the case of Angola and the CAR, financial management and procurement responsibilities are assigned to contracted (semi-) independent entities. The mission stressed, however, that such arrangements should only be initiated under exceptional circumstances, and should always report to a high-level government authority (such as the Minister of Finance). Special projects also need to meet these social, financial and environmental criteria, proportionate to their size, complexity and anticipated impacts.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

17. The mission reaffirmed the importance of the core MDRP principle of *national ownership*. This is critical to building national capacity and ensuring durable solutions. In the case of Rwanda, the government has successfully assumed full planning and implementation leadership of the RDRP. In Angola, the government has embarked on the process of developing a national program framework. The government of the DRC has also already initiated preparation of a national program framework through the *Commission Militaire Mixte* (CMM) and the *Bureau National de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion* (BUNADER). The mission recommends that MDRP partners support these government initiatives within the MDRP framework. The mission encourages the government of the DRC to establish a suitable institutional mechanism as soon as possible to advance the DDR planning process and to interact with external partners.

18. The government of Uganda confirmed its intention to launch preparation of a national program in the near future. The mission recommends that MDRP partners consider the initiation of support to the development of a national program after the receipt of a formal request from the government of Uganda. Similarly, the mission recommends MDRP support to the government of the CAR to strengthen its national disarmament and reintegration program.

19. Government technical counterparts confirmed that the *regional mechanisms* established under the MDRP, especially the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), have helped to *build confidence* and *share knowledge* among DDR technical personnel in the region. For example, informal technical discussions between the governments of Rwanda and the DRC during the Luanda TCG meeting led to a bilateral technical meeting in Nairobi in mid-September 2002. The objective of this meeting was to discuss detailed *cross-border technical planning* of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation

activities envisaged under the Pretoria Agreement. The MDRP Secretariat provided financial and facilitation support to these meetings, which were also attended by the United Nations Mission to the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

20. It is hoped that these technical meetings to discuss issues of mutual concern will culminate in joint measures to advance the DDR process of Rwandan armed groups based in the DRC. The mission recommends that the MDRP continue to support such initiatives as and when relevant opportunities arise. Similar bilateral technical meetings could be useful to discuss the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Burundian armed groups in the DRC, if and when requested by both governments.

21. The mission noted that the lack of accurate information about disarmament, demobilization and repatriation options remains an obstacle to voluntary disarmament, especially of Rwandan armed groups based in the DRC. The mission recommends that the MDRP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) finance cross-border sensitization activities supported by relevant governments and partners. In this vein, the mission welcomed the efforts of MONUC to take 84 Rwandans from Kamina on a sensitization visit to Rwanda.

22. As outlined in the risks section below, the *harmonization* of DDR activities remains a significant challenge at both regional and national levels. At the regional level, the DRC-Rwanda cross-border DDR initiatives of MONUC should be more closely synchronized with the relevant authorities and programs of both governments in order to minimize the risks of financial and operational duplication and gaps. For example, in the case of Uganda the activities of the government's Amnesty Commission and the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board are currently uncoordinated, and would need to be integrated within a single framework in the course of the elaboration of a comprehensive national program.

23. The MDRP Trust Fund has not yet been formally activated by the World Bank, raising concerns about the speed and flexibility of this financing mechanism. Thus, the MDRP so far has limited capacity to ensure an *optimization of external assistance*. The mission expects that the Trust Fund be established before the next partners meeting in November 2002. At the same time, the preliminary evidence from the RDRP is encouraging. The RDRC is beginning to ensure that external partner contributions fit within the agreed national program framework and respect government leadership.

24. At the same time, the mission notes with concern that the latest report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on MONUC requests "that the costs of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of members of armed groups be borne under the assessed budget."³ The mission requested additional clarification from MONUC on this point, as the existing MDTF could in principle finance demobilization and repatriation activities for foreign armed groups in the DRC. A duplication of financing mechanisms for such activities could easily lead to an unnecessary duplication

³ Paragraph 74, Report of the Secretary General on MONUC to the Security Council, September 10, 2002.

of activities and operationally incompatible approaches, which should be avoided at all costs.

25. The mission reaffirms the MDRP principle that no other trust funds be established to finance DDR activities in the region. Furthermore, in countries where a national program is in place, there should be no special projects. MDTF financing in such situations should flow through government in the first instance in order to ensure government ownership and program integrity. Partners should seek to overcome possible internal administrative obstacles to contracting with relevant governments. Respective governments, with the support of the World Bank, should ensure that adequate contracting capacity is in place, and that procurement procedures are efficient and responsive. Bilateral contributions to national programs and special projects should be provided within the MDRP framework.

26. The mission believes that the MDRP approach will help participating governments to address the needs of *special target groups* more consistently in their respective national programs. In particular, national counterparts are being sensitized about the importance of addressing the needs of child soldiers, female ex-combatants, dependents, chronically ill and disabled ex-combatants more systematically. The child soldier demobilization and reintegration activities conducted within the RDRP are encouraging. However, the recent failure to register child soldiers in the course of the UNITA demobilization process underlines the need for systematic follow-up to ensure that the needs of special target groups are indeed addressed.

27. The mission noted that the MDRP Secretariat has to date not responded to proposals for financing of MDTF *special projects* within a satisfactory timeframe. The World Bank acknowledged this shortcoming and confirmed that it was currently in the process of putting in place consistent guidelines, screening criteria and procedures to improve response consistency and timeliness.

28. While recognizing that a national demobilization and reintegration program is the desired goal in each country, the mission noted that an expansion of the definition of special projects may be merited in certain situations in order to enable the MDRP to support positive developments on the ground flexibly and promptly.. For example, it is unlikely that a comprehensive ceasefire agreement will be signed soon in Burundi. However, the unconditional demobilization of child combatants and targeted support to vulnerable combatants, especially the handicapped, are considered sufficiently important and urgent that the mission believes they should be initiated in advance of a national program.

29. The mission therefore endorses the expansion of the special projects definition to include activities for special groups or priority pilot activities in countries in advance of the finalization of a national program framework. In this vein, the mission recommends that the MDRP Trust Fund Committee (TFC) support the two special projects identified for Burundi.

30. The strategic financing of special projects and regional projects to address the needs of special groups, build confidence, remove obstacles to peace and increase cross-border information will likely be a critical determinant of the success of the MDRP. However, the mission fully recognizes the risk that a proliferation of special projects could lead to a fragmentation and inefficient allocation of MDTF resources. A collection of unrelated or parallel special projects could impede the development or even seek to replace a comprehensive national program.

31. To ensure the primacy of the national ownership principle, the mission recommends that the MDRP Secretariat develop a robust set of criteria for the financing of such special projects, including an explanation how the special project fits into the plan to prepare a national program. Agreements for such special projects should contain a provision that coordination responsibility of activities funded by the MDRP before the initiation of a national program would shift to the relevant government agency once a national program is in place. Finally, such special projects should include a clause giving governments the right to review their continuation once a national program has been established under the MDRP.

32. Close *coordination with reconstruction and poverty reduction efforts* will be critical to facilitating the social and economic absorption of ex-combatants following their demobilization, especially in countries emerging from conflict. National programs will need to pay special attention to ongoing or planned processes for the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and should seek to develop synergies with community development projects undertaken by partners in the fields of education, health care, HIV/AIDS and social work. In the case of Angola, for example, reintegration assistance plans are closely linked to reconstruction and recovery efforts that also target other war-affected populations.

33. Reintegration at the beneficiary level is typically linked to the social and economic environment, skills, attitude and assets of the individual and his or her family. In addition, the quality of reintegration assistance can make an important difference. The mission noted that several DDR programs undertaken in the region in the past had neglected the need for longer-term reintegration assistance.

34. The mission therefore recommends that national programs and special projects supported under the MDRP ensure the provision of effective reintegration assistance as much as possible. In addition, national programs should be integrated into their countries' respective poverty reduction strategies to the greatest extent possible. The RDRP, for example, is explicitly prioritized and integrated into the government of Rwanda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

35. The financial *transparency* of MDRP supported activities will be central to the MDRP's credibility and sustainability. At the operational level, for example, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission has put in place robust financial management and procurement systems. Current planning for the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP), which is operating in a more challenging

governance environment, envisages the recruitment of a semi-autonomous financial management and procurement unit to administer all program resources.

36. At a more general level, the mission encourages participating countries to include the costs of national programs in their annual government budgeting and expenditure planning. In addition, MDRP partners should encourage participating countries to apply normal public expenditure management systems to their defense sectors.

37. The ability of the MDRP to balance the imperatives of *flexibility* and consistency in a strategic manner will largely determine its capacity to respond effectively to the diverse and complex country environments with which it will be confronted. Initial indications from Angola, the DRC and Rwanda are that the MDRP is capable of responding to vastly differing national needs and environments in a flexible yet rigorous manner.

4. Efforts complementary to DDR

38. War brings insecurity, and insecurity persists even as war ends. In the aftermath of war, a lack of *local security* is often linked to the lack of opportunities to earn a living. Survival at the barrel of a gun becomes a new form of livelihood, especially for unemployed and militarized youth. This phenomenon can be observed in particular in Burundi, the CAR and Congo. Organized crime syndicates, prevalent especially in urban areas also fuel insecurity in conflict and post-conflict environments. Finally, the prevalence of *landmines* (especially in Angola), is likely to impede rehabilitation and civilian resettlement activities.

39. A DDR program can address but a small element in this equation, by providing structured reinsertion and reintegration assistance to ex-combatants. Activities of greater importance, first and foremost strengthening the police and/or gendarmerie and re-establishing the rule of law, are addressed to varying degrees in the countries of the greater Great Lakes region. For example, MONUC is providing support to such processes in the DRC through its CIVPOL contingent. Community-based reconciliation, post-conflict justice and peace-building activities also have a crucial role to play. However, with the exception of genocide screening in Rwanda to determine eligibility for benefits, these activities are beyond the scope of the MDRP.

40. One of the most important complementary activity is *security sector reform*. In many cases, the long-term impact of a DDR program upon security sector governance may be limited without complementary security sector reform. In a post-conflict context, security sector reform may also be an important reconciliation activity by bringing opposition forces into the mainstream.

41. However, relatively little has so far been achieved in this sensitive area. Most multilateral development actors lack the mandate and/or the technical capacity to engage governments effectively on security sector governance questions. In Burundi and the DRC, the relevant peace/ceasefire agreements provide a legal basis for the pursuit of

security sector reform. The mission encourages bilateral partners to carry the dialogue on security sector reform forward where feasible, for instance by providing technical assistance for its planning and implementation.

42. For example, the mission noted that the government of Uganda has embarked on a defense review with assistance from DFID, and the government of Rwanda is exploring the possibility of external assistance for security sector reform. National programs should proactively explore synergies between security sector reform initiatives and demobilization planning wherever possible. Uganda and CAR pose special cases in that recruitment is going on at the same time as demobilization and reintegration programs are being contemplated. Under such circumstances, countries would need to provide a strong rationale for MDRP support.

43. There are no doubt many more weapons in the region than there are combatants. *Civilian disarmament* efforts can reduce the weapons stock and thereby help to reduce the risk of renewed conflict. UNDP has launched small-scale activities in the CAR and the Republic of Congo. Other UN agencies have carried out assessments for several of the MDRP countries. However, much greater, and much more coordinated efforts would be needed to address this pervasive problem. This link with the MDRP thus, also needs strengthening.

44. *Involuntary disarmament* of combatants is an important challenge for the peace process in the DRC. It is quite possible that a number of foreign armed groups will decline to surrender their arms voluntarily. In this event, there may be a need to pursue a coercive disarmament strategy in order to restore security in the eastern DRC and ensure the full dismantling of the foreign armed groups, as required under the Lusaka and Pretoria agreements.

45. The mission noted that the current mandate and capacity of MONUC are strictly limited to voluntary disarmament, and that there appears to be no contingency planning for a forcible disarmament strategy. The mission thus recommends that the parties to the peace process and the international community develop robust contingency plans for forcible disarmament of the foreign armed groups in the DRC through MONUC or other mechanisms, with due respect for human rights and humanitarian law.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

46. Overall, the peace process in the Great Lakes region has advanced positively in the past six months. The withdrawal of the Rwandan and Ugandan forces from the eastern DRC may represent an important step towards the termination of foreign military presence in the DRC. The mission believes that the successful conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which is to resume shortly, is an essential complementary political requirement for the sustainability of the Congolese peace process and associated national demobilization and reintegration program. Even so, the risk of a *reversal of the peace process* in the region persists.

47. In view of the absence of effective governance and security structures in the eastern DRC, there is a substantial risk that the vacuum left by the withdrawing forces could lead to large-scale insecurity in the eastern DRC, and to renewed attempts by Rwandan armed groups based in the DRC to attack Rwanda. This could in turn provoke a Rwandan response and a reversal of the DRC-Rwanda peace process. There is also a significant risk that the Burundian peace process may be jeopardized by an intensification of fighting in Burundi, as Burundian and Rwandan armed groups currently based in the DRC try to shift the focus of their operations to Burundi.

48. At this time, the risk of *moral hazard* in the MDRP remains limited but requires careful monitoring. The linkage of national DDR programs to security sector reforms would reduce the risk that the MDRP national programs are used to reduce the costs of war to governments and to finance military pensions. National programs in Burundi, the DRC and Congo will have to take care that the promise of potential financial assistance does not lead to an inflation of militia forces. Similarly, the balance of assistance to ex-combatants vis-à-vis civilians in war-affected communities will demand careful and inclusive planning, especially in Angola, Burundi, Congo and the DRC. The integration of reintegration assistance for ex-combatants in decentralized and community-based mechanisms, as for instance in the RDRP, can help to mitigate this risk.

49. There is currently no *funding gap* for DDR activities within the MDRP framework. The financing of the RDRP, the first national program within the MDRP, has been secured through an IDA credit, the MDTF and bilateral financing. Preparatory activities for the ADRP are being secured with financing from an IDA Project Preparation Facility (PPF).

50. *Effective coordination* of all DDR activities at both regional level and in MDRP countries is a core principle of the MDRP but remains a major implementation challenge. Coordination has been hampered by the slow recruitment of the MDRP regional DDR specialists (to be posted in Kinshasa and Kigali). The World Bank assured partners that the process is nearing completion, and that it expects the specialists to be in place in early 2003. The World Bank plans extended missions to the region as an interim measure.

51. The risk of poor coordination among partners appears to be most significant in the complex environment of the DRC. The UN Country Team in Kinshasa led by the UNDP Resident Coordinator has recently taken initiatives to plan for a national program in Kinshasa. UNDP agreed to ensure that MDRP partners are henceforth fully informed about its actions in support of the planning of the national DDR program in the DRC and confirmed that it will work within the MDRP framework. UNDP will also consult with MDRP partners in Kinshasa and headquarters regarding the modalities of how to bring current DDR activities in the DRC into the MDRP framework.

52. The mission concluded that MONUC's substantive policy and technical engagement with MDRP partners and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda remains unsatisfactory. For example, the latest report of the Secretary General of the UN on MONUC to the Security Council fails to mention either the MDRP or the RDRP. The first draft MONUC Joint Operations Plan (JOP) does not take into account

demobilization and reintegration activities already catered for under the RDRP. In addition, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda informed the mission that they had not been consulted with respect to the DDR activities outlined in these documents.

53. This lack of coordination may have negative implications for the timely and cost-effective implementation of DDR activities in the region. For example, the government of Rwanda expressed the concern that several demobilization activities proposed by MONUC could lead to a delay in repatriation of Rwandan armed groups and a duplication of activities already being financed and implemented under the RDRP.

54. The mission thus strongly recommends that MDRP partners and the MDRP Secretariat seek to strengthen coordination with UNDPKO/MONUC and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The planned joint briefing of the World Bank, UNDPKO and UNDP to the UN Security Council may provide an important opportunity to improve this relationship. MONUC should also be encouraged to participate fully in the next MDRP mission, and to intensify its cooperation at the focal point level.

55. The mission notes that close coordination among external partners with respect to DDR planning is critical, especially in countries still affected by conflict. In the case of Burundi, the mission concluded that uncoordinated and ill-timed demobilization initiatives could destabilize a fragile peace process. Furthermore, the mission notes that where effective donor coordination mechanisms are in place, such as in the case of the Donor Technical Group for the North, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict in Uganda, they should be drawn upon and regularly consulted during the development of national program frameworks.

56. The *risks of non-engagement* vary by country. The international community has recently increased its support to the regional peace process. The European Union and its member states as well as the United States strengthened their diplomatic efforts to consolidate peace in the region. Furthermore, the high-level mediation of the South African government in the DRC-Rwanda and Burundi peace processes, the Angolan government's mediation of the DRC-Uganda agreement and the continuing contributions of Gabon and Tanzania reflect an increasing commitment of African leaders to contribute substantively to the resolution of the conflicts in the Great Lakes. Renewed efforts to organize a Great Lakes peace conference are another important sign of international commitment. The mission expects the MDRP to be closely associated to this conference.

57. At the same time, the mission remains concerned that the international community has not yet provided MONUC with the human and military resources to deploy effectively in the eastern DRC. The mission also observes that MONUC does not appear to be technically prepared to initiate large-scale disarmament, demobilization and repatriation activities for members of foreign armed groups in the near future.

58. The risk that MONUC will not be able to help stabilize the security situation in the eastern DRC and will not be able to support the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Rwandan armed groups in the DRC in a timely manner is real, especially in the absence of an involuntary disarmament contingency plan. As noted above, a failure

to effectively and rapidly disarm, demobilized and repatriate the foreign armed groups in the DRC could lead to a renewed cycle of conflict in the DRC. The mission thus encourages the MDRP to support regional government and partner efforts to advance the DDR process.

59. The mission further notes that the risk of non-engagement by the international community is greater in countries only peripherally affected by the DRC conflict. In particular, there is a risk that the international community does not provide sufficient attention and resources to the resolution of the conflicts in the Congo and the Central African Republic. The mission was able to identify concrete next steps to advance DDR issues in both countries.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

60. Strategy Indicators

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* Baseline figures can be found in the country report annexes and will be compared over time.

2 *Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* The free movement of persons and goods is limited to varying degrees in all countries with the exception of Rwanda.

3 *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Baseline figures can be found in the country report annexes and will be compared over time.

61. Program Indicators

4 *Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.* In Angola and Rwanda, almost all DDR activities are undertaken within the MDRP framework. In all other countries visited by the mission, DDR activities are being brought under the MDRP umbrella as a result of this supervision mission.

5 *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the MDTF.* No MDTF funds have yet been disbursed.

6 *Degree of harmonization of national programs.* The two national programs currently under preparation/implementation in Angola and Rwanda have a similar structure yet correspond to the respective social, economic and political environment.

62. Output Indicators

7 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.* To date, a total of 9,400 combatants have been demobilized

under the RDRP (6,900 soldiers and 2,500 armed groups), the only program up and running within the MDRP framework at this time.

8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* No combatants have yet been demobilized under special projects.

9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* Two events have been organized for members of the Technical Coordination Group: in Luanda in July/August 2002 (TCG) and in Nairobi in September 2002 (DRC and Rwanda).

10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* The supervision mission encountered several minor organizational problems in all countries visited.

7. Mission assessment

63. Overall, the joint mission provided a valuable opportunity to strengthen this partnership effort by bringing partners closer together at both the headquarters and field level. The mission also afforded all partners as well as the national stakeholders concerned an opportunity to deepen their shared understanding of the DDR issues on the ground and of the need for effective coordination.

64. Room for improvement in mission organization was observed. There was generally weak advance preparation in each country, with directions from the MDRP Secretariat not being sufficiently clear. There has also been limited organization *sur place*. As a result, several teams felt that the meetings were not always representative of the different stakeholder groups. The overall mission orientation and terms of reference were, however, deemed pertinent. The next supervision mission is planned for April 2003. The mission recommends that the MDRP Secretariat improve its advance planning, using in particular coordination mechanisms in-country.

8. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

65. Among others, the mission recommends that:

- (i) MDRP partners urgently support the initiatives by the government of the DRC within the MDRP framework;
- (ii) the MDRP continue to support initiatives aimed at preparing joint measures among concerned governments to advance the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation process of foreign armed groups based in the DRC;
- (iii) the TFC consider the initiation of support to the development of a Ugandan national program;
- (iv) the TFC consider support to the government of the CAR to enhance its national disarmament and reintegration program;

- (v) the TFC consider support to the two special projects identified for Burundi;
- (vi) the MDTF finance cross-border sensitization activities supported by relevant governments and partners;
- (vii) the MDRP Secretariat develop a robust set of criteria for the financing of special projects;
- (viii) the parties to the peace process and the international community develop robust contingency plans for forcible disarmament of the foreign armed groups in the DRC through MONUC or other means;
- (ix) the MDRP framework help the government of the CAR to engage with Chad, and assist Uganda vis-à-vis the Sudan; and
- (x) MDRP partners and the MDRP Secretariat seek to strengthen coordination with DPKO/MONUC and DPA.

66. The mission proposes the following next steps:

<i>Next Steps</i>	<i>Responsible Party</i>	<i>Timeframe</i>
1. Briefing of UN Security Council	World Bank, UNDPKO and UNDP	Late October
2. Visit to New York to identify measures to strengthen cooperation within the MDRP framework	MDRP Secretariat, UNDP, UNDPKO and UNDPA	Late October
3. Preparation of guidelines and procedures for special projects	MDRP Secretariat	Completed late November
4. Activation of the multi-donor trust fund	MDRP Secretariat	Completed early November
5. Consultation with MDRP partners in Kinshasa and headquarters to bring current DDR activities in the DRC into the MDRP framework	UNDP	Completed early November
6. TCG Meeting	MDRP Secretariat	November 7
7. Advisory Committee and Trust Fund Committee meeting	MDRP Secretariat and Government of Netherlands	November 8
8. Installation of MDRP Regional Specialists in Kigali and Kinshasa	MDRP Secretariat	Completed January
9. Monitoring of the setting up of coordination mechanisms in each of the countries	MDRP Secretariat	Ongoing
10. Support to DRC-Rwanda bilateral technical planning processes	MDRP Secretariat with MONUC and UNDP	Ongoing

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<i>Next Steps</i>	<i>Responsible Party</i>	<i>Timeframe</i>
11. Collaboration with preparatory activities for Great Lakes conference	MDRP Secretariat and UNDP	To be determined
12. Engagement with the government of the CAR to address cross-border issues with Chad	MDRP Secretariat	To be determined

Attachment 2

Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Joint Supervision Mission

September/October 2002

Terms of Reference

Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the World Bank in cooperation with donor and UN agency partners will undertake a joint supervision mission to assess MDRP implementation progress to date.

I. Mission Organization and Team Composition

The mission will comprise four teams to visit the following countries:

Team 1:

DRC: September 23-26
Congo: September 27-30

Team 2:

Uganda: September 23- 26
Rwanda: September 27-October 1

Team 3:

CAR: September 23-25
Burundi: September 26-October 2

Team 4:

Angola: September 30-October 1.

II. Mission Activities

Each team will undertake the following activities:

1. Reviewing benefits of the MDRP approach (paragraph 98 of the MDRP document):

- (i) enhanced effectiveness of the international response;
- (ii) greater coherence among DDR activities;
- (iii) the facilitation of positive feedback relationships among DDR activities in the region;
- (iv) the provision of similar incentives for all parties to the conflict to pursue peaceful strategies;
- (v) the ability to address the regional externalities associated with some individual programs;

- (vi) enhanced transparency of closely related DDR activities; and
 - (vii) the facilitation of knowledge-sharing and training across DDR implementers.
- 2. Evaluating risks and mitigation measures (paragraphs 101ff.):**
- (i) reversal of the peace processes;
 - (ii) moral hazard;
 - (iii) balance between support for ex-combatants with assistance to other vulnerable groups;
 - (iv) funding gaps;
 - (v) lack of coordination; and
 - (vi) risks of non-engagement.
- 3. Reviewing general and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance (paragraph 113):**
- (i) being affected by conflict;
 - (ii) participation in the regional peace process;
 - (iii) preparation of a national DRP as a result of the conflict(s);
 - (iv) establishment of a suitable institutional structure;
 - (v) a letter of demobilization policy outlining government commitment; and
 - (vi) establishment of appropriate safe guards and fiduciary measures.
- 4. Examining relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles (paragraph 119):**
- (i) national ownership;
 - (ii) confidence-building;
 - (iii) harmonization of DDR activities;
 - (iv) knowledge sharing;
 - (v) optimization of external assistance;
 - (vi) special target groups;
 - (vii) special projects;
 - (viii) coordination with reconstruction efforts;
 - (ix) transparency; and
 - (x) flexibility.
- 5. Establishing a baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators, including (paragraph 148):**
- A. Strategy Indicators*
- 1. Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.
 - 2. Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries.

3. Evolution of social expenditures in participating countries, including in relation to security spending.

B. Program Indicators

4. Percent of DDR activities undertaken in the region within the framework of the MDRP.
5. Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.
6. Degree of harmonization of national programs.

C. Output Indicators

7. Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.
8. Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.
9. Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.
10. Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.

6. Assessing efforts complementary to DDR in the following areas (paras. 50ff.) and discussing the potential roles of different partners (paras. 91ff.):

- (i) local security;
- (ii) security sector reform;
- (iii) civilian disarmament; and
- (iv) involuntary disarmament.

III. Mission Report

A wrap-up workshop will be held in Entebbe, Uganda, on October 3-4 to review findings and recommendations from each country and prepare a consolidated mission report. This report will be submitted to the Advisory Committee and Trust Fund Committee at their next meeting on November 8, 2002.

Attachment 3

Wrap-Up Workshop Attendance List

	Name	Title	Agency	E-mail address
1	Mr. Anton Baaré	Advisor	DANIDA, Kampala	abaare@ncg.dk
2	Ms. Azeb Asrat	Regional Program Advisor	WFP, Regional Bureau, Kampala	azeb.asrat@wfp.org
3	Mr. Bruno Hanses	Assistant of the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region	European Union, Brussels	bruno.hanses@consilium.eu.int
4	Mr. Cheaka Touré	Reintegration Specialist	ILO EMAC, Yaoundé	cheaka@ilo.org
5	Mr. Christian R. Manahl	Regional Political Advisor	European Commission, Nairobi	crmanahl@hotmail.com
6	Mr. Dan Temu	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP, Kampala	dan.temu@undp.org
7	Mr. David Stevenson	Country Director	WFP, Rwanda	david.stevenson@wfp.org
8	Mr. Domenico Rosa	DRC Desk Officer	European Commission, Brussels	domenico.rosa@cec.eu.int
9	Mr. Florian Fichtl	Senior Social Protection Specialist, MDRP focal point for DRC	World Bank, Washington	ffichtl@worldbank.org
10	Mr. Gana Fofang	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP, Kigali	gana.fofang@undp.org
11	Mr. Graham Carrington	Adviser	DFID, Uganda	g-carrington@dfid.gov.uk
12	Mr. Hans Poley	First Secretary	Dutch Embassy, Kigali	hans.poley@minbuza.nl
13	Mr. Ingo Wiederhofer	Operations Officer	World Bank, Washington	iwiederhofer@worldbank.org
14	Mr. Jean-Luc Stalon	Senior Recovery Program Specialist	UNDP BCPR, Geneva	jean-luc.stalon@undp.org
15	Mr. Jean-Marc Ruiz	Economic Advisor	European Commission, Kampala	jean-marc.ruiz@deluga.cec.eu.int
16	Ms. Juana Brachet	Junior Professional Associate, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit	World Bank, Washington	jbrachet@worldbank.org
17	Ms. Judith Suminwa	Program Advisor	UNDP, Kinshasa	judith.suminwa@undp.org
18	Ms. Karen Brandt	Intern, Governance Section	UNDP, Kampala	karenkaadbrandt@hotmail.com
19	Mr. Manuel Fontaine	Child Protection Adviser	UNICEF, New York	mfontaine@unicef.org
20	Mr. Markus Kostner	MDRP Manager	World Bank, Washington	mkostner@worldbank.org
21	Ms. Marona van den Heuvel	Desk Officer, Great Lakes Region	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague	marona-vanden.heuvel@minbuza.nl

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	Name	Title	Agency	E-mail address
22	Mr. Martin Koper	Deputy Head, Peacebuilding and Governance Division	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague	martin.koper@minbuza.nl
23	Mr. Peter Beck Christiansen	Head of Unit, Great Lakes and Central Africa	European Commission, Brussels	peter.christiansen@cec.eu.int
24	Mr. Philip Lancaster	Consultant, UNICEF Regional Child Soldier Protection	UNICEF, Nairobi	plancaster@unicef.org
25	Mr. Philippe de Bard	Political Officer	MONUC, Kampala	phdebard@undp.org
26	Ms. Sarah Norton-Staal	Regional Child Protection Officer, Children Affected by Armed Conflict	UNICEF ESAR, Nairobi	snortonstaal@unicef.org
27	Mr. Sigurd Illing	European Commission Head of Delegation	European Commission, Kampala	sigurd.illing@cec.eu.int
28	Ms. Sophie da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes	Expert, Central Africa	Belgium DGCI, Brussels	Sophie.da.Camara@diplobel.fed.be

Attachment 4

Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Joint Supervision Mission

September/October 2002

Country Reports

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Annex 1

Angola

September 29-October 1, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited the Angola from September 29 to October 1, 2002, to assess MDRP implementation progress to date. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of Angola and donor and UN partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. The 1991 Bicesse Accords and the 1994 Lusaka Accords were short-lived attempts to bring lasting peace to the country. The third attempt to achieve peace began following the death of Savimbi in combat on February 22, 2002, and the subsequent signature of a ceasefire agreement on April 4 by the Government of Angola and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). By late July, 84,000 UNITA military forces (FMU) were quartered in 35 cantonment areas and disarmament was completed; military observers of the so-called Troika (Portugal, Russia, and the United States) were able to verify some of these events.

3. In August 2002, all FMU were administratively absorbed into the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and the FMU formally ceased to exist. On August 26, 2002, in the presence of United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Government and UNITA signed a Memorandum of Commitment, stating that all remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol would be implemented by October 15, 2002. However, it appears likely that this deadline will be missed.

4. While the April 4 Memorandum of Understanding between UNITA and the MPLA has brought to an end the primary conflict in Angola, a secondary (separatist) conflict in the oil-rich province of Cabinda, which is separated from the main landmass of Angola by a sliver of land connecting the DRC interior to the sea, continues. Following a September 2002 appeal from the leader of the *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (FLEC), Nzita Tiago, for an end to this smaller conflict, the Government reaffirmed its willingness to open talks on granting the province limited autonomy, though it reiterated its stand against full independence.

5. Relations between the international community and the Government of Angola are strongly influenced by the significant oil reserves off the coast of Angola. On the one hand, these reserves make Angola an important strategic partner for major industrial powers and present lucrative business opportunities for major oil companies. On the other hand, the lack of transparent governance to date of these oil revenues by the Government have strained relations with key development partners.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. Angola has been *a major player* in several conflicts in the greater Great Lakes region. In particular, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was allied with the Marxist government of Denis Sassou-Ngeusso in Congo. When the new Congolese government of Pascal Lissouba allied itself with UNITA in 1995, the Government provided troops in support of Sassou-Ngeusso, which proved decisive in the 1997 and 1998/99 wars. Angola also intervened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), helping to defend the government of Laurent Kabila against Congolese rebels backed by Ugandan and Rwandan forces. Angolan participation in regional conflicts is reflected in part in the fact that some 680 troops in ex-FMU quartering areas are from the DRC or Rwanda; in addition, some 450,000 Angolan refugees live in the DRC or Zambia.

7. Angolan involvement in outside conflicts historically has been a function of UNITA efforts to secure military alliances. With the dissolution of UNITA's military forces, the need for such alliances ceases. There is already evidence that non-Angolan participation in the Angolan conflict, and Angolan participation in non-Angolan conflicts, has dropped precipitously. At the same time, conditions are more favorable than ever before for the return of Angolan refugees from the DRC, Namibia and Zambia.

8. The resolution of the conflict in Angola is seen as a major contribution to stability in the greater Great Lakes region. The resolution of the Angolan conflict is governed by the Memorandum of Understanding, which constitutes an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol. Angola is also *participating in the regional peace process* through its agreement to the Lusaka ceasefire agreement.

9. Angola is a credible and respected military force in sub-Saharan Africa and President Dos Santos recently has taken an active role in promoting peace within the greater Great Lakes region. In August-September 2002, he brokered an agreement between President Kabila, DRC, and President Museveni, Uganda, under which the two Presidents agreed to the normalization of relations, including a timeline for the total withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the DRC.

10. The Government, with assistance from several MDRP partners led by the World Bank initiated the *preparation of a demobilization and reintegration program* following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding on April 4, 2002. The Government has taken administrative and financial responsibility for disarmament and demobilization (undertaken by the FAA) as well as for the provision of transitional assistance, and it has requested administrative and financial assistance for the provision of reintegration services. An appraisal mission of this program, known as the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP), is underway in parallel to this MDRP supervision mission.

11. Overall parameters of the ADRP remain to be determined. The appraisal mission is expected to calculate overall costs of the program, based on the ADRP objectives, review institutional and implementation arrangements, and define which portion of the

program will be financed through what source of funding (Government counterpart funds, the IDA credit, and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) associated with the MDRP). There is broad agreement among the donors that the ADRP is well structured and that the Government as a whole is contributing an appropriate level of support.

12. Overall assistance is expected, on a per capita basis, to be within the range of similar programs in other MDRP-eligible countries; and more generally the program is expected to promote *harmonization of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs* in the region.

13. The *institutional arrangements* for the ADRP fit within the general MDRP model. The National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of the Demobilized and Displaced (CNRDD), which was established in June 2002, has a mandate to coordinate Government efforts in reintegrating ex-combatants demobilized under the various peace accords signed by the Government. As such, it will be tasked with overall program supervision and the provision of policy guidance. The *Instituto de Reintegração Sócio-profissional dos Ex-Militares* (IRSEM), which was established by decree in 1995, will serve as a national coordinator to oversee decentralized program implementation and provide information, communication and referral services as well as overall program monitoring and evaluation.

14. The appraisal mission expects to discuss a draft *letter of demobilization policy* with the Government; this draft has been prepared on the basis of a detailed outline provided to the Government by the World Bank at the end of the May-June 2002 project identification mission.

15. As the ADRP is being prepared within the framework of the MDRP, it will meet MDRP principles of *appropriate environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures*. Given donor concern with public financial management in Angola, the Government has agreed that ADRP financial management and procurement will be devolved to a semi-autonomous Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) that will be staffed by experienced professionals identified through the use of IBRD procurement guidelines.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

16. *National ownership* of the DDR process is very high. The Luena peace process is home-grown, resulting from a Government military victory over UNITA. Disarmament and demobilization have proceeded, entirely under Government control, with relative success to date. IRSEM is a Government entity that, since 1995, has had the mandate to coordinate assistance to the reintegration of ex-combatants. It acquired considerable experience in this work following the signature of the Lusaka Protocol, and is now restructuring itself internally to coordinate implementation of the ADRP. In addition, both IRSEM's parent ministry, MINARS, and the Ministry of Planning (MINPLAN) have been closely involved in ADRP preparation. That said, some partners believe that the Government and the UNITA leadership are increasingly disengaged and/or disconnected from the process.

17. The Government is aware of the regional dimension of conflict in Angola and the greater Great Lakes region and it fully supports *confidence-building measures* with other governments. The Government is committed to ending the flow of arms into the DRC as well as to the repatriation of refugees (including ex-soldiers). It has already approached the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for assistance in repatriating DRC and Rwandan combatants who have been found among the ex-FMU in the quartering areas. The Government also deported a former senior officer of the Forces Armées Rwandaises implicated in the 1994 Rwanda genocide to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha.

18. Since the end of the conflict, relations with Namibia, Uganda and Zambia have improved markedly, and the expected repatriation of refugees from Zambia will help relations to improve further with that country. Relations with Congo (Brazzaville) continue to be complicated by the Cabinda conflict.

19. The Government supports the Technical Coordination Group (TCG) of participating governments' DDR focal points. Angola hosted a TCG seminar in Luanda from July 30 to August 2, 2002. The seminar included a visit to one of the areas where ex-FMU are currently quartered. In addition, IRSEM staff are planning a study tour to *share knowledge* and exchange experiences and lessons learned with staff of other DDR programs in the greater Great Lakes region.

20. As noted in paragraph 16 above, *external assistance* in the area of DDR has yet to be determined. Provisional agreement on financing is expected to be concluded during the current appraisal mission, but final amounts will not be known until the World Bank's Board approves a credit in support of the ADRP and MDTF contributors endorse the program. Both the Government and its external partners view the MDRP framework, including the consultative processes that the ADRP preparation team has followed within that framework, as a useful mechanism to determine the scope and structure of external assistance.

21. Although the ADRP expects to provide special assistance to *special target groups* such as female, underage and disabled ex-combatants, the numbers of individuals included in these groups is currently unknown. Information gathered following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol suggests that the number of female ex-combatants will be small (they numbered 118 post-Lusaka). However, the number of disabled ex-combatants may be high (disabled numbered some 16,700 post-Lusaka). Assistance to this group is expected to be provided under protocols established in the context of the MDRP or through the work of agencies, such as GTZ, which has articulated assistance frameworks that have obtained widespread acceptance internationally. All activities would be undertaken within the MDRP framework.

22. The numbers of underage combatants in the post-Luena process has yet to be established, though it may be significant ((underage numbered some 8,600 post-Lusaka). It is a matter of some concern that, to date, there has been no registration of underage combatants in the FMU quartering areas. Instead, underage soldiers have been registered as family members. The mission encourages the Government to explore measures, in

collaboration with UNICEF, to identify and register former child soldiers in the quartering areas. Reinsertion and reintegration assistance for underage ex-combatants could be provided through MINARS and UNICEF, by way of assistance frameworks that have obtained widespread acceptance internationally. All activities would be undertaken within the MDRP framework.

23. At present, it is not believed that *special projects* will be needed in Angola, as national authorities are re-establishing control over the entire national territory following the end of the conflict.

24. The Government plans to undertake a major post-conflict *reconstruction effort*. An interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) is under preparation, and the World Bank and other donors are helping the Government to prepare an emergency post-conflict reconstruction program, for presentation to the international community in late 2002 or early 2003. It is widely understood that a demobilization and reintegration program cannot in and of itself stabilize the country, and that reconstruction efforts on a large scale are also needed to consolidate the peace. However, in an effort to ensure that demobilized ex-combatants do not resort to banditry to secure a livelihood, the ADRP is expected to include specific reintegration support to help ex-combatants to make a successful transition to civilian life.

25. The post-conflict emergency reconstruction program is expected to develop a structured program of assistance for returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Current assistance from the international community is being coordinated by MINARS and MINPLAN, with the assistance of UNDP's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Of particular importance is the link to demining activities which facilitate the free movement of persons and goods, help improve agricultural production, and enlarge the choice of community of settlement.

26. *Transparency* has been a prominent issue in the DDR dialogue with the Government. The letter of demobilization policy is nearing completion, and is expected to clarify Government intentions respecting sub-regional conflicts and security sector reform. In addition, the Government has agreed to devolve financial management and procurement activities related to the ADRP to a semi-autonomous Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) that will be staffed by experienced professionals identified through the use of World Bank procurement guidelines.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

27. There has been an obvious improvement in *local security* since the conclusion of the conflict between the Government and UNITA in early April, 2002. A return to war is not believed to be likely. Even so, security remains a major concern. Criminal activity appears to be on the rise in major urban centers, such as Luanda. This is believed by some observers to result from decreased vigilance on the part of security forces following the end of the conflict.

28. Security is also impeded by the presence of some five to seven million landmines in the country, by the lack of local administration in most areas formerly held by UNITA, and by possible discontent among the ex-FMU, some of whom are said not to believe that they are receiving their share of a peace dividend. While the ADRP will address some of these issues, efforts going beyond the MDRP will also be required.

29. The Government, through the FAA, is undertaking *security sector reform*, which includes as key elements the demobilization of some 33,000 FAA and the integration of some 5,000 ex-FMU into the FAA. Historical military alliances may constitute one impediment to reform. In particular, Soviet-made weapons systems, and cost inflation which could result from a change in suppliers, imply continued cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet-bloc countries to maintain operational capacity.

30. The Government of Portugal is providing technical assistance, through ISEM (*Instituto Superior de Estudos Militares*), to help the FAA to adapt Western standards (for example, to establish a military academy and redefine the role of armed forces in a democratic society in peacetime), but the scope for rapid reform appears to be limited. The mission encourages MDRP partners to engage Government with respect to the importance of applying public expenditure management standards to defense procurement in the course of further program preparation.

31. There is also need to address the widely ignored problem of the MPLA's substantial paramilitary forces. UNITA is trying to raise this issue through the Joint Commission in the context of the Government's expressed commitment to national reconciliation and democratic processes (albeit not specifically as part of the Lusaka process). Resolving these issues is expected to take sustained effort over the medium term.

32. Arms proliferation among civilians is one of the major problems facing Angola. Although the total number of arms, large or small, is unknown, the number is believed to be high (some 100,000 small arms are believed to exist in private hands in Luanda alone), and *civilian disarmament* is widely agreed to be a key need. The ADRP cannot, however, provide alternative livelihood for disarmed civilians.

33. All FMU ex-combatants are considered disarmed. No provisions for *involuntary disarmament* are therefore envisaged.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

34. A *reversal of the peace process* in Angola is unlikely, as the peace was achieved through a decisive military victory. UNITA forces are physically and emotionally exhausted. Furthermore, resource flows to UNITA have been substantially reduced (including through international action, such as United Nations sanctions against UNITA and concerted action to control the trade in so-called 'conflict diamonds', and the alliance between the Government and the government of the DRC). The end of the MPLA-UNITA conflict is also expected to have a stabilizing effect on other regional conflicts, as Angolan participation typically occurred as an extension of the Angolan conflict, with

one side seeking military support of a sub-regional partner primarily to gain advantage over the other.

35. Even so, as a result of continuing unrest in Cabinda province and poorly managed ex-combatant expectations which may result in disillusionment and discontent, local and low-scale banditry remains a distinct possibility. To help prevent these possibilities from becoming realized, it is important for the Government to engage the civilian opposition, including opposition parties representing UNITA and FLEC, in a more extensive dialogue with a view to building a broad base for the difficult reform challenges ahead.

36. Neither the Government nor its international partners believe that the provision of financial assistance to the Government and to individual ex-combatants through the ADRP will be perceived as an incentive for future violence. The cost of the conflict, both to the country and to individuals involved in it (particularly the ex-FMU), is considered to be too high, and the benefits being offered through the ADRP too low, to give rise to a *moral hazard* of this kind. At the same time, both the Government (through its letter of demobilization policy) and ex-combatants demobilized under the April 4 Memorandum of Understanding are expected formally to demonstrate their commitment to peace and stability in Angola as a condition of receiving ADRP assistance.

37. All parties to these programs, as well as to the future ADRP, are acutely aware that poverty levels are high in Angola, particularly among IDPs and refugees, and that support targeted exclusively at ex-combatants may lead to grievances among these groups. Hence, it is clear to all that a *balance between support for ex-combatants and assistance to other vulnerable groups* is necessary, and programs are being designed specifically to help ensure this result, with assistance to ex-combatants carefully calibrated with assistance to be provided to IDPs and refugees. Some partners would like to see ADRP resources funding social services that benefit the wider community.

38. The MDRP has made a tentative allocation of \$112.5 million to a demobilization and reintegration program in Angola. The appraisal mission now underway will determine the financing needs of the ADRP and the contributions to be made by the Government (through counterpart funds), IDA, and the MDTF associated with the MDRP. Donors are prepared to contribute financial resources to the ADRP through the MDTF, and at present it appears unlikely that the program will experience a *funding gap*.

39. *Coordination* in the preparation of the ADRP has taken place within the MDRP framework and has been good to date. DFID, GTZ, ILO, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNDPA, UNICEF, and USAID have all participated officially in ADRP preparation missions led by the World Bank, and MDRP partners have been regularly consulted on key issues confronting ADRP preparation as well as informed of resolutions adopted in light of those consultations. The fact that the implementation of reintegration activities is expected to be contracted out to various implementing partners, which may include UN agencies and/or NGOs involved in project preparation, has contributed to continuing coordination.

40. Even so, some partners are concerned that coordination in the wider resettlement and return effort remains weak across leading agencies such as the World Bank, UNDP, OCHA and UNHCR. In addition, two donors have provided some assistance to IRSEM (the ADRP's coordinating body) without consulting with the MDRP partnership or Secretariat (in particular IOM, with USAID funding, has undertaken a sample survey of the reintegration preferences of ex-FMU ex-combatants).

41. Although this activity is entirely consistent with MDRP principles, it would have been better if it had been developed in consultation with other donors involved in preparing the ADRP. It is likely that the absence of a World Bank country office manager in Luanda and of an MDRP regional DDR specialist in Kinshasa has contributed to this coordination shortcoming. It is expected that the imminent appointment of these two positions will help to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

42. The *risk of non-engagement* by the international community in helping to resolve the Angola conflict is limited. The United Nations have recently agreed to dispatch a United Nations mission to Angola. There is broad agreement that the Government lacks the technical capacity to reintegrate ex-combatants successfully. The Government and its external partners also concur that without external assistance, many incipient political activities will come to a halt, thereby delaying the stabilization process within Angola and in the region more generally. The MDRP offers a unique opportunity to channel international assistance in one of the most critical areas (i.e., DDR) and thereby maximize its impact. However, concerns about the governance of Government oil revenues may limit the willingness of some international development partners to provide substantial financial assistance to the ADRP and to wider reconstruction efforts in Angola.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

43. *Strategy Indicators*

1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** There are an estimated four million IDPs in Angola and 450,000 Angolan refugees in neighboring countries, mostly DRC and Zambia. It is expected that 1.5 million IDPs and virtually all refugees will return to their places of origin (to date some 600,000 IDPs and 37,000 refugees are believed to have returned, largely 'spontaneously', i.e. without Government or donor assistance). The reluctance of some IDPs and refugees to return home may be explained by the short-lived peace following the Bicesse and Lusaka Accords and the long duration of displacement of many families. Some have also expressed a desire to see in advance of their return the re-establishment of social structures in their expected areas of return.

2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** There is widespread anecdotal and some statistical evidence that freedom of movement of persons and goods has improved substantially since the signing of the April 4 Memorandum of Understanding. UN security advisors have granted WFP permission to open many new road routes for the delivery of food aid. The road between Luanda and Lobito-Benguela is open to convoy travel for the first time in many years. And,

produce from the rural areas of Angola is appearing in Luanda in much greater abundance than in previous years. That said, the presence of landmines on many roads, the destruction of more than 350 road and rail bridges, and the impassability of most transnational railroads, continues to make internal movement risky and/or difficult.

3 *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Classification problems make an analysis of Government spending patterns difficult, but it appears that expenditures on defense and internal security have declined since 1999 (from 31.3 percent of total public spending in 1999, to 14.8 percent in 2000, and 12.4 percent in 2001). Social expenditures are expected to increase as the country moves to a non-conflict budgetary stance. The evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term will be closely monitored by the MDRP partners and assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs.

44. *Program Indicators*

4 *Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.* The ADRP is the main DDR activity in Angola and it is being prepared within the MDRP framework.

5 *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.* No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Angola, and the Government has provided most DDR resources expended to date.

6 *Degree of harmonization of national programs.* The ADRP is being prepared within the framework of the MDRP and is expected to accord closely with its core principles.

45. *Output Indicators*

7 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.* Some 85,000 ex-FMU have been 'demobilized' from the FMU (which formally ceased to exist on August 2, 2002) and integrated into the FAA. Five thousand of these integrated FMU are expected to remain in the FAA, and the remainder are expected to be demobilized from the FAA. The ADRP will provide reinsertion and reintegration assistance to this remaining 80,000, as well as to the 33,000 FAA and 1,500 FLEC that are expected to be demobilized in the medium term.

8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* There is no special project in existence in Angola.

9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* IRSEM hosted the first workshop of the MDRP Technical Coordination Group (TCG) in Luanda, at the end of July 2002 and accordingly benefited from the exchange of experiences and lessons learned in that context.

10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* As stated in paragraph 38 above, DFID, GTZ, ILO, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNDPA, UNICEF, USAID, and the World Bank have officially participated in ADRP missions. In addition, some 120 individuals representing almost 40 agencies are regularly informed of progress in preparing the ADRP and consulted on emerging issues.

7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

46. The mission's recommendations include the following:

- (i) The Government should consult with MDRP partners on the draft letter of demobilization policy.
- (ii) Pending the successful outcome of the appraisal mission, the Trust Fund Committee at its next meeting should discuss Angola's eligibility to access MDTF funds.

47. Recommendations and proposed next steps specific to the ADRP will be detailed in the appraisal mission's aide-mémoire, which will be discussed with the Government at the conclusion of that mission.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Mr. Johannes Zutt, ADRP Task Team Leader, World Bank, Washington

Mr. Joseph Battistini di Monticello, Embassy of France, Luanda

Mr. Walter Viegas, European Commission, Luanda

Attachment 2

Mission Program

Sunday, September 29, 2002

Mr. João Baptista Kussumua, Minister, MINARS
General António Francisco de Andrade, Director General, IRSEM
Mr. José Antonio Martins, Adviser, MINARS

Monday, September 30, 2002

Mr. Luís Simpaio, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Portugal

Tuesday, October 1, 2002

Mr. John Thompson, Ambassador of the United Kingdom
Mr. Christopher Dell, Ambassador of the United States of America
Mr. Erick de Mul, UN Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative, UNDP
Mr. Roger Brink, Ambassador of the Netherlands
Mr. Nicola Bertolini, Acting Delegate, European Commission

Annex 2

Burundi

September 27-October 2, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited Burundi from September 27 to October 2, 2002 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of Burundi, donor and UN partners and non-governmental organizations for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. After seven years of fighting, political parties signed the Arusha peace agreement on August 28, 2000 to bring this long-lasting conflict to an end. A transitional government, which is based on a power-sharing arrangement between the major political groupings and envisages a change in leadership after the first half (18 months) of the transition process, was established on November 1, 2001.

3. Despite extensive mediation efforts by regional governments, in particular South Africa and Tanzania, no comprehensive ceasefire agreement has so far been reached between Government and the two rebel movements, Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and Forces Nationales pour la Libération (FNL). Negotiations have been further complicated recently by the fragmentation within both the FDD and the FNL. Both the Government and the rebel forces are currently stepping up recruitment and armament efforts. At the same time, it is generally established that all segments of the Burundian population are tired of the conflict, which has intensified in recent months.

4. Already before the onset of conflict in 1993, Burundi was among the poorest countries in Africa. As a result of the embargo (1996-99) and the prolonged conflict, poverty has deepened significantly. The depth of poverty, coupled with a severe demographic pressure and land shortages, poses a particular challenge for the reintegration of over one million people currently displaced by war. Extensive reconstruction efforts will, therefore, be required to bring the country back to the path of poverty reduction and sustainable development. Full international support for these efforts has yet to materialize.

5. It is within this fragile socio-political and economic context that the MDRP mission was undertaken. The mission feels that the time is not yet right to consider a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. A joint mission specifically dedicated to this subject will have to await the successful outcome of ceasefire negotiations and a plan for security sector restructuring.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. Burundi is heavily *affected by conflicts* in the greater Great Lakes region. Historically, events in Rwanda and Burundi have mutually influenced each other (such as in 1972 and 1993/94). The outbreak of war in the DRC in 1998 effectively stalled ceasefire talks between the Government and the rebellion. Rebel forces have been operating out of the DRC and Tanzania. The Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) have also deployed in the DRC to counter the threat.

7. There is growing concern that the ongoing withdrawal of Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF)⁴ from the DRC will push Burundian armed groups into Burundi to continue their struggle. Even more disconcertingly, there are indications that Rwandan armed groups (including ex-FAR and *interahamwe*) may be fighting with the rebellion. The influence of the Rwandan groups could harden the negotiating position of the FDD and FNL.

8. Burundi is not part of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement for the DRC. The peace process in Burundi is guided by the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement of August 2000. The Government actively *participates in the regional peace process* for Burundi which has been in place since the beginning of the Arusha negotiations. As a result of this process, a memorandum of understanding with the smaller FDD faction has already been signed. Furthermore, the Governments of Burundi and the DRC have signed an agreement that determines the withdrawal of FAB troops from the DRC in exchange for a cessation of support to the Burundian rebels by the DRC. The Government of Burundi has already initiated its troop withdrawal from the DRC.

9. In view of continued fighting and ongoing political negotiations, it is clearly premature to consider the *preparation of a demobilization and reintegration program*. Any future program will depend on an agreement on army restructuring, which in turn depends on the signing of a ceasefire. Although prospects for a quick resolution of the conflict are slim, various stakeholders have initiated reflections on this subject. This early thinking is guided by Protocol III of the Arusha peace agreement, which foresees the demobilization of those combatants not retained in a unified army, and the provision of support to facilitate their return to civilian life.

10. The Government has been reflecting about a possible DDR strategy, which may contain a phased approach to demobilization in order to minimize social and economic frictions emanating from the process. The Government is keenly aware that any future DDR process will result in the loss of income of those affected, which is why reinsertion and reintegration support is essential and needs to be provided immediately after discharge. The Government has, therefore, initiated a number of preparatory activities including study visits to learn from experiences elsewhere. It is hoped that such activities would enable the Government to initiate proper program preparation once the situation is favorable.

⁴ Formerly the Rwanda Patriotic Army, RPA.

11. The provisions of Protocol III are known to members of the national armed forces and parts of the population. Nevertheless, the mission considers further sensitization of and psychosocial support to different stakeholders, including the population at large, important in order to help them be prepared and support relevant activities when the moment is opportune. Burundian civil society should play an important role in this process.

12. The time is also not yet ripe to establish of an appropriate national *institutional structure* to plan DDR activities in Burundi. Nonetheless, the Government has undertaken preliminary reflections about basic principles of implementation, in order to position itself for timely action as soon as the situation permits. The two overarching institutional principles are inclusiveness, i.e., that representatives of all warring factions be included in the structure, and ownership, i.e., that the Government leads program coordination and implementation. The authorities are cognizant of the fact that for the provision of reintegration support in particular, the program will need to rely on the implementation capacities of UN agencies and NGOs.

13. The mission considers it important that Burundian civil society be recognized as an important stakeholder in the peace process and hence any future DDR program. Civil society may need to organize itself so as to be able to engage civilian and military authorities and assist in the preparation and implementation of relevant activities throughout a future DDR process.

14. Government will have to draft a *letter of demobilization policy* outlining its commitment in order to access MDRP funding for a future national program. At this point in time, the mission deems it premature to discuss the elements of this letter with the Government.

15. *Appropriate environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* will need to be established to minimize any potentially negative social and environmental impact and ensure the proper use of program funds. Again, the mission concludes that it was premature to discuss such arrangements with the Government at this time.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

16. The Government expressed its firm intention to be in the forefront of preparatory and implementation activities for DDR in order to ensure that national priorities are set right from the beginning. *National ownership* is, therefore, an accepted principle. The international community stands ready to assist the Government and other stakeholders as and when requested.

17. The mission considers *confidence building* the essential principle in Burundi at the moment. Even if at a limited scale, preparatory and pilot activities can demonstrate to belligerents that an exit strategy is available. This in turn may facilitate ceasefire negotiations. Confidence building measures would also be important for the communities where ex-combatants and returning refugees and IDPs will settle.

18. Moreover, confidence building has an important regional dimension. Even though the DDR process in Burundi lags behind that in other countries (including Rwanda and the DRC), efforts consistent with MDRP principles may enhance the credibility of the Government's actions vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In this respect, it is deemed valuable that the international community through the MDRP support DDR activities across borders. Any cross-border activities involving Burundi should be developed with the full participation of the Government.

19. That said, the *harmonization of DDR activities* needs to allow individual countries to follow a different planning and implementation pace related to their respective situation. In this respect, it should be noted that the MDRP financing mechanism is not based on a first-come-first-serve principle (see below). Funds would be available for a national program in Burundi even if, as is likely, such a program would be implemented in Burundi later than in other countries.

20. The Government of Burundi fully supports the Technical Coordination Group (TCG) of participating governments' DDR focal points. The Government appreciates the support to *share knowledge* and exchange experiences with and learn lessons from other countries in the greater Great Lakes region. In this respect, the Government valued the TCG workshop in Luanda in July/August 2002. It is committed to participating in future such activities.

21. With the signing of the Arusha peace accord in August 2000, the international community (and most notably UNICEF and the World Bank) have engaged the authorities in a dialogue aimed at preparing and implementing a national program, including for child combatants. With violent conflict continuing, concrete activities have been limited. Nevertheless, the international community's willingness to provide *external assistance* to DDR in Burundi remains strong, and support to such a program would be a priority for many donors and agencies.

22. Much like the authorities and civil society, the international community also needs to prepare itself to provide timely assistance when the time is ripe. The mission, therefore, encourages MDRP partners to engage national stakeholders in a dialogue on principles and concepts and to assess their own capacities for assistance in a coordinated manner under overall Government leadership. It is firmly understood that the international community will not bring ready-made solutions and that uncoordinated individual activities could be very counterproductive to the peace process as long as there is no cease-fire in place and basic parameters for security sector reform are still unknown.

23. There are a number of *special target groups* among both the FAB and the rebellion. Although exact numbers cannot be established, it is believed that several thousand children have been recruited. Many children join because the armed forces/groups offer protection, shelter, and food. Others join because of a lack of employment opportunities in a depressed economy. The FAB are already undertaking a registration of all child soldiers as broadly defined by the Cape Town principles. In collaboration with various Government ministries and other partners, UNICEF is in the process of preparing a project for the unconditional demobilization of child combatants

even before the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, the FAB have initiated small-scale reintegration activities for handicapped soldiers but. However, their financial and technical capacities are limited.

24. After consultation with a wide range of national and international stakeholders, the mission considers the time right to initiate two *special projects* under the MDRP, viz. for child combatants and for vulnerable combatants. Both projects should in principle cover beneficiaries from the FAB and, once sufficient contact has been established, the rebellion. Such special projects may provide an opportunity to pilot reintegration activities for special target groups and test associated implementation arrangements in anticipation of a national program once the peace process has advanced. They would also help sensitize different segments of Burundian society about various reintegration activities.

25. The special project for child combatants would be prepared by UNICEF in close consultation with relevant Government departments and international and local partners. A special emphasis should be placed on developing safeguards against the re-recruitment of demobilized child ex-combatants. The special project for vulnerable combatants would be prepared by the Government in cooperation with relevant partners. There should be no cross-conditionality between these two sub-projects. However, minimal assurances could be provided by government, i.e. a commitment not to re-recruit and a transparent database of beneficiaries.

26. A third special project may need to be launched in case of a voluntary return of Burundian armed groups from the DRC before a national program is in place. This possibility emanates from the example being set for the voluntary disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Rwandan armed groups to Rwanda. Similar processes could be envisaged in the case of Burundian armed groups.

27. The link between DDR and general *reconstruction efforts* is particularly critical in Burundi, given the enormous number of internally displaced and refugees. It is generally accepted that such efforts can help prepare the communities for the return of ex-combatants and the displaced alike. Smaller projects are already underway by a variety of international partners, such as UNDP's Community Assistance Umbrella Program, which is supported by various donors, and the World Bank's second Burundi Social Action Program.

28. It is acknowledged that even if limited in scale, such projects can help stabilize local economies and, therefore, provide viable economic alternatives especially for youth. These activities are coordinated by a working group on reintegration. UNDP and UNHCR are currently in the process of setting up a unit to optimize coordination. MDRP partners *sur place* will cooperate closely with this unit to ensure consistency across beneficiary groups.

29. In the absence of a lasting ceasefire agreement, DDR remains a sensitive issue in Burundi. The mission has observed a certain lack of *transparency* among various stakeholders in dealing with this topic but considers this broadly acceptable for the time

being. That said, the mission encourages the authorities to engage other stakeholders more directly in its DDR thinking.

30. The MDRP approach promises sufficient *flexibility* for engaging in DDR in Burundi. In particular, the possibility of special projects would enable the Government and its partners to initiate strictly limited activities in anticipation of a national program upon signing of a ceasefire agreement.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

31. With fighting increasing inside Burundi, *local security* is a major concern for the Government. Although the Geneva Conventions oblige warring parties to protect the civilian population in any circumstances, civilians have repeatedly been killed by both Government and rebel forces in the course of the conflict. Attempts to establish lasting local security will only be possible with the signing of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement.

32. *Security sector reform* is at the heart of the Burundian peace process. Protocol III of the Arusha agreement spells out general principles for security sector reform, the details of which will need to be worked out during and after the ceasefire negotiations. In broad terms, Protocol III foresees the unification of Government and rebel forces, a restructuring of the new armed forces to meet the new challenges of a post-conflict country, and the subsequent demobilization of surplus soldiers to reach a target strength that is financially sustainable. Without a ceasefire, security sector reform cannot be undertaken.⁵ In turn, without security sector reform, no national demobilization and reintegration program can start. Once these preconditions are in place, an open dialogue and debate with society-at-large on the future of the security forces warrants particular consideration.

33. Although precise information does not exist, it is believed that small weapons are widely available in Burundi as a legacy of an almost decade-old conflict. In this context, *civilian disarmament* takes on a special importance. There are currently no related activities underway or planned. Serious attempts at civilian disarmament can only start once a ceasefire agreement has been signed. However, the mission considers it useful to review possible options for a structured approach, for instance under the framework of the regional small arms reduction initiative assisted by UNDP.

34. No *involuntary disarmament* is currently planned in the Burundian context. It is expected that any disarmament activities for combatants would be undertaken according to the provisions of an eventual ceasefire agreement.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

35. Burundi faces a real risk of a *reversal of the peace process*. The transition government has undertaken commendable efforts to stabilize the situation. However, little progress has been achieved towards a lasting ceasefire since the signing of the

⁵ Plans about security sector reform are, however, also important to inform ceasefire negotiations.

Arusha agreement. Most importantly, there has not been any peace dividend yet. With poverty rising, the credibility of the Government is increasingly put in doubt.

36. With the situation in eastern DRC rapidly evolving and alliances among armed groups possibly being strengthened, Burundian rebel groups may feel that military victory is feasible. There is little doubt that renewed fighting will create immense suffering for the population. At the same time, given the socio-political constellation in the Great Lakes region, a military solution to the conflict in Burundi is not considered realistic for either side.

37. Two developments require special attention by the international community in general, and MDRP partners with the necessary mandate in particular. First, if a ceasefire is not signed and the reform of the army is not initiated before the second phase of the transition starts on May 1, 2003, the situation is likely to become much more fragile. Second, any further fragmentation of rebel forces will make the achievement of a comprehensive ceasefire comprising ever more difficult.

38. The civilian and military authorities are cognizant of the fact that DDR linked to a ceasefire agreement and army reform is inevitable. Therefore, the mission deems the risk of *moral hazard* low that the Government may not seriously pursue a national program if the special projects for child combatants and vulnerable combatants were initiated.

39. The large number of people uprooted by war in Burundi requires close attention to finding a *balance between support to ex-combatants and assistance to other vulnerable groups*, in particular returning refugees and IDPs and host communities. It is generally acknowledged that needs differ between these target groups and that, therefore, differentiated assistance should be provided. That said, the mission considers it important to maintain an acceptable level of proportionality between ex-combatants and other war-affected populations.⁶ In this respect, a harmonization of delivery mechanisms may go a long way toward this goal.

40. The risk of a *funding gap* is small. The MDRP has tentatively allocated \$90 million to DDR in Burundi, to be financed partly through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund linked to the MDRP, partly through bilateral contributions, partly by the World Bank. This arrangement will ensure that funds for a national demobilization and reintegration program in Burundi are available as and when required.

41. Given the low level of DDR-related activities by the international community to date, *lack of coordination* has not been a significant problem. As efforts may speed up in the near future, especially related to the two special projects outlined above, coordination of international community support (bilaterals, UN agencies, NGOs) is necessary. The mission also noted a certain gap in communication between various MDRP partners' headquarters and field offices. In the given context, the mission considers a structured yet informal coordination mechanism as sufficient. The mission thus recommends that the

⁶ It should be noted that many combatants from the FAB and the rebellion have family members either in refugee camps outside the country or who are displaced within Burundi's borders. This fact would need to be considered when designing reinsertion and reintegration assistance.

World Bank re-launch coordination efforts among external partners *sur place* on an informal basis.

42. The *risk of non-engagement* of the international community in the Burundian peace process is limited. The international community strongly supported the Arusha peace process and has a responsibility to assist in its implementation. South Africa, Tanzania, the European Union and the United Nations are providing important mediation support to the process. The government of South Africa has deployed 800 soldiers to Bujumbura to protect the government of national unity established after Arusha.

43. The continued support of the international community in the DDR and reconstruction process will be essential. As a case in point, if the Government were to reduce the size of the unified army as stipulated in Protocol III and any eventual ceasefire agreement without external financial assistance, demobilization would likely be undertaken without reintegration support, which could in turn undermine the sustainability of the peace process.

44. Engagement in Burundi, however, does not only imply a continued dialogue with and among the Government and the rebellion. Equally important is an engagement by MDRP partners with the DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania. Unless this regional dimension is addressed in the political and technical dialogue of MDRP partners on the basis of their respective capacities and mandates, the situation in Burundi is likely to remain fragile.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

45. Strategy Indicators

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* There are currently about 600,000 IDPs in Burundi (including 230,000 in resettlement sites) and around 550,000 refugees in neighboring countries (especially Tanzania), of whom 160,000 are old caseload. These figures have been relatively stable recently.

2 *Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* The movement of persons and goods is severely impaired throughout the country. Security incidents occur regularly and particularly affect the primary road network. Six provinces are under UN security phase IV.

3 *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Social expenditures have reached FBu 23.9 billion in 2001, or 24.6 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures have reached FBu 34.9 billion or 36.0 percent of recurrent expenditure in the same year. By comparison, in 1995, i.e., the year before the coup d'état after which regional sanctions were imposed, social and military expenditures amounted to 17.5 percent and 24.4 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively. In case of MDRP engagement, the evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term needs to be assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs.

46. *Program Indicators*

4 *Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.* No noteworthy activity is currently being undertaken. Small-scale activities by UNICEF and the World Bank are being brought into the framework of the MDRP.

5 *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.* No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Burundi.

6 *Degree of harmonization of national programs.* There is currently no national program in Burundi.

47. *Output Indicators*

7 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.* There is currently no national program in Burundi.

8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* There are currently no special projects in Burundi.

9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* The Government participated in the Luanda workshop and also carried out a number of study visits to countries with DDR programs. These experiences have been useful in the reflection process within the Government regarding a post-ceasefire program, including possible institutional arrangements.

10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* Enhanced awareness among key national and international stakeholders regarding the MDRP and associated activities has been an important positive mission outcome. This having been the first MDRP supervision mission, a certain imbalance in the persons and institutions met was noted.

7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

48. The mission's recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:

- (i) The World Bank should re-launch coordination efforts among MDRP partners *sur place* shortly but on a more informal basis for the time being.
- (ii) The Trust Fund Committee at its next meeting should discuss support to the two special projects. If MDTF partners agreed on such support:
 - a. UNICEF should revise its special project for child combatants;
 - b. the Government should launch preparation for a special project for vulnerable combatants, focusing at the beginning on the handicapped; and

c. a joint preparation mission should be carried out in late 2002/early 2003. This mission would, *inter alia*, help the Government prepare the special project for vulnerable combatants and review the project proposed by UNICEF.

(iii) UNDP should initiate a planning process for civilian disarmament activities complementary to a future national program under the MDRP.

49. The mission also encourages civil society groups to organize themselves and to engage authorities in a dialogue on MDRP-related issues. Lastly, the mission supports the initiation of activities for youth (providing economic livelihoods) and for host communities (stimulating local economies to prepare them for the return of the displaced and ex-combatants).

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Mr. Alf Eliasson, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Ms. Catherine Ransquin, Protection Program Officer, UNICEF, Bujumbura
Mr. Jean Ndenzako, Economist, World Bank, Bujumbura
Mr. Laurent Joseph, Reintegration Specialist, UNDP, Bujumbura
Mr. Markus Kostner, MDRP Manager, World Bank, Washington
Ms. Marona van den Heuvel, Great Lakes Desk Officer, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
Ms. Patricia Huyghebaert, Program Officer, UNICEF, New York
Mr. Peter Christiansen, Head of Unit, Great Lakes and Central Africa, European Commission, Brussels
Ms. Sophie da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes, Expert for Central Africa, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels
Mr. Walter Ehmeir, Attaché, Austrian Development Cooperation, Bujumbura
Mr. Yves Nindorera, Attaché, Belgian Embassy, Bujumbura

Attachment 2

Mission Program

September 27, 2002

- 9.00 Donors and United Nations agencies (United Kingdom, FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF; IRC)
- 11.00 Ms. Mariam Pangah, UNDP Resident Representative a.i.
- 15.00 International non-governmental organizations (ACORD, ActionAid, AFRICARE, Austrian Help Program, CISU, GTZ, ICRC, IFES, JRS, National Democratic Institute, Search for Common Ground, Terre des Hommes,)
- 17.00 Mr. Bruno MPODO-EPO (Conseiller politique), United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB)

September 30, 2002

- 9.00 Cabinet militaire du Président
- 11.00 Mr. Jan Van Eck, Consultant in conflict analysis and resolution
- 14.00 Mr. James Yellin, Ambassador of the United States of America, and Mr. John Marietti, Economics Officer
- 15.00 Chefs de Cabinet, Ministries of Finance, Plan and 3R

October 1, 2002

- 9.00 Mr. Christian Daziano, Ambassador of France
- 10.00 Mr. Malick Sene, UNICEF Resident Representative
- 11.30 Mr. Stefano Severe, UNHCR Delegate
- 15.00 Civil society (Cadre de Concertation des Associations des Droits de l'Homme, Net Press, Réseau de Concertation et d'Appui à l'Action de la Société Civile, Communauté Islamique du Burundi, Association Solidarité Femmes Parlementaires Burundaises, Collectif des Associations et ONG Féminines Burundaises, Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi, Centre de Recherches pour l'Inculturation et le Développement, Ligue Burundaise de Droit de l'Homme, Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale, Association Burundaise des Journalistes, Evêque de Bujumbura)
- 17.00 Team wrap-up meeting

October 2, 2002

- 8.00 Col. Alain Amory (MONUC) and Mr. Christophe Beney (ICRC)
- 9.30 Mr. Léo D'Aes, Ambassador of Belgium, Luc Vanderlinden, Attaché militaire, Michel Bostaille, Attaché de coopération
- 10.30 Ms. Georgina Yates, Country Representative, DFID, Bujumbura

Annex 3

Central African Republic

September 23-25, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited the Central African Republic (CAR) from September 23-25, 2002 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the CAR Government, donors and UN partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. After a long and peaceful period since independence in 1960, a series of mutinies erupted in the mid-1990s. Their impact has severely destabilized CAR's society and economy. Soldiers started three mutinies in 1996 and 1997, in protest against extensive salary arrears. After each mutiny, soldiers were re-incorporated into the armed forces. In 1999, Government launched the preparation for a demobilization and reintegration program. This program was presented to donors at a meeting in New York in May 2000 where donors pledged funds for its implementation. In parallel, retirement reduced the size of the armed forces.

3. However, grievances related to salary arrears (including those to civil servants) have persisted. Finally, an attempted coup d'état took place in May 2001. Under the CEN-SAD agreement, the government of Libya provided a protection force to President Patassé, which proved decisive in preventing the coup. The soldiers who participated in these events fled to the DRC and Chad. Their number is estimated to have been around 1,500, which represents at least one-third of the army's pre-coup strength. In November 2001, General François Bozize, the coup leader, fled to Chad.

4. The CAR Government considers these soldiers "self-demobilized", which thus translates automatically into a reduction in force of the security forces. The Government has called upon these ex-soldiers to return to the country, practically granting them amnesty.⁷ About 500 of them have heeded the call, and have registered with BONUCA, the United Nations Office in the CAR.⁸

5. The Government's earlier plans for demobilization have been overtaken by events, and no further demobilization is currently planned. Rather, and given the troubled

⁷ The Government rules out the re-incorporation of ex-soldiers into the armed forces. However, it is open to integrating them into other Government services to use their skills.

⁸ It is said that a number of these self-demobilized ex-soldiers has again left the country as delivery of the promised assistance has been slow. In addition, a number of them were tried and sentenced *in absentia*.

regional situation and unprotected borders, the army has initiated new recruitment to regain its pre-crisis strength.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. The CAR is not directly engaged in conflict in any neighboring country but is heavily *affected by conflicts* in the region. The country has witnessed a proliferation of arms from the DRC and Sudan in particular. It is host to 50,000 refugees from neighboring countries as well as Rwanda and Burundi. At the same time, an estimated 23,000 CAR citizens sought refuge in the DRC and in the Republic of Congo in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of mid-2001. During this coup, the MLC which controls the Equateur province of the DRC, supported the Government in Bangui.

7. Problems at a local level with Chad and the Sudan persist. In the case of Chad, the presence of General Bozize and his followers in the Sarh region of southern Chad keep uncertainty and rumors about a renewed attempt at high levels.⁹ This uncertainty also hinders the Government's voluntary disarmament program (see below). The border problem is aggravated by cross-border cattle rustling emanating from both sides of the border. Incursions by poachers from the Sudan are a common occurrence in eastern CAR, leading to insecurity and the depletion of wildlife.

8. In neither case have problems reached national proportions so far. However, an escalation of the conflict with Chad is possible if the two governments do not direct their full attention to resolving the problem at hand. The recent initiative by leaders of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) to bring the two governments together to stop supporting each others mutual opponents (General Bozize and Abdoulaye Miskine) is, therefore, very timely. The mission also welcomes the recent decision of CEMAC to deploy a small peacekeeping force of 300 soldiers to the CAR-Chad border to facilitate joint patrols and other confidence-building measures.

9. The resolution of the conflict in the DRC is seen as a major contributor to stability in the CAR. For instance, the integration of MLC military forces into the Forces Armées Congolaises is considered an important factor for normalizing social and economic relations across the Oubangui river. It is also hoped that this would lead to a decrease in the illegal importation of weapons.

10. The CAR is not party to the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and its *participation in the regional peace process* is, therefore, limited. The resolution of the conflict in the CAR is guided by the Bangui accords. The status of implementation of these accords remains to be assessed.

11. The CAR Government, with assistance from UNDP and UNOPS, initiated the *preparation of a demobilization and reintegration program* as a result of the series of mutinies of the second half of the 1990s. This program was redesigned after the coup attempt in May 2001 and was launched as the *Programme National de Désarmement et*

⁹ Whilst Chad is sheltering General François Bozize, the CAR Government is sheltering Abdoulaye Miskine, a Chadian bandit considered responsible for much of the armed robberies in the border region.

de Réinsertion (PNDR) in January 2002. The three-year PNDR aims at collecting and destroying 10,000 weapons from the civilian population and assisting in the reintegration of 2,000 who have handed in weapons voluntarily. The program is not targeted specifically at ex-combatants yet hopes to reintegrate 500 of them.

12. A *prime de démobilisation* of up to FCFA 75,000 (\$110) is paid to those handing in a weapon, depending on its type and quality. Reintegration support consists of vocational training for 6 months, followed by financial support in the amount of \$500 per person for income-generating activities. To date, over 750 arms¹⁰ have been collected and over 600 beneficiaries have been identified for training.¹¹ Total costs amount to \$5.2 million¹² of which approximately \$4.0 million¹³ are said to have been secured.

13. The Government welcomes potential support under the MDRP and is ready to engage the international community. The initiation of a parallel activity under the MDRP does not seem sensible. Rather, there is broad agreement that the PNDR could be enhanced and appropriately revised to address the specific needs of self-demobilized ex-soldiers and other ex-combatants, if any. The revised PNDR may continue to focus on disarmament and reintegration but may also offer reinsertion (settling-in) assistance to ex-soldiers and other demobilized ex-combatants. The target group may need to be extended by about 1,500 to 2,000 ex-soldiers from the armed forces, the police and the gendarmerie, those demobilized before 2001 without any support, and other ex-combatants.

14. Before enhancing the PNDR, it is deemed important to determine the number of ex-combatant beneficiaries as precisely as possible, review the cost calculation based on the enhanced objectives and the additional target group, review institutional and implementation arrangements, reconsider design elements, and define which portion of the PNDR should be financed through the MDRP.

15. The PNDR has an *institutional structure* that could easily be revised to fit the MDRP objectives. There are two national commissions envisaged, one for disarmament (which is already established) and one for reintegration, each supported by a technical committee. Furthermore, the PNDR contains local disarmament committees of which 26 have already been set up (18 in Bangui). These local committees take the lead for sensitization and weapons collection. At the central level, the PNDR is managed by a Secretariat with assistance from UNOPS (technical assistance) and UNDP (financial management, see below). These local and central structures could be built on for an enhanced PNDR.

¹⁰ It should be noted that the weapons collected to date are not used by the CAR armed forces (FACA), which is an indication of their foreign and illegal origin.

¹¹ For further information on the PNDR, see the program document and Aide-Mémoire: Synthèse des activités du Programme National de Désarmement et de Réinsertion (PNDR) au 31/08/02.

¹² It should be noted that the program costs are based on the initial objectives of collecting 2,000 arms and providing reintegration support to 400 beneficiaries. The cost implications of the revised objectives have not yet been calculated.

¹³ This amount remains to be confirmed as it may include contributions from several donors who prefer to channel assistance to the PNDR through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) of the MDRP.

16. Other than the decree establishing the General Delegation for Disarmament, there does not yet exist an explicit Government policy on demobilization and reintegration matters. In order to access MDRP resources for a national program, the Government will need to prepare a *letter of demobilization policy* outlining its commitment to a well-prepared and transparent program.

17. Although the mission has not engaged the Government on policy matters, the letter could contain the following elements, *inter alia*: confirmation of the provision of reinsertion and reintegration assistance to self-demobilized ex-soldiers who participated in the coup attempt in 2001; commitment to demobilize and reintegrate the militias affiliated with the Government or the coup leaders; efforts to improve transparency in military expenditure (including fiscal management to pay salaries on time)¹⁴; assurance of financial transparency of PNDR funds; and plans for restructuring the security forces (including transparent recruitment criteria).

18. Upon request by donors at the New York meeting in 2000, the Government confirmed the application of transparent financial procedures. As a result, UNDP currently manages PNDR funds and undertakes direct disbursements. Procurement and the recruitment of local staff are undertaken following UN guidelines. In case of PNDR enhancement, these arrangements would be assessed with a view to meeting the MDRP principles of *appropriate environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures*.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

19. *National ownership* of the PNDR is high. In addition to the PNDR institutional structure, the Government has nominated a General Delegate for Disarmament. Ownership will be further strengthened with the expected recruitment of a Chief Technical Adviser (UNOPS) who will replace the international Program Coordinator (from UNV) and support the national Program Manager.

20. The Government is very much aware of the regional dimension of conflict in the CAR and supports *confidence-building measures* with other governments. Such activities would relate to the DRC and efforts to halt the arms flow as well as the mutual repatriation of refugees (including ex-soldiers). Even more importantly, relations with Chad need to be improved. In this respect, the CAR Government expressed its desire to associate the Government of Chad to the MDRP framework.

21. The situation regarding demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the CAR is not comparable to that in other countries. It is, therefore, considered difficult to *harmonize disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities* in terms of institutional arrangements or benefits. For instance, the PNDR will need to maintain a strong focus on civilian voluntary disarmament to have a recognizable impact on the internal security situation. At the same time, simultaneous DDR activities in the DRC and Chad on the one hand and the CAR on the other hand, would certainly provide mutual security benefits to all countries.

¹⁴ The World Bank and the European Commission are assisting the CAR Government for improving the management of fiscal resources. Fiscal transparency for the security sector could benefit from this work.

22. PNDR staff have expressed their interest in *knowledge sharing*, exchanging experiences with and learning lessons from other countries in the greater Great Lakes region in the context of the MDRP Technical Coordination Group (TCG). The CAR did not participate in the TCG workshop in Luanda in July/August 2002 but is committed to participating in future such activities.

23. There is a strong sense among Government and international partners that the problems in the CAR need to be addressed within a regional context. Such efforts should not be limited to DDR *per se* but extend to poverty reduction more generally. *External assistance* in the area of DDR, however, has yet to be enhanced (see below). Both the Government and international partners view the MDRP framework as a useful mechanism to achieve this objective.

24. No information currently exists regarding *special target groups*. After close investigation, UNICEF has not identified child soldiers as a significant issue to be addressed. It is also not established whether female, disabled and/or chronically ill ex-soldiers exist. Preparation for an enhanced PNDR would require a thorough analysis of potential special target groups.

25. The CAR is host to 50,000 refugees from abroad and may consider offering permanent settlement for some of those. The MDRP may be in a position to support the settlement of foreign ex-combatants and their families in the CAR through its *special projects* window. Should this option be pursued, legal questions (such as the granting of citizenship rights or residency permits) and the consideration of the needs of receiving communities would require special attention.

26. The mutinies of 1996 and 1997 and the coup attempt of 2001 led to quite severe destruction in Bangui, however few *reconstruction efforts* are ongoing or planned.. Measures complementary to an enhanced PNDR are deemed essential to help the CAR find its path to sustainable development. It is widely understood that a demobilization and reintegration program cannot in and of itself stabilize the country. In this respect, coordination with poverty reduction activities, especially the PRSP process, the LICUS initiative¹⁵, and the program under the ninth European Development Fund, is essential and would need to be pursued vigorously.

27. Given the early stage of MDRP engagement in the CAR, no discussions have yet taken place regarding *transparency*. As noted above, however, transparency issues would feature prominently in the letter of demobilization policy. The ongoing UNDP-sponsored initiative of creating a central civil service database (*Fichier unique de référence en Centrafrique-FURCA*) may constitute an opportunity to create a similar system for the security forces, in close collaboration with those partners working to support army restructuring. This initial reform is an indispensable first step towards building transparency within the restructuring and demobilization process and should feature in the government's letter of demobilization policy (see above). 1. The MDRP approach is

¹⁵ LICUS, low income countries under stress, is an initiative recently launched by the World Bank and is being implemented in close collaboration with UNDP. The CAR has been identified as a LICUS country.

considered sufficiently *flexible* by both Government and international partners to address the specific DDR needs of the country. But, it should be noted that the MDRP would not be in a position to alone address the need for civilian disarmament, and providing an alternative livelihood for those thus disarmed.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

28. The lack of *local security* is a major problem in the CAR. The Government has identified two major causes of insecurity, armed highway robbery (*coupeurs de route*) in the countryside and poaching. Such insecurity disrupts trade, especially the marketing of food inside the CAR and in neighboring countries. This in turn may have an important impact on food security in certain parts of the country. Armed robberies are also on the rise in Bangui and other towns. The prevalence of small weapons throughout the country is considered the major facilitating factor for such illegal activities, general poverty its main cause. Efforts to curb the rise of insecurity are undertaken within the context of the PNDR but will require strengthening beyond a possible MDRP contribution.

29. The Government is aware of the need for *security sector reform* but its pursuit of this agenda appears somewhat unstructured. In particular, the efficacy of the armed forces has suffered from the mutinies and coup attempt, and the armed forces are not considered representative of the country's population. The Ministry of Defense plans to review the relevant legal texts and then develop a restructuring plan. Restructuring may also require the rehabilitation of barracks, the training of soldiers, and the procurement of appropriate equipment and supplies. The Government has not received much outside assistance in this area so far. Bilateral partners may, therefore, be encouraged to support this restructuring process technically and financially.

30. While plans for restructuring are still in their infancy, recruitment has already begun to reach the pre-coup strength (see above). Given the internal and external security threats the country faces, such recruitment is considered acceptable among members of the international community. However, it raises the question of the justification for a simultaneous demobilization and reintegration program, especially as the currently already scant financial resources allocated to the security sector would be spread even more thinly.¹⁶

31. Recruitment and an enhanced PNDR are not considered mutually exclusive as long as the recruitment process follows transparent and objectively verifiable criteria.¹⁷ Other elements of the security sector (such as a computerized personnel database and payroll list, etc.) may also need to be addressed during the PNDR review process so as to avoid that demobilized soldiers are recycled through the PNDR and then be re-absorbed in the military.

32. Arms proliferation is one of the major problems facing the country although the total number of arms, large or small, is unknown. Responding to this need, UNDP is assisting the Government in the financing and implementation of the PNDR (see above).

¹⁶ As a case in point, current salary arrears to soldiers date back to April 2001.

¹⁷ The current indication is that recruitment is not undertaken in a representative manner.

Human security and *civilian disarmament* activities will likely occupy a prominent place within the poverty reduction strategy which is currently under preparation. It is expected that these activities can help reduce the incidence of roadblocks and thus enhance local security and stabilize the country.

33. It is acknowledged that in many cases, a weapon is used as a means to survive. For this reason, the PNDR includes specific reintegration support to provide for alternative livelihoods. There is an amnesty for those voluntarily handing in their weapons. At the same time, every effort needs to be made to avoid that voluntary disarmament degenerates into a lucrative business or that people arm themselves just to have access to reintegration support.

34. The possession of a weapon is in principle strictly regulated. Civilians may apply for a permission to own a hunting rifle. However, the possession by a civilian of a weapon meant for war is illegal. Anyone in the possession of a war weapon (AK 47, grenades, ammunition, etc.) would stand trial by a military tribunal or criminal court (for civilians). *Involuntary disarmament* would, thus, carry a heavy penalty. The PNDR envisages voluntary disarmament for the first two years of its operation. Thereafter, the Government would start to forcefully collect arms. Those disarmed involuntarily would not be eligible to receive any receive reintegration assistance. In reality, the Government has already started involuntary disarmament in Bangui which risks undermining the principles and procedures of the PNDR. Clearly, voluntary and involuntary disarmament activities would need to be synchronized.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

35. The social, economic and political situation in the CAR is very fragile. If general poverty (main cause) and salary arrears and arms proliferation (main factors) are not addressed systematically, insecurity at the local and national level is likely to increase. In this context, unemployed and discontent ex-soldiers are an incipient danger to the country's stability. A *reversal of the peace processes* cannot, thus, be ruled out. It is, therefore, also considered important that the Government engage the civilian opposition in a more extensive dialogue with a view to building a broad base for the difficult reform challenges ahead.

36. An enhanced PNDR with MDRP support may be an important element in the stabilization of the country. With increased security and better relations to neighboring countries, the Government may feel that critical reforms, including that of the security sector, have less urgency. This potential *moral hazard* problem needs to be addressed in the context of the PNDR revision and clear and monitorable assurances would need to be given by the Government in the letter of demobilization policy (see above).

37. There is currently no structured assistance in place for returning IDPs and refugees. Furthermore, poverty levels are high in the CAR and support targeted exclusively at ex-combatants may lead to grievances among the general population. A *balance between support for ex-combatants and assistance to other vulnerable groups*, therefore, needs to be found. The PNDR addresses part of this problem by providing

assistance to civilians who hand in their weapon(s). However, a more concerted effort will need to be made to link the PNDR to the poverty reduction strategy and related projects (such as the envisaged community-driven development (CDD) project by the World Bank). The UNDP poverty reduction support project, scheduled to end in December 2002, is currently being evaluated and would also provide lessons for the formulation of a more comprehensive and inclusive socio-economic recovery strategy with increased focus on addressing widespread chronic poverty.

38. Even before enhancing the PNDR, a *funding gap* of at least \$1.2 million exists (see above). The financial requirements of an enhanced PNDR need to be assessed and the possible contribution of the MDRP defined. It should be noted that the MDRP includes a tentative allocation of \$3 million to a national demobilization and reintegration program in the CAR.

39. Collaboration between BONUCA and UNDP regarding the interface of political and technical issues related to the return and reintegration of ex-soldiers is good. Otherwise, however, a *lack of coordination* is a visible problem regarding the regional dimensions of DDR in the CAR. As a case in point, the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA) has undertaken a study on the regional dimensions of the CAR conflict and has developed a regional plan for disarmament (covering Congo, Chad, and the CAR). The UN disarmament center in Lomé has also prepared a regional plan for disarmament for Congo, the CAR and Cameroon.

40. By the same token, coordination within MDRP partners has been found wanting. Little information seems to have been shared between various headquarters and capitals and the representations on the ground. The absence of a World Bank country manager further complicates the situation. The mission, therefore, recommends to set up a network that is comprised of focal points of interested donors and UN agencies based in Bangui and is linked to the MDRP Secretariat. This network could coordinate DDR-related efforts among local focal points, vis-à-vis Government, and vis-à-vis headquarters. UNDP may be best placed to take the lead in this network. UNDP has expressed its readiness to provide the resources necessary to operationalize such a network and to ensure that all partners with relevant competencies, including the UN system, are fully involved.

41. The *risk of non-engagement* by the international community in helping resolve the CAR conflict is real. There is broad agreement that the Government's financial and technical capacities are insufficient to address the numerous problems at hand. Government and international partners also concur that without external assistance, many incipient economic and political activities, including the planned conduct of local and legislative elections over the next twelve months, may come to a halt, thereby delaying the stabilization process within the CAR and in the region. Again, the MDRP offers a unique opportunity to channel external assistance to the PNDR as an important stabilization effort and thereby maximize its impact.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

42. *Strategy Indicators*

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* There were an estimated 80,000 internally displaced at the height of the crisis in 2001. Many fled to the countryside for fear of persecution because of ethnic affiliation. This number has decreased to possibly 25,000 today. It should be noted, however, that IDPs are dispersed among the population and it is, thus, difficult to establish their exact numbers or even to identify them. There are also IDPs as a result of the conflicts with Chad and the Sudan.

According to UNHCR, there were 23,000 CAR refugees in the DRC and in the Republic of Congo in mid-2001, of whom possibly 1,300 were self-demobilized ex-soldiers. This figure is now down to approximately 3,500 refugees among whom possibly 500 ex-soldiers. Many ex-soldiers have fled with their families. These families are unlikely to return as long as the ex-soldier heads of households remain outside the country.

2 *Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* The impact of the conflict in this area is in general limited, though it is felt to some extent in the northern and eastern border regions. The frequent road robberies in the north and in the northwest of the country have a much greater impact on the free movement of persons and goods, although a precise figure on occurrences or losses is not available.

3 *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Budgeted social expenditures have reached FCFA 17.5 billion in 2002, or 37.0 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures have reached FCFA 7.4 billion or 15.6 percent in the same year. By comparison, in 1995, i.e., the year before the first mutiny, social and military expenditures amounted to 31.1 percent and 12.1 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively. In case of MDRP engagement, the evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term needs to be assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs.

43. *Program Indicators*

4 *Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.* The PNDR is the only important DDR activity in the CAR, and is now being brought into the MDRP framework.

5 *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.* No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to the CAR.

6 *Degree of harmonization of national programs.* There is currently no national program as defined by the MDRP in the CAR.

44. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** A total of approximately 1,300 ex-soldiers have self-demobilized in carrying out the attempted coup in May 2001. There is no national program in place for their assistance. However, over 600 ex-soldiers have already been identified to undergo vocational training and receive reintegration assistance through the PNDR for having handed in a weapon.
- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** There is no special project in existence in the CAR.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The CAR Government has not participated in the Luanda workshop and, thus, not benefited from the exchange of experiences and lessons learned.
- 10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** This was the first mission to the CAR in the context of the MDRP. It consequently also served as sensitization for both the Government and international partners. Furthermore, this is the first report reviewing DDR activities in the CAR.

7. **Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

45. The mission's recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:
- (i) At its next meeting, the MDRP Trust Fund Committee should discuss urgent support for DDR activities in the CAR to address current local and regional security concerns. If MDTF partners agreed on such support:
 - a. a joint preparation mission should be carried out in early 2003. This mission should, *inter alia*, initiate the revisions to the PNDR, engage the Government regarding the preparation of the letter of demobilization policy, and identify complementary measures that are essential for the success of the enhanced PNDR, including collaboration with the Government of Chad.
 - (ii) MDRP assistance to the CAR should be through enhancing the existing PNDR following MDRP principles rather than developing a separate operation.
 - (iii) The Government of Chad should be associated to the MDRP coordination framework. The MDRP Secretariat should consult the governments of the CAR and Chad with a view to address technical aspects of cross-border DDR and security-related issues, including arrangements for the possible return of CAR ex-soldiers still in Chad.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

- Mr. Camara Ibrahim Fane, Chief Technical Adviser, International Labor Organization, Bangui
- Ms. Claudia Leonini, Program Officer, European Commission, Bangui
- Mr. Léon Diberet, Program Officer, United Nations Development Programme, Bangui
- Mr. Markus Kostner, MDRP Manager, World Bank, Washington
- Mr. Serge-Alain Yabouet-Bazoly, MDRP Focal Point, Government of the Central African Republic

Attachment 2

Mission Program

September 23, 2002

- 10.30 S.E.M. Général Xavier Sylvestre Yangongo, Ministre Délégué, Ministry of Defense
- 11.30 S.E.M. Joseph Monzoule, Minister of Interior
- 12.30 S.E.M. Clément Eregani, Ministre Délégué, Ministry of Plan
- 14.00 Mr. Stan Nkwain, UNDP Resident Representative
- 15.00 Mr. Josep Lloveras, Chef de Délégation, European Commission
- 16.30 General Lamine Cissé, Representative of the Secretary General, Chief of BONUCA, and Ousmane Kaba

September 24, 2002

- 9.30 Programme National de Désarmement et de Réinsertion (M. Aleck Soupene, Chef de la Division Formation, M. Firmin Nvouni, Assistant Administratif et Financier)
- 11.00 United Nations Heads of Agencies(M. Nana Sinkam/FAO, M. Emile Segbor/HCR, Dr Amara Toure/WHO, Stan Nkwain/UNDP, and M. Aboudou Karimou Adjibade/UNICEF) and UNFPA, WFP, BONUCA, PNDR, Centre de formation professionnelle Don Bosco de Damala, ACFPE, General Delegation for Disarmament
- 13.00 S.E.M. Simon Yanou-Gonia, Minister, Directeur de Cabinet, Primature
- 15.30 Jean-Luc Le Bras, Chef de Service, Service de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle, Embassy of France
- 16.30 Ms. Mattie R. Sharpless, Ambassador of the United States of America
- 18.00 Team wrap-up meeting

September 25, 2002

- 11.00 S.E.M. Martin Ziguélé, Prime Minister

Annex 4

Republic of Congo

September 27-28, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited the Republic of Congo September 27 to 28, 2002, to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of Congo, donors and UN partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. Following the ceasefire and cessation of the hostilities agreements of November and December 1999, and the subsequent national dialogue on reconciliation that begun in March 2001, the civil war is considered to have come to an end. Government and partners on the ground agree that the major challenge for Congo is economic growth, employment creation, and good governance. However, renewed instability erupted a few weeks after the March 2002 presidential election and is still affecting part of the Pool region, where rebels under the leadership of Mr. Ntoumi refuse to disarm.

3. So far, out of an estimated 20,000-25,000 ex-combatants (Government estimate), about 10,000 ex-combatants are said to have been demobilized. These 10,000 are mostly former Ninjas and include some Cocoyes; most of Cobra militias who fought on the side of President Sassou-Nguesso have been integrated in the national army. At this time, Government is not contemplating the demobilization of any army soldiers.

4. As for foreign armed groups, such as ex-FAZ/FAC, progress with the ongoing peace process in the greater Great Lakes region is key to their return to the DRC and Rwanda. However, issues regarding the conditions and the timing of their return remain to be resolved. So far, no foreign armed groups have been formally repatriated.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

5. The Republic of Congo is *affected by the civil war*, which ended in 1999, and by the resurgence of internal conflict that accompanied the March 2002 elections. The legacy as well as a cause of this instability are long-term poor governance (including of oil revenues), high levels of youth unemployment, instability in neighboring countries, and the development of competing militias (e.g., Ninjas, Cobras) affiliated to different political groupings.

6. The Republic of Congo is not a signatory of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. However, the Congo has been both an actor and a victim in the conflicts affecting Angola and the DRC. Congo has for a long time been involved in the secessionist war affecting

the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. The government of Angola provided critical support to the government of President Sassou Nguesso during the civil war of 1999. With respect to the DRC, Congo has provided shelter to several thousand soldiers for the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) following the collapse of the Mobutu regime, as well as to several thousand former soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) implicated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The normalization of its relations with neighboring DRC and Angola as well as Rwanda would constitute an important contribution to the stabilization of the Great Lakes region.

7. There is a limited *national program for demobilization and reintegration* in place in Congo at this time. The establishment of the *Haut Commissariat à la Reinsertion des Ex-Combattants* was prompted by the World Bank IDA credit for DDR, which was conditional upon the establishment of a national *implementing institution*. It is widely acknowledged that the institution is still in its start-up phase. The *Haut Commissariat* has produced a national DDR framework, which partners on the ground and the mission are looking forward to receiving. Government has completed the demobilization and reinsertion of nearly 2,000 combatants within the framework of the IDA credit to date. One thousand others are currently undergoing demobilization and reinsertion.

8. The mission found no particular momentum for additional future demobilization of either army or militias. Government, bilateral partners and UN agencies in Brazzaville emphasized the need to expedite the transition from emergency to long-term development measures, and to facilitate sustainable reintegration. In that context, Government expressed a concern that reintegration provisions in the current national program supported by the World Bank are inadequate. The mission recommends that this issue be addressed in the context of a review of the current program and its incorporation into the MDRP framework.

9. Further dialogue with Government should be pursued on issues of demobilization and reintegration policy and strategy:

- (i) The need for the DDR program to focus on reintegration opportunities given the end of the war more than two years ago;
- (ii) The need for a DDR program to be focused, yet coordinated with other development and reconstruction initiatives; and
- (iii) The need for demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed forces to be sensitive to political, security, and socio-economic conditions of return.

10. At the same time, a UNDP project implemented by IOM supported the demobilization and reintegration of about 8,000 combatants. The project is due to end in December 2002. At this time, there would be an opportunity for UNDP and IOM to *share knowledge*, with Government and transfer technical capacity to Government.

11. Government would have to draft a *letter of demobilization and reintegration policy* outlining its commitment in order to access MDRP funding for a future national

program. At this point in time, the mission deemed it premature to discuss the elements of this letter with the Government.

12. The establishment of *appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures* remains paramount, given a high risk of instrumentalization of DDR for political gains and a poor financial transparency record. For example, the fairness of recent elections has been disputed and competition between militia-backed political groups continues. It should be noted that adequate safeguards and fiduciary arrangements are set up for the IDA credit.

3 Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

13. The need for *Government ownership* was clearly emphasized. However, actual leadership could be strengthened by Government also taking a more pro-active stance to coordinate DDR activities with complementary reconstruction and employment creation efforts.

14. Government and partners agree on the importance of *confidence-building*. Two aspects were emphasized: for members of the militia, both timely intervention and sustained follow-up are critical to avoid that individuals return to the fighting forces out of lack of alternatives. For communities, benefits to former militia members need to be balanced with support to basic social and economic infrastructure.

15. The disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups could build on, and contribute to, the dynamics of peace at work in the greater Great Lakes region. Thus, *confidence building* has an important regional dimension as the repatriation of ex-FAZ/FAC and other armed groups may impact on the security of the country of return. However, this needs to be carefully timed and coordinated across borders so as not to upset fragile equilibria.

16. Close collaboration at the political and technical level is required to this end. Notably, possible MDRP support for the return of members of Congolese armed forces (ex-FAZ and ex-FAC) requires a better understanding of their numbers and preferences, clear signs of political will from Kinshasa, and guarantees on the conditions of reintegration. Availability of reintegration opportunities should coincide with repatriation to the DRC.

17. In that context, the MDRP may provide an important mechanism for cross-country collaboration that could help to establish planning, financing and timing parameters for the return of ex-FAZ and ex-FAC as well as the ex-FAR. The return of the Angolan and Chadian troops said to be present in the Republic of Congo is contingent upon the security situation and the peace process in the greater Great Lakes region.

18. Although considerable progress has been made in improving coordination and harmonization efforts, there is still room for improvement. Various partners, including UNDP and the World Bank, need to work closely across borders to *harmonize support* given to the Government in their DDR efforts. The planned review of experience to date (IOM and the *Haut Commissariat*) could provide additional input in identifying the challenges of reintegration, the benefits of DDR to the communities of return, and

monitoring to avoid double dipping by beneficiaries and to ensure a smooth handover of activities from the IOM to the *Haut Commissariat*. The planned review could help the two parallel activities come together under one framework and could also provides an opportunity for the international partners involved in DDR to coordinate more closely among themselves and with Government.

19. As for *special projects*, the Governments of Congo and the DRC recently confirmed, in principle, their intention to facilitate the return of ex-FAZ and ex-FAC. UNDP (Brazzaville) and IOM are committed to working with both Governments and MDRP partners on a suitable framework and proposal, which could be considered for financing under the MDRP / MDTF.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

20. Good governance and *security sector reform* are at the heart of long-term stability in the Congo. However, security sector reform does not appear to be an immediate priority for Government. This may be explained by the recent incorporation of President Sassou-Nguesso's Cobra militias into the army, political interest in the status quo, and the current instability in the Pool region. Bilateral partners have not voiced support for reform of the security sector either, though France has demonstrated some interest, by initiating a study for technical assistance to the police and *gendarmerie*.

21. Restoration of *local security* remains a major concern for the Government, especially in the volatile Pool region, where remaining Ninja militias continue to back Mr. Ntoumi. With an estimated 40,000 *small arms* in circulation (Small Arms Survey, 2002), small arms recovery takes on a special importance. UNDP's regional Small Arms Reduction Program has just initiated studies on cross-border trade in small arms and measures to reduce it (including incentive kits).

22. Continued **national dialogue** and involvement of communities at the grassroots level offer additional opportunities for peace-building required to complement DDR efforts.

23. Although *involuntary disarmament* is not officially being planned for in the Republic of Congo, the ongoing unrest may require the preparation of contingency plans for individuals who will be forcibly disarmed.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

24. A *deterioration of the security situation* in parts of the country cannot be excluded given the current unrest in the Pool region, the quantity of small arms in circulation, and the fact that the militias could be reconstituted rather quickly. At this time, the militia still appear to retain their allegiance to political leaders as well as access to small arms. Although a comprehensive reform of the security sector (armed forces, military and civilian police) is required to increase stability, it is not a Government priority at this point in time. Lack of such reform would be a missed opportunity to integrate remaining militias, active or dormant, into a unified army.

25. There seems to be consensus that announcing a formal DDR program, with benefits going to identifiable groups, would entail a *significant moral hazard* by potentially encouraging remaining rebel groups to preserve their situation to strengthen their bargaining position. Rather, Government emphasized the need to address the needs not only of former combatants but of youth in general, mainly through employment, as they constitute the recruitment pool for militias.

26. The mission found Government tempted to include in DDR issues unrelated, or only indirectly related to DDR, such as refugees and widows of war. Government and international partners should be sensitive to the need to address those humanitarian and development issues, and coordinate their response with DDR. However, burdening DDR with non-core activities would risk impeding its success.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

27. *Strategy Indicators*

1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** There are currently about 45,000 IDPs in the Republic of Congo, although recent instability in the Pool is said to have added 30,000 IDPs to this figure. There are around 30,000 refugees of the Republic of Congo in neighboring countries (17,000 in Gabon, 5,000 in South Africa and 3,000 in the DRC), of whom fewer than 1,000 have returned to Congo-Brazzaville since January 2002. The Congo hosts refugees, including approximately 80,000 from the DRC, 15,000 from Angola, 15,000 from Gabon, 5,000 from Rwanda and Burundi, and 2,000 from Central African Republic. A tripartite agreement frames the return of refugees to Gabon. Other groups of refugees return in limited numbers (less than two thousand).

2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** The movement of persons and goods is severely impaired throughout the country. Security incidents occur regularly, such as recent attacks which disrupted air and rail traffic in Brazzaville, and severed the links to the Pool region.

3 ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Education and health expenditures have reached US\$ 160 million in 2000/01, or 27 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures have reached US\$ 210 million or 35 percent in the same year, compared to 10 percent of total recurrent expenditures in 1996. Given the weak statistical database, these data are considered rough estimates. In case of MDRP engagement, the evolution of social and military expenditures in the near-term needs to be assessed in light of the country's security needs.

28. *Program Indicators*

4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** At this time, no DDR activity in Congo is being undertaken with MDRP financing. The ongoing activities by IOM and the *Haut Commissariat a la Reinsertion des*

Ex-Combattants will be assessed for capacity and lessons learned to be taken into account in the framework of the MDRP.

5 **Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to the Congo.

6 **Degree of harmonization of national programs.** The creation of the *Haut Commissariat* is expected to further improve harmonization of activities by various partners. Repatriation of foreign armed groups is at an early study phase and needs to be coordination with efforts in the country of return.

29. *Output Indicators*

7 **Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.** Close to 2,000 ex-combatants have recently been demobilized by the government's *Haut Commissariat a la Reinsertion des Ex-Combattants*. Previously, a further 8,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized by the UNDP/IOM program.

8 **Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.** There are currently no special projects in the Congo.

9 **Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.** The Government participated in the Luanda workshop, which helped the *Haut Commissariat a la Reinsertion des Ex-Combattants* gauge its institutional arrangements.

10 **Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.** This was the first joint mission to the Congo in the context of the MDRP. It contributed to raising awareness among key national stakeholders and implementing agencies on the ground regarding the MDRP.

6. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

30. The mission's recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:

- (i) Government, with the support of the World Bank, IOM and UNDP should review the demobilization and reintegration experience to date, and engage partners in discussing a comprehensive reintegration framework. In this context, Government, the World Bank and UNDP should explore opportunities to bring existing parallel activities within the MDRP framework. To this end, a joint mission is recommended before the end of 2002.
- (ii) Government should develop a framework for the repatriation of foreign armed groups to their countries of origin in close cooperation with the governments of the DRC and Rwanda.
- (iii) Government should reconsider the need for security sector reform with a view to improving security sector governance and national reconciliation.

Attachment 1

Mission Team

European Commission	Mr. Domenico Rosa
Netherlands	Mr. Dirk Knook
ILO	Mr. Cheaka Touré
UNDP	Mr. Babacar Cisse
World Bank	Mr. Florian Fichtl
	Ms. Juana Brachet

Attachment 2

Mission Program

Meeting with the Haut Commissariat a la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants:

S.E.M. Michel Ngakala, Ministre Délégué, Haut-Commissaire
Colonel Francois Bouesse, Haut-Commissaire Adjoint, Conseiller Spécial du
Chef de l'Etat
M. Pierre Bounou Bounou, Commissaire à la démobilisation et au désarmement
M. Jean Pierre Lekoba, Commissaire à la Réinsertion Economique
M. Joseph Mbizi, Commissaire à l'Execution des Project
M. Joseph Mbossa, Directeur de Cabinet, HCRC
M. Olingoba Mwanzibi, Conseiller du HCREC
Mme Olingoba Mwanzibi, Consellere du HCREC
M. Etokabeka, Job Sylvanus, Chef de Service Gestion de l'Information et des
Publications
M. Ebondzi, Alain Roger, Chef de Service Administratif, financier et de la
logistique
M. Morossa, Fulbert, Chef de Service Passation des marches
M. Fidele Migambanou, Attaché HCREC

Meeting with UNDP

Mr. Jacques Bandelier, Resident Representative a.i.
Mr. Joseph Pih, Conseiller économique
Mr. Gilbert Barthe, Program Manager, Great Lakes Region Small Arms
Reduction Program

Meeting with the UN Country Team, including the World Bank, European Commission delegation and representatives of member states (including Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands) and the United States

Mr. Jean-Eric Holzapfel, Chef de délégation, Commission européenne
Mr. Gaetano La Piana, Ambassadeur d'Italie
Mr. Etienne de Souza, Ambassade de France, Premier Secretaire
Mr. Moustapha Niasse, Program Coordinator, FAO
Mr. Amadou Ouattara, FAO
Mr. Sory Ouane, World Food Program
Mr. Jacques Bandelier, Resident Representative a.i., UNDP
Mr. Gilbert Barthe, Program Manager, Great Lakes Region Small Arms
Reduction Program, UNDP
Mr. Ibrahim Traore, UNHCR
Bienvenu Monthe, World Bank, Brazzaville country office
Hans Grysson, Chargé d'Affaires, Ambassade de Belgique

Meeting with IOM

Mr. Maximo Halty, Chef de Mission

Annex 5

Democratic Republic of Congo

September 23-26, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from September 23-26 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of the DRC, donor and UN partners and non-governmental organizations for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. The DRC has been the main battlefield of the Great Lakes conflict since 1996. Following the failure of the international community and the Government to prevent repeated incursions into Rwanda from refugee camps controlled by ex-FAR and *interahamwe* militia in the eastern DRC (then Zaïre), the government of Rwanda launched a military operation to disband the refugee camps and helped Congolese rebels to oust the government of Mobutu Sese Seko.

3. However, relations between the government of president Laurent Kabila and Rwanda deteriorated in 1998, with Rwandese armed groups again attempting to destabilize Rwanda from the DRC. Rwandan forces launched a major military operation in the DRC again in 1998, supporting newly emerging Congolese rebel forces in the eastern DRC. This triggered a complex civil war in which numerous Congolese groups and at least seven foreign countries have intervened militarily.

4. The Lusaka Agreement of July 1999 represented the first significant effort to resolve the conflict. However, implementation of the Agreement was limited until 2001. The Government of the DRC, the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Uganda have strengthened their efforts to bring an end to the conflict in the DRC. The recent signing of the Pretoria and Luanda Peace agreements with Rwanda and Uganda respectively, has resulted in a rapid withdrawal of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) from the DRC. This in turn opens opportunities to restore peace within the eastern DRC.

5. The mission welcomed the Government's demand for the cessation of all political activities by Rwandese groups and the departure of the leadership of Rwandese armed groups based in the DRC. In addition, the mission noted that the spontaneous demobilization of individual combatants around Beni, and the sensitization visit of 84 demobilized members of Rwandese armed groups and their dependents to Kigali may have raised the prospect of larger scale disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of

foreign armed groups in the near future – which is key to a resolution of the conflict in the region.

6. The Pretoria agreement envisages the establishment of the Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) and calls for the deployment of additional troops to reinforce the United Nations Organization Mission to Congo (MONUC). Timely and effective additional international support could provide critical momentum to the current peace consolidation process.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

7. The DRC has been *severely affected by conflict* since 1998. The country has de facto become the theatre of war of the Great Lakes and has been partitioned between pro- and anti-government military alliances supported by different external actors. A large number of Congolese have been killed or displaced in this conflict. An already poor infrastructure base has been further eroded, and the movement of trade and persons has been severely hampered.

8. The DRC is *contributing to the regional peace process*, as a signatory of the Lusaka, Luanda and Pretoria agreements. Recent substantial progress in the implementation of these agreements, including the expected voluntary disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups by MONUC, make the preparation of a comprehensive national DDR program even more pressing.

9. Government has initiated preparation of such a *national program* based on on-going pilot activities and taking into account the experiences of other countries. It presented the mission with an outline of a National Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PNDR), thereby demonstrated ownership of a certain vision. The mission encourages MDRP partners to support Government's efforts to develop a comprehensive national program.

10. Given the complexity and potential risks, a *letter of demobilization policy* outlining the government's strategy would provide additional, required comfort for bilateral and multilateral financing partners. At this point in time, the mission deemed it premature to discuss the elements of this letter with the Government.

11. *Appropriate environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* will need to be established to minimize any potentially negative social and environmental impact and ensure the proper use of program funds. Again, the mission concludes that it was premature to discuss such arrangements with the Government at this time.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

12. The mission found there is now a strong consensus on the part of Government and the international community to accelerate planning and implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and repatriation program for the foreign armed groups. There is also new recognition from all sides of the need for a coordinated approach to a well-targeted national program.

13. In general, Government *ownership* is high, though political commitment is not yet fully reflected in an appropriate institutional set-up. Responsibility is currently scattered among various agencies, making the interaction with the international community prone to misunderstandings. Among the donor community, commitment is high to support the government in the preparation and financing of its DDR program, but scope exists to further improve donor coordination, especially in a regional context.

14. Ultimate *ownership* and responsibility for the design and implementation of a national demobilization and reintegration program lies with the government – it cannot be shared. Consequently, the mission believes that a joint chairmanship of the PNDR at the policy level is not appropriate. However, regular consultations on policy and financing issues involving the government(s) and the international community are necessary to sustain the peace process and to avoid any disconnect between government(s) and the international community.

15. As the international community is striving to coordinate its support to a national program, it is vital that Government also strengthens its institutional interface at a level appropriate to its political commitment. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is a cross-sector effort of great sensitivity with political, security and financial implications, requiring decision-making capacity and direct access to the highest level of authority.

16. The international community also needs to closely *coordinate its technical support* with political processes in support of a national program. The mission acknowledges that cooperation with countries at war is a complex undertaking and that shifts in political positions and sudden evolutions render advance planning and precision even more difficult.

17. Technical assistance should be provided in a transparent manner agreed upon with Government and partners. Towards that end, effective coordination mechanisms need to be set up for both the Government and the international community. In similar circumstances, Technical Coordination Committees (TCC) have proven successful to advance program preparation and steer implementation insofar as (i) they provide a participatory forum; (ii) responsibility for technical issues is indeed delegated to technical staff from various agencies; and (iii) the TCC is clearly linked, and responsible, to the policy making level.

18. The mission appreciates increased efforts on the part of MONUC and UNDP to coordinate support at the national level. The mission recommends that the MDRP contribute to these efforts by strengthening its technical capacity, including the posting of a regional DDR specialist in Kinshasa as soon as possible. The mission also finds that parallel efforts of bilateral partners should be reflected in the comprehensive programming framework.

19. Given the challenging environment in terms of politics and logistics, setbacks and delays are likely to occur during implementation of a DDR program. These need to be managed. The mission calls for a transparent and participatory process in the design and implementation, and close coordination among all partners at the operational level –

including MONUC, TPVM, the Joint Military Commission (CMM) and the national *Commissariat au Processus de Paix dans les Grands Lacs*. It is equally important that there is no disconnect between the technical and political level, which could lead to unrealistic expectations and misperceptions among the various mediators and the political leadership of the countries concerned.

20. The number of available troops for MONUC operations is not the only decisive factor – program design and implementation strategy are equally important. The disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups in the DRC calls for expediency and simplicity to avoid lengthy encampment and duplication of activities already planned for in the country of return. For example, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program already provides for comprehensive demobilization and reintegration of returning combatants. The mission thus encourages the MDRP Secretariat and MONUC to enhance their collaboration, such that MONUC is better aware of efforts undertaken by regional governments and partners within the MDRP framework.

21. In this context, the mission noted that the Government deems that it has not been consulted adequately with respect to the DDR activities entailed in the draft MONUC Joint Operational Plan (JOP) and draft Concept of Operations (ConOps) for the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Rwandese groups. The mission recommends that MONUC and the Special Task Force collaborate more closely with the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda in finalizing the JOP and ConOps, and other relevant operational issues.

22. ***Coordination with respect to financing*** will also be critical. The recommendation of the United Nations Secretary General “that the costs of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of members of armed groups be borne under the assessed budget”¹⁸ requires further clarification. To define the role of the MDRP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, further information is sought regarding: (i) the mandate and procedures used for MONUC Phase III deployment; and (ii) a possible time lag between Security Council decision and the approval of related funding by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly.

23. Activities in support of ***special groups*** have already been launched in July 1999 in anticipation of a national program resulting from the inter-Congolese dialogue. The Government issued a decree for the demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable soldiers in early 2000. Vulnerable groups include, among others, child soldiers and disabled, chronically ill and overage soldiers. These efforts are coordinated by the *Bureau National de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion* (BUNADER). In collaboration with UNICEF and the World Bank/ILO, a number of pilot reintegration activities have been undertaken, the lessons of which need to be incorporated in any future national program.

24. The issue of ***special projects*** in areas not under the Government’s control is sensitive. Until recently, insecurity, political uncertainty and the absence of agreed basic DDR principles have conspired against the utilization of MDRP funds in the eastern

¹⁸ Report of the UNSG dated September 10, paragraph 74.

DRC, irrespective of the availability of funds. This is changing and, security conditions permitting, it is recommended that the MDRP Trust Fund Committee consider the project proposals submitted by various agencies such as UNDP as well as NGOs. Discussion of these proposals should include discussion of MDRP guidelines, of technical feasibility, and of the impact on security and stability.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

25. The restoration of authority and good governance throughout the country are critical to create an environment conducive to successful disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of *foreign armed groups*, and to address the vacuum created by the rapid withdrawal of foreign forces. Towards that end, further progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue towards an inclusive government and local peace-building initiatives are essential.

26. The PNDR is essential — but not sufficient — to support the peace process and facilitate social and economic recovery. Additional measures will be required to address emergency humanitarian needs and ensure sustainable development. Continued humanitarian assistance, civilian small arms recovery efforts, rapid developmental assistance and support to involve civil society and foster reconciliation should be considered in the development of a *comprehensive framework for recovery*.

27. *Local security* poses a considerable challenge, partially to be addressed through the DDR program, but to a larger extent linked to the establishment of an inclusive government, good governance, and reform of the security sector.

28. In the context of the DRC, the *reform of the armed forces* to arrive at a professional and inclusive force is a complementary requirement to the design and implementation of a national DDR program, an area to be discussed at the inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD). The ICD also needs to tackle the treatment of *Congolese armed groups*, for whom an inclusive government, reform of the armed forces, and restoration of law and order are critical complementary elements. Similarly, a *reform of civilian security forces* is required to support restoration of confidence and stability. Lack of progress on these issues could jeopardize the successful implementation of a PNDR and undermine sustainability.

29. Given the complexity of the situation in the DRC, the proliferation of armed groups, many of which are community-based, and a large number of soldiers who fall in the category of vulnerable ex-combatants, *complementary options* to a formal DDR program need to be considered. Civilian weapons recovery programs and community-based approaches might, in many cases, be more appropriate.

30. *Involuntary disarmament* is currently not considered an option for either the foreign or the Congolese armed groups. However, contingency plans should be put in place to deal with all eventualities.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

31. Concerns remain about MONUC's capacity to respond rapidly and on a large scale. For example, “re-tooling” MONUC to respond to the changed situation as well as a delayed arrival of the requested additional troops could lead to a *risk of a loss of momentum*. A rapid response from the international community in support of MONUC's efforts will be critical.

32. Possible delays in the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups caused by a deterioration of the security situation in parts of the country risks *reversing the peace process*. Therefore, a rapid deployment of MONUC/TPVM is required to jump-start these activities and to provide confidence in the peace process.

33. Regarding the DDR for national armed groups, the complexity of the situation including the proliferation of fluid armed groups invite the risk of major *moral hazard*. The mission strongly cautions that the preparation of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program should avoid raising false expectations, in terms of the level of benefits, the number of beneficiaries, and the secondary objectives to be included. Unrealistic expectations as to the levels of benefits and the number of eligible beneficiaries could easily create perverse incentives, which could contribute to a proliferation of armed groups or an increase in their size, rather than to their demise.

34. Close coordination between demobilization and repatriation efforts (MONUC), humanitarian assistance (OCHA) and early developmental efforts (UNDP, UN agencies, bi-lateral and multilateral partners) is absolutely critical for the success of the peace process and early economic recovery, especially in the eastern DRC. This is particularly important as support to former combatants needs to be *balanced with support to war-affected communities of return*.

35. There may, due to lack of communication between MONUC and the MDRP, be a risk of *a financing gap* for the DDR of foreign armed groups in the DRC. MONUC confirmed that its response to finance activities related to the demobilization and encampment of combatants is currently limited by its mandate and a lack of authorized budget for these activities. The mission recommends that MONUC: (i) finalize budgets related to the demobilization and repatriation of the foreign armed groups so that the financing gap can be considered and addressed; and (ii) make them available to the recently created Special Task Force¹⁹ charged with coordinating the contributions of UN specialized agencies and others. This is to ensure comprehensive planning of contributions by UN agencies and other partners, avoid a financing gap and make provisions for interim solutions, as necessary.

36. The *risk of non-engagement* of the international community in the DRC is very limited. With the deployment of MONUC and the strategic location of the DRC as the fulcrum of the conflict, the international community is committed to supporting efforts to consolidate peace in the DRC. However, it is less clear whether the international

¹⁹ The Special Task Force includes heads of UN agencies, including the World Bank.

community has the political will to tackle the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups in the DRC aggressively enough. It remains to be seen whether MONUC has an adequate mandate or technical capacity to effectively disarm and repatriate the Rwandese armed groups still present in the DRC.

37. The lack of contingency planning for the forcible disarmament of these groups, the increasing insecurity in the eastern DRC, and the fact that MONUC currently has neither the mandate nor the military capacity to implement a forcible disarmament strategy raises the risk that the situation in the eastern DRC could deteriorate and that the Government would not be able to reassert effective control over these areas.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

38. Strategy Indicators

- 1 Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* There are currently about 2.2 million IDPs in the DRC and around 365,000 refugees in neighboring countries, including 120,000 in Tanzania, 80,000 in Congo-Brazzaville, 50,000 in Zambia, 33,000 in Rwanda, 27,000 in Burundi, 12,000 in Angola, 10,000 in Central African Republic, 8,000 in Uganda, 4,000 in Zimbabwe, 3,000 in Mozambique, and 1,000 each in Namibia and Benin. Nearly 10,000 Congolese applied for asylum in Western countries during 2001. Approximately 250,000 Congolese have fled their homes since January 2002. The DRC also hosts about 300,000 refugees from neighboring countries, including 180,000 from Angola, 70,000 from Sudan, and several thousand from Burundi, Central African Republic, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville, and Rwanda respectively. In addition, an estimated 30,000 Rwandese live in the DRC without formal refugee status. Since January 2001, about 5,000 Angolan refugees have returned to Angola. Several thousands Sudanese and Ugandan refugees are also believed to have returned spontaneously.
- 2 Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* The de-facto partition of the country and lack of security severely disrupts social and economic networks. The conflict has had devastating impact on the country's already degraded infrastructure, further impeding the movement of persons and goods, even locally. The resumption of fluvial traffic, opened by the humanitarian barge that left Kinshasa for Kisangani in May 2002, the rehabilitation of roads around key cities, and the proposed rehabilitation of railways, give hope for freer movement of persons and goods.
- 3 Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Social expenditures have reached FC 5.767 billion in 2001, or 6.7 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures (including security) have reached FC 19.571 billion or 22.9 percent in the same year. By comparison, in 1995, social and military expenditures (excluding security) amounted to 2.4 percent and 5.4 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively. The evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term needs to be assessed

in light of the country's security needs, including in the territories being vacated by the RDF and the UPDF.

39. *Program Indicators*

4 *Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.* No activity is currently MDRP-funded. However, there is general consensus to work within the MDRP framework. On-going activities include an ILO-implemented, World Bank-supported pilot project demobilizing and reintegrating 800 vulnerable ex-combatants, which will inform the formulation of the Government's proposed PNDR. Bilateral partners through local and international NGOs currently finance child demobilization activities in the East. MONUC and the UN family have initiated the demobilization of foreign armed groups (in Kamina and Beni).

5 *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.* No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to the DRC.

6 *Degree of harmonization of national programs.* There is currently no national program in DRC as defined by the MDRP. However, discussions at a regional level and with partners in the DRC have been initiated to ensure harmonization. This is particularly pertinent for the repatriation of foreign armed groups.

40. *Output Indicators*

7 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.* There is currently no national program in the DRC as defined by the MDRP. However, 800 vulnerable ex-combatants and up to 500 child soldiers have been demobilized in pilot activities, and the government's *Bureau National de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion* (BUNADER) has presented the outline of a national program.

8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* There are currently no special projects in the DRC.

9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* Government of DRC representatives have benefited from numerous experience-sharing activities, including a high-level workshop in Washington with Sierra Leone officials, a field visit to Sierra Leone, and the Luanda and Nairobi regional workshops with counterparts from neighboring countries. It is expected that this knowledge-sharing contributes to improved cooperation with the government of Rwanda regarding the repatriation of Rwandese armed groups and the development of a national program.

10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* This was the first joint mission to DRC in the context of the MDRP. The mission attempted to address gaps in awareness and knowledge of the MDRP approach, and related MDTF.

7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

41. Despite the absence of a full-fledged, agreed upon national framework, the mission recommends that the MDTF considers financing of priority activities, in response to the unfolding situation and/or related to the preparation of the national program. In principle, decision-making should be delegated to parties on the ground. For that reason, the rapid establishment of an MDRP presence in Kinshasa is paramount.

42. For territories for now not under the control of Government, the prime responsibility to appraise these proposals lies with the MDRP. Towards that end, the mission recommends that relevant submitted proposals be presented to the Trust Fund Committee at the upcoming meeting in the Hague, along with related guidelines for preparation and appraisal. If necessary, an appraisal mission to the eastern DRC should be carried out prior to that.

43. The mission proposes the following next steps:

Issue	Responsible parties
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjust and finalize JOP and ConOps for the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups in consultation with governments of the DRC and Rwanda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONUC, Special Task Force, Governments of the DRC and Rwanda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify mandate, timetable, procedures, budget and role of the MDRP for the demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups; and put in place an interim mechanism, if necessary. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONUC, MDRP Secretariat, Special Task Force, Governments of the DRC and Rwanda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a presence in Kinshasa and Kigali as early as possible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDRP Secretariat
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify MDTF criteria and procedures to finance priority activities in support of the PNDR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDRP Secretariat, Special Task Force
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support cross-border confidence-building measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONUC, MDRP Secretariat, Government of DRC, Government of Rwanda

a. There is need for continued coordination at regional level of demobilization and reintegration efforts among affected countries, especially between the DRC and Rwanda.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Belgium	Pierre Lebrun
European Commission	Domenico Rosa
European Union	Roland Kobia
ILO	Cheaka Toure
Netherlands	Dirk Knook
	Marona van den Heuvel
USAID	Anthony Gambino
	Nicholas Jenks
UNICEF	Manuel Fontaine
UNDP	Babacar Cissé
	Judith Tuluka Suminwa
World Bank	Florian Fichtl
	Juana Brachet

Attachment 2

List of Persons Met

Government

Ministère de la Défense	S.E .M. Irung-A-Wan, Ministre de la Défense Col. Médard Unyon-Pewu, Directeur de Cabinet Professeur Kirongozi, Chef de Cabinet Adjoint Capitaine Magistrat Rémy Ruphin Kilimpimpi mwa Kilimpimpi, Conseiller juridique
Ministre de l'Intérieur	S.E. M. Mwenze Kongolo, Ministre de l'Intérieur
Commissariat général chargé du Processus de Paix	Mr. Seraphin Ngwej, Commissaire adjoint, chargé du DDR
BUNADER	Dr. Malela, Coordinateur général

United Nations

MONUC	M. Amos Ngongi, SRSG Mme Lena Sundh, Deputy SRSG M. Peter Swarbrick, Director DDRRRR/Political Affairs Ms. Stella Schuhmacher, Political Affairs Officer M. Alec Wargo, Child Protection Advisor
UNDP	M. Herbert McLeod, Resident Representative, UN Resident Coodinator Mme. Judith Tuluka Suminwa, DDR Project Officer M. Gustavo Gonzales, Consultant M. Salomon Tudieshe, Conseiller a la Coordination
UNICEF	Mme Trish Hiddleston, Child Protection Officer M. Stephane Pichette
BIT Projet BIT/Banque mondiale	Mme Dayina Mayenga, Directeur M. Sylvain Ilunga, Coordinateur projet BIT/Banque mondiale
OCHA	M. Michel Nourredine Kassa, Head of Office
UNHCR	M. Ngonlardjé Mbaidjol, Délégué régional pour l'Afrique centrale
WFP	M. Felix Bamezon
FAO	M. Adrianus Spijkers
WHO	M. Léonard Tapsoba, Representative
HRFOC	Pierre-Michel Fontaine
UNESCO	Professeur Youri

Bilateral Partners

Special Representative
of the EU for the Great
Lakes

M. Aldo Ajello

Belgium

M. Frederic Meurice, Ministre Conseiller

Italy

M. Maurizio Bungaro, Premier Conseiller

France

M. Denis Berthelot, Chef du Service de Coopération et
d'Action Culturelle

Germany

Mme. Doretta Loschelder, Ambassadeur

Greece

M. Spyridon Theocharopoulos, Ambassadeur

Spain

Mme. Clara Girbau Ronda, Premier Secrétaire

Sweden

Ms. Katarina Tafvelin, Première Secrétaire

Annex 6

Rwanda

September 27 – October 2, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited Rwanda from September 27 to October 2, 2002 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of Rwanda, donor and UN partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF, formerly the Rwanda Patriotic Army) has been deployed in large parts of the eastern DRC since 1998, after Rwandese armed groups, led by elements of ex-FAR and allied militia (*interahamwe*) implicated in the 1994 genocide, launched large scale incursions into Rwanda from the territory of the DRC. Rwanda has been able to restore security on its own territory, but the RDF has become embroiled in a complex war in the DRC. Furthermore, although the Rwandese armed groups have been driven further into the DRC, they continue to pose a security threat to Rwanda.

3. The governments of Rwanda and the DRC signed the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999. This agreement included provisions for a cessation of hostilities, the termination of DRC government support for the Rwandese armed groups, and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from DRC territory. However, implementation of the agreement was limited until July 2002.

4. The bilateral Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002 directly addresses the core concerns of the two governments – a withdrawal of the RDF from the DRC in exchange for a dismantling and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups by the government of the DRC with the support of the international community within a 90-day period. Initial indications are encouraging. The government of Rwanda completed the withdrawal of its forces from the DRC on October 5, 2002, and the government of the DRC has begun to take measures to dismantle the Rwandese armed groups present on its territory. However, large scale efforts to disarm and repatriate the Rwandese armed groups have yet to commence, especially in the eastern DRC. In addition, it appears that irregular Congolese and foreign armed groups may seek to exploit the security vacuum in the eastern DRC following the departure of the RDF.

5. Relations between the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Uganda deteriorated in 2001, with repeated clashes between RDF and UPDF contingents in Kisangani, and accusations of mutual political subversion. With the support of the

government of the United Kingdom, the two governments are participating in bilateral confidence-building measures.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. ***Being affected by conflict:*** Rwanda has been at the heart of the conflict in the Great Lakes Region since the genocide of 1994, in which at least 800,000 Rwandans were killed. Over 2 million Rwandan civilians also fled to neighboring countries and a further 2 million were internally displaced in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and the expulsion of the former government. Repeated attacks by Rwandese armed groups based in the DRC between 1994-1996, in 1998 and again in 2001 displaced a significant number of Rwandan civilians and severely destabilized parts of western Rwanda.

7. ***Participation in the regional peace processes:*** The Government is a signatory of the Lusaka Agreement. In this context, it has consistently participated in the regional peace process and associated mechanisms such as the Joint Military Commission (JMC). As noted above, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda recently concluded the Pretoria Agreement, which included provisions for the withdrawal of the RDF from DRC territory and for the dismantling and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups by the Government of the DRC with the support of the international community within a 90 day period. The Government initiated the withdrawal of the RDF from the DRC on September 17, 2002.

8. ***Preparation of a national DRP:*** The Government launched the first stage of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) in 1997. Between 1997 and 2001, the Program demobilized 18,692 soldiers (including 2,634 child soldiers) of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). However, stage I suffered from substantial technical shortcomings and a lack of adequate financing. Donors were reluctant to finance demobilization activities for the RPA in the context of ongoing hostilities in the DRC. Reintegration activities in particular were limited as a result of these shortcomings.

9. In July 2001, the Government initiated preparation of stage II of the RDRP. Overall, RDRP stage II envisages the demobilization and reintegration of about 20,000 RDF soldiers and about 25,000 Rwandese armed groups. In addition, RDRP II plans to provide retroactive reintegration assistance to eligible stage I beneficiaries. The preparation of RDRP II has taken the MDRP framework into account. Implementation of stage II began in December 2001 and the program is now up and running.

10. To date, the RDRC has demobilized 6,866 RDF soldiers and about 2,500 members of Rwandese armed groups who returned to Rwanda after May 2001. Reinsertion activities have been initiated and reintegration activities are in final planning stages. The RDRC noted that the implementation of reintegration activities has been constrained by the lag between the approval (April 25, 2002) and effectiveness (September 23, 2002) of the Government of Rwanda's IDA credit. At the same time, the mission noted the need to increase the visibility of the RDRP within Rwanda (and also in the DRC in relation to Rwandan armed groups), and encourages the RDRC to pursue

opportunities to enhance the awareness of partners and potential beneficiaries at both national and regional levels.

11. *Establishment of a suitable institutional structure*: The Government has established the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) to oversee the implementation of RDRP II. The RDRC has established a Technical Secretariat to coordinate and implement the Program.

12. *Letter of demobilization policy*: Government submitted a letter of demobilization policy to the World Bank on March 14, 2002. The mission strongly urged Government to make this letter available to interested MDRP partners without further delay.

13. *Appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures* have been put in place by Government in the course of program preparation, and in accordance with World Bank social and environmental safeguard and financial management requirements. The RDRC will complete a thorough social and environmental assessment within the next 6 months.

3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

14. The principle of *national ownership* has been integral to the preparation and implementation of the RDRP. The Government has mandated the RDRC to oversee all demobilization and reintegration activities in Rwanda. The Technical Secretariat of the RDRC has led implementation of demobilization activities and is *coordinating* the inputs of all governmental and external partners of the RDRP through a Technical Coordination Committee (TCC). International partners on the ground strongly endorsed the national ownership principle for the RDRP and welcomed the establishment of the TCC. Several also indicated that the RDRC should further strengthen its partner coordination at the political level in Kigali. The RDRC was encouraged to participate more actively in the Friends of the Commission mechanism established by donors in Kigali.

15. The RDRC confirmed that the regional mechanisms established under the MDRP, especially the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), has helped to facilitate *confidence-building* and *knowledge sharing* among technical personnel engaged in DDR programs. RDRC discussions with Congolese counterparts, which began in the course of a Luanda TCG meeting, led to a bilateral technical meeting between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda in Nairobi in mid-September 2002. The latter meeting focused on detailed *cross-border technical planning* of the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation activities envisaged under the Pretoria Agreement. The MDRP provided financial and facilitation support to these meetings, which were also attended by MONUC and UNDP.

16. The RDRC reaffirmed its intention to continue the technical dialogue with its counterparts of the Government of the DRC. To this end, the RDRC has indicated that it plans to invite its Congolese counterparts to Kigali to familiarize themselves with the demobilization and reintegration provisions in place for returning members of Rwandese armed groups.

17. The mission welcomes MONUC's efforts to help build confidence by facilitating a visit of about 84 ex-combatants and dependents from Kamina to Rwanda, and would

encourage the RDRC and MONUC to explore further opportunities for collaboration, especially with regard to cross-border sensitization efforts.

18. Government expressed the concern that the MDRP, at the regional level, *is not yet adequately optimizing the contribution of external partners supporting cross-border DDR activities*, in particular those of MONUC. The RDRC noted that (i) the latest report of the Secretary General of the UN on MONUC to the Security Council fails to mention the RDRP, and (ii) the draft MONUC Joint Operations Plan (JOP) fails to take into account demobilization and reintegration activities already catered for under the RDRP. The RDRC indicated that it has not been consulted by MONUC about the DDR activities outlined in these documents, and expressed concerns that several of the demobilization activities proposed by MONUC could lead to a delay in repatriation and a costly duplication of activities already being implemented under the RDRP.²⁰ The Government urged the MDRP to strengthen the coordination of MONUC DDR activities with those planned by the Government and the Government of the DRC.

19. The RDRP contains specific provisions for the following *special target groups*: (i) child soldiers, (ii) chronically ill ex-combatants, (iii) physically disabled ex-combatants, and (iv) female ex-combatants. RDRP demobilization activities include health counseling, medical screening, HIV/AIDS sensitization, and Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV/AIDS. In addition, the RDRP will provide specialized reintegration assistance for the chronically ill and the disabled. The RDRP also contains a Vulnerability Support Window to provide supplementary assistance to socio-economically vulnerable ex-combatants. The Program will also seek to ensure that female ex-combatants are able to fully access all program benefits.

20. The RDRC is collaborating with the Ministry of Local Affairs (MINALOC) and UNICEF to ensure the provision of specialized demobilization, family tracing and reintegration activities for child soldiers. Of the 450 child soldiers who returned with the Rwandese armed groups since May 2001, only four still remain in the Gitagata center.

21. RDRP reintegration activities are closely *coordinated* with the Government's decentralization program. In particular, elected Community Development Committees (CDCs), which form a cornerstone of the Government's decentralization and community empowerment strategy, play a central role in the approval and monitoring of reintegration benefits for ex-combatants. The RDRP will encourage ex-combatant participation in more general poverty reduction and employment activities supported by Government and external partners.

22. *Transparent* use of RDRP resources is assured by the utilization of financial management and procurement procedures that are in accordance with World Bank requirements. Transparency issues related to the *security sector* were addressed by Government in the Letter of Demobilization Policy. *Inter alia*, Government confirmed that defense procurement procedures are consistent with the requirements of the National

²⁰ The mission regrets that it was not able to meet with MONUC Kigali despite scheduling two appointments.

Tender Board and with those for other parts of Government, and that the Auditor General conducts an annual external audit of the Ministry of Defense.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

23. There are several Government agencies and partners that are engaged in activities *complementary* to the RDRP. The Joint Commission for the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees (JCRRR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) support the repatriation of Rwandese refugees from neighboring countries.

24. The Government of Rwanda has recently initiated a large-scale community-based post-conflict justice initiative (*gacaca*) to address the judicial legacy of those accused of participation in the 1994 genocide. All ex-combatants demobilized under the RDRP are subject to the *gacaca* system.

25. The demobilization of RDF soldiers is also related to the Ministry of Defense's (MINADEF) planning to reduce the size of the army to 25,000 in the course of a professionalization program.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

26. The security situation within Rwanda is stable. However, the risk of a *reversal of the peace process* remains high, especially if Rwandese armed groups are able to operate freely in the eastern DRC following the withdrawal of the RDF. An effective disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC to Rwanda and the re-establishment of security in the eastern DRC would significantly reduce the security threat to Rwanda, and thus the likelihood of future RDF incursions into the DRC. Government participation in the JMC and the Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) established under the Pretoria Agreement may help to mitigate this risk.

27. The regional peace process could also be reversed by a deterioration of the security situation in Burundi, especially if members of Rwandese armed groups seek to destabilize Rwanda from Burundian territory. Finally, the risk of a further deterioration of Rwanda – Uganda relations cannot be excluded. However, the continued participation of the Government in bilateral confidence-building and verification mechanisms established with the support of the government of the United Kingdom should help to mitigate this risk.

28. The risk of *uncoordinated DDR* activities within Rwanda is low. The Government has legally mandated the RDRC to coordinate all DDR activities in Rwanda. With the Technical Secretariat in place and the recent establishment of the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), and with broad partner support of Government leadership, the risk of uncoordinated parallel efforts within Rwanda is limited. However, as noted above, the risk of an inadequate coordination of cross-border DDR activities with MONUC is real. The mission recommends that Government continue to encourage MONUC participation at technical and policy levels, encourages MDRP partners on the ground to facilitate MONUC-RDRC collaboration, and urges the MDRP Secretariat to enhance coordination with UNDPKO in New York and with MONUC in Kinshasa.

29. Based on partner feedback in Kigali, it is evident that some MDRP focal points have not effectively shared MDRP information with their representations in Rwanda. Several partners were not aware of the timing or the terms of reference of the MDRP supervision mission. The mission, therefore, recommends that the World Bank strengthen the dissemination of MDRP information at national level through its Kigali office.

30. The *risk of non-engagement* by the international community in helping to reduce role of Rwanda in the Great Lakes conflict is small. Rwanda is at the center of the conflict, and the stabilization of the region is a central question in the relations of most bilateral partners with the Government. However, it is less clear whether the international community has the political will to address Rwanda’s security concerns in the DRC effectively. It remains to be seen whether MONUC has an adequate mandate or technical capacity to effectively disarm and repatriate the Rwandese armed groups still present in the DRC in a timely manner. It is not evident that the current voluntary disarmament strategy will yield a large-scale disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups. The lack of contingency planning for the forcible disarmament of these groups, the increasing insecurity in the eastern DRC, and the fact that MONUC currently has neither the mandate nor the military capacity to implement a forcible disarmament strategy raises the risk that Rwanda’s security concerns in the DRC will not be addressed adequately.

31. There is no *funding gap* for the RDRP, which has been elaborated within the MDRP framework. In this context, the following financing breakdown has been agreed for the RDRP. The IDA credit of US\$25 million for the RDRP became effective on September 23, 2002. The UK Government has already agreed to provide US\$ 5 million directly to the RDRC, and the German government intends to provide a bilateral contribution of Euro 2.2 million. The remainder will be financed through the regional MDTF of the MDRP. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) urged MDRP partners to consider the possibility of increasing the proportion of grant financing to the RDRP through the MDTF, in order to reduce the debt burden of the Government.

**Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Financing Plan
(Stage II)**

Source	Million US\$	Percent
Government of Rwanda	2.7	5
IDA	25.0	47
Bilaterals (MDTF/parallel)	25.6	48
Total	53.3	100

32. Various international and national *partners* are already playing an important role in support of the RDRP. The World Food Programme (WFP) has provided food assistance to ex-combatants in the demobilization phase. As noted above, UNICEF is working with the RDRC and MINALOC to provide specialized assistance for child soldiers. The German government is discussing with the RDRC the possibility of financing the medical rehabilitation component of the RDRP. In addition, numerous partners are engaged in the provision of community-based development, public works

and vocational training programs and services in Rwanda, which could help to reintegrate ex-combatants. The mission encourages the RDRC to further expand its outreach and communication with various potential partners in order to optimize the referral of ex-combatants to such programs.

33. As there is a national program in place in Rwanda, there is no scope for a special project in Rwanda. However, a number of UN partners expressed the concern that they may face administrative constraints to accessing MDTF resources for national programs, especially if they are required to access these through Government. They thus encouraged the mission to consider the possibility of direct financing via the MDTF of UN activities in support of MDRP national programs. However, donor partners and Government expressed a clear preference for all MDTF resources to flow through Government in the first instance in order to safeguard national ownership and program integrity. Partners were encouraged to explore ways to overcome their administrative constraints in consultation with the Government and the MDRP Secretariat. In addition, the RDRC was urged to ensure that it has adequate contracting capacity and procedures in place.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

34. Strategy Indicators

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* TBD

2 *Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* There are currently no limitations on the movement of goods or persons within Rwanda. The impact of the conflict in the DRC on the western part of Rwanda has been significant. Historical trade routes from the eastern DRC to the ports of Kenya and Tanzania and migrant labor patterns have been disrupted.

3 *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Social expenditures have more than doubled in the past four years, while defense expenditure has declined at a modest rate. The evolution of social and military expenditure will need to be tracked in light of the country's internal and external security needs, budgetary constraints and the impact of the RDRP.

Government Expenditure (in million FRw and percent)

Categories	1998	1999	2000	2001
GDP	632.1	646.1	699.3	763.7
Total current expenditure	75.3	87.1	89.2	106.0
<i>Defense expenditure</i>	27.2	27.0	23.9	25.1
<i>Social expenditure</i>	17.7	25.2	28.7	39.5
<i>Other expenditure</i>	30.4	34.9	36.6	37.1
Defense/GDP	4.3%	4.2%	3.4%	3.3%
Defense/recurrent expenditures	36.1%	31.0%	26.8%	23.7%
Defense/social expenditures	153.7%	107.1%	83.3%	63.5%

Source: IMF and Government.

35. *Program Indicators*

- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** All demobilization and reintegration activities in Rwanda are currently conducted within the RDRP, which is a national program within the MDRP framework.
- 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** The World Bank is currently in the process of preparing a grant agreement with the Government of Rwanda. No MDTF funds have been disbursed to Rwanda yet.
- 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** As the RDRP is the first national program being implemented within the MDRP, there is no other comparable national program at this time.

36. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** A total of 6,866 RDF soldiers and about 2,500 Rwandese armed groups have been demobilized in a structured manner in RDRP II since December 2001.
- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** As there is a national program in place in Rwanda, there is no scope for a special project in Rwanda.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The Rwandan Government participated in the Luanda workshop and confirmed its interest in learning more from the experiences of other countries as well as sharing its own experience with other regional stakeholders.
- 10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** This was the first joint MDRP mission to Rwanda and this is the first joint report reviewing DDR activities in Rwanda from a regional perspective.

7. **Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

37. The mission's main recommendations and next steps are as follows:

- (i) The RDRC should further strengthen its national coordination role at both technical and political levels. The World Bank should enhance its support of the Government's coordination role.
- (ii) The MDRP should continue to support cross-border initiatives of the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
- (iii) The mission recommends that Government continue to encourage MONUC participation at technical and policy levels, encourages MDRP partners on the ground to facilitate MONUC-RDRC collaboration, and recommends that the MDRP Secretariat strengthen coordination with UNDPKO in New York and

with MONUC in Kinshasa. In general, MDRP partners should encourage MONUC to work more closely within the MDRP framework.

- (iv) The World Bank should make credit and MDTF financing for the RDRP available as soon as possible in view of the possibility of a rapid increase in demobilization and reintegration demands for Rwandese armed groups.
- (v) MDTF financing in support of the RDRP should flow through Government in the first instance. Partners should seek to overcome possible internal administrative obstacles to contracting with Government. The RDRC, with the support of the World Bank, should ensure that adequate contracting capacity is in place in the RDRC, and that procurement procedures are efficient and timely.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Mr. Ingo Wiederhofer, Operations Officer, World Bank, Washington DC

Mr. Manuel Fontaine, Child Protection Advisor, UNICEF

Mr. Martin Koper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands, Hague

Mr. Philip Lancaster, Consultant, UNICEF

Attachment 2

Mission Program

September 27, 2002

- 8.30 Mr. Eliphaz Benjamin Karenzi, Secretary General, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- 10.30 Mr. John Zigira, Commissioner, and Mr. Faustin Rwigema, Coordinator, Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
- 12.00 Mr. Gerard Howe, Social Advisor, Department for International Development
- 14.00 Mr. Jeremy Lester, Delegate, European Commission
- 16.00 Mr. Theophane Nikyema, Representative, UNICEF and Mr. David Stephenson, Country Representative, WFP

September 28, 2002

Visit to Mutobo Demobilization Center

September 30, 2002

- 11.00 Mr. John Zigira, Commissioner, and Mr. Faustin Rwigema, Coordinator, Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
- 15.00 Mr. Gana Fofang, Acting Resident Representative, UNDP
- 16.30 Col. Pierre Pinchart, Military Attache, Embassy of Belgium

October 1, 2002

- 12.30 Mr. Cyril Ndaba, Political Advisor, Embassy of South Africa
- 14.00 Mr. Alphons Hennekens, Ambassador, Embassy of Netherlands

October 2, 2002

- 10.00 Wrap-up with Heads of Missions

Annex 7

Uganda

September 23-26, 2002

Country Report

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint mission visited the Republic of Uganda from September 23-26, 2002 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps. The mission composition and program are attached. The mission would like to thank the Government of Uganda, donor and UN partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

1. Country context

2. Uganda has been a key actor in the conflict in the Great Lakes Region, having deployed soldiers of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) in the eastern DRC since 1998 in response to increased destabilization of southwestern Uganda by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). On 6 September 2002, at Luanda, the Government and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo signed an agreement (the Luanda Agreement) on the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the DRC, and on cooperation and the normalization of relations between the two countries. This agreement included a 100 day framework for the full withdrawal of the UPDF from the DRC.

3. The largest security concern in Uganda today is the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. The security situation in northern Uganda has deteriorated significantly since July 2002. In a series of attacks on villages and vehicles, a large number of civilians have been displaced, and a significant number have been killed and abducted. Road transport and humanitarian operations have been disrupted severely. While the security and humanitarian situation in southwestern Uganda has improved since 2000, there is a concern that instability in the DRC following the withdrawal of Ugandan forces may result in a substantial influx of refugees from the DRC and a destabilization of border areas. Government has also not yet been able to put an end to armed cattle rustling by Karamajong herdsmen in parts of northern Uganda.

4. Relations between the Government of Uganda (Government) and the government of Rwanda deteriorated in 2001, with repeated clashes between Rwanda Defense Force and UPDF contingents in Kisangani, and accusations of mutual political subversion. With the support of the government of the United Kingdom, the two governments are participating in bilateral confidence-building measures.

5. The Government undertook a demobilization and reintegration program, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP), from 1992-1996. An estimated 37,000 Government soldiers were demobilized and received reinsertion support under this program. In 2000, parliament passed an amnesty law, which established an Amnesty

Commission (AC) and included provisions for the amnesty of irregular forces that have been combating the Government for several years. These include the LRA, the ADF and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II). In addition to amnesty, the AC, with the support of bilateral partners and NGOs, has provided demobilization and reintegration assistance to an estimated 1,500 irregular combatants (“reporters”) since its inception.

2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. The majority of Ugandan territory has been at peace since 1986. However, several districts in northern and south-western Uganda have been destabilized by the LRA and ADF insurgencies respectively. The fluid security situation, particularly in southern Sudan, contributes to the insecurity in northern Uganda. The UNRF II, based in the Sudan, has recently signed a cease-fire with government, is currently cantoned, and is engaged in negotiations towards a final peace agreement with the Government. The security situation in southwestern Uganda has stabilized following a successful UPDF offensive against the ADF in the DRC in 2001.

7. Uganda is a signatory to the Lusaka Agreement of July 1999, and has *consistently participated in the regional peace process*. The recent Luanda Agreement with the Government of the DRC has reconfirmed the Government’s intention to withdraw its forces from the DRC in accordance with a jointly agreed calendar. As a first step, MONUC has observed the withdrawal of at least 1,850 UPDF soldiers from Beni and Gbadolite since August 2002.²¹ The two governments have also re-established a Joint Ministerial Commission for cooperation in various areas of common interest, including defense and security.

8. The Government does not currently have a national demobilization and reintegration program in place. While the bulk of UVAP activities have come to an end, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) continues to provide limited reintegration assistance to veterans demobilized by Government. The AC, which reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), has provided demobilization and reintegration assistance to irregular combatants who surrender to authorities. Bilateral donors have supported the amnesty process through direct financial and technical assistance to the Amnesty Commission, reintegration support through specialized NGOs and repatriation and reintegration assistance channeled through the IOM.

9. The Government confirmed to the mission its interest in developing a comprehensive *national demobilization and reintegration program* within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). Government indicated that it would submit a formal request to initiate preparation of a national program to the MDRP Secretariat shortly. The national program would seek to integrate measures for the demobilization and reintegration for UPDF soldiers and irregular forces in order to ensure consistency and transparency. A letter of demobilization policy as well as social, environmental and fiduciary safeguards would be addressed in the course of program development.

²¹ Special report of the Secretary General on the UN Organization Mission in DR Congo, September 10, 2002.

10. The Ministry of Defence has indicated that it would like to demobilize approximately 10,000 soldiers of the UPDF as soon as possible, and indicated that an additional 5,000, which have recently been demobilized without benefits, should also be considered for assistance under any future national program. Government further confirmed that it was currently undertaking a defense sector review with the support of the UK Government. The mission noted that this defense sector review would provide an important opportunity for the Government to synchronize defense sector and demobilization planning, and provide an opportunity to enhance *transparency* and *accountability* of defense expenditure management. In this context, the mission encouraged Government to also address the need for a pension policy for army personnel.

11. Government already has *institutional structures* in place that could plan and oversee implementation of a national program. The UVAB retains substantial institutional memory from the large-scale demobilization and reintegration of UPDF in the mid-1990s. As noted above, the AC is currently supporting small-scale reintegration activities for irregular ex-combatants through NGO implementing partners. The mission encouraged Government to establish a coordination and policy-making focal point in order to ensure that all relevant parts of Government and civil society are implicated in program development.

4. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

12. The principle of national ownership will be integral to the planning and implementation of any national demobilization and reintegration program in Uganda. Government already has significant relevant experience and institutional capacity. Furthermore, the international community has committed itself to supporting the Poverty Eradication Action Program (PEAP) strongly led by Government.

13. International partners have established a Donor Technical Group (DTG) on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict in Kampala, which is currently coordinating the provision of capacity-building support to the AC as well as ad hoc basket-financing for small-scale demobilization and reintegration activities for irregular forces. The DTG confirmed that the MDRP approach could help to optimize external assistance and harmonize the consistency of demobilization and reintegration activities through the establishment of a national program. However, the DTG also indicated that planning for a national program should not disrupt ongoing or urgent activities (e.g. UNRF II program). The DTG has expressed its willingness to consider such proposals as an interim measure.

14. The AC confirmed that it would be submitting a small demobilization and reintegration project for the ADF to the DTG in the near future. In the event of an urgent financing need for the demobilization of an irregular group prior to the finalization of a national program, the mission recommends that the MDRP Trust Fund Committee (TFC) review the possibility of providing complementary MDTF financing upon Government request, and in consultation with the DTG, through the special projects window.

15. The Government fully supports the Technical Coordination Group (TCG) of participating governments' DDR focal points. UVAB staff have participated in the TCG workshop in Luanda in July/August 2002, and have expressed an interest in future *knowledge sharing* activities of this kind.

16. The mission was unable to obtain information on *special target groups* during its brief visit. The mission understands that the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and several NGOs have gained experience in the implementation of child soldier demobilization and reintegration activities in Uganda. Preparation for a national program would require a thorough analysis of potential special target groups, including child soldiers, disabled and/or chronically ill combatants.

17. Most development activities in Uganda are being undertaken in a peaceful environment. However, the Government's decentralization program and several targeted reconstruction programs are active in conflict-affected area. The potential for meaningful *coordination* with these activities would have to be explored thoroughly in the course of program preparation. In general terms, it is widely recognized that a demobilization and reintegration program will struggle to succeed in the absence of employment generating economic growth. In this respect, coordination with poverty reduction activities, particularly those initiatives under the pillar three of the PEAP, which focuses on improving the income of the poor, is essential. Finally, the mission encourages Government to consult with and draw upon the coordination and planning experience gained by the DTG during program preparation.

18. Given the early stage of MDRP engagement in Uganda, no discussions have yet taken place regarding *transparency*. As noted above, however, transparency issues would feature prominently in the letter of demobilization policy and would be addressed in the context of the defense sector review and the preparation of the national program.

4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

19. As noted above, the Government has initiated a *defense sector review* with the support of the Government of the United Kingdom. This review includes an analysis of personnel management and procurement procedures. A White Paper should be available for parliamentary consultation by April 2003, and the entire review should be completed by December 2003. The force restructuring and personnel management components of this review may have a direct bearing on the timing and scale of demobilization activities for regular forces in the national program. The precise scope and nature of synergies would need to be explored in the context of program preparation.

20. While plans for restructuring are ongoing and Government has indicated a desire to initiate demobilization, the Ministry of Defense has also indicated that it may be required to recruit new soldiers to combat increased insecurity in northern Uganda. While such recruitment may be justifiable in view of the security threats confronting Uganda, it may raise questions as to the timing, fiscal impact and sustainability of a national demobilization and reintegration program. In principle, recruitment and demobilization are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as long as the recruitment process follows

transparent and objectively verifiable criteria, and is linked to a longer term vision for the armed forces. Other elements of defense personnel management (such as a computerized personnel database and payroll lists) may also need to be addressed during the defense sector review and planning for the national demobilization and reintegration program in order to avoid the recycling of demobilized soldiers back into the UPDF.

5. Risks and mitigation measures

21. The overall social, economic and political situation in the Uganda is stable. Uganda has experienced several years of strong economic growth and social indicators have improved significantly in the last decade. However, there is a pattern of increased insecurity and displacement in the north as well as a risk of increased insecurity on the DRC frontier following the withdrawal of the UPDF from the DRC. In this context, a *reversal of the peace processes* with the DRC and Sudan cannot be ruled out. It is, therefore, also considered important that the Government continue to participate in the Great Lakes peace process as well as in discussions with the Government of the Sudan.

22. In addition, there continues to be a risk of a deterioration of relations with Rwanda. It is therefore important that the international community continue to support confidence-building measures between the governments of Uganda and Rwanda.

23. As mentioned above, the DTG has established a framework for systematically addressing periodic DDR proposals for irregular ex-combatants. The World Bank is a member of the DTG and has disseminated information on the MDRP in the course of two preceding technical missions. Therefore, the risk of *uncoordinated DDR* activities within the international community is minimal. Nonetheless, it appears that some MDRP focal points have not effectively shared advance information on the MDRP mission with their representations on the ground. Within Government, there appears to have been only limited interaction between UVAB and the AC to date. Cooperation between UVAB and the AC would need to be improved in the preparation of a comprehensive national program under an MDRP umbrella.

24. The *risk of non-engagement* by the international community in helping resolve the Ugandan conflict is limited due to Uganda's strong relationship with several international partners.

6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

25. *Strategy Indicators*

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* As of the end of August, there were an estimated 657,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Uganda as well as 190,000 refugees from neighboring countries.²² It is likely that this number has increased in September due to the spreading instability in the

²² Humanitarian Update Uganda, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July/August 2002, Volume IV, Issue VII/VIII.

north. The vast majority of these IDPs and refugees are to be found in the north and northeast of the country.

- 2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** The impact of the conflict in the DRC on the western border has been significant. Historical trade routes from the eastern DRC to the ports of Kenya and Tanzania have been disrupted, though extensive smuggling persists. In addition, freedom of movement of goods and persons in the north has been severely disrupted by the LRA. Government has also indicated that it may require civilians to resettle in camps and restrict their movement as part of its counterinsurgency strategy.
- 3 ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Education and health expenditures have reached US\$ 618.6 billion in 2001/02, or 33 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Defense expenditures have reached US\$ 238 billion or 13 percent in the same year. By comparison, in 1997/98, i.e., the year before the resumption of war in the DRC, education and health expenditures and military expenditures amounted to 35 percent and 16 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively.

26. *Program Indicators*

- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** The demobilization and reintegration of “reporters” through the Amnesty Commission is the only DDR activity in Uganda today, and is currently outside the MDRP framework.
- 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Uganda.
- 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** There is currently no national program as defined by the MDRP in Uganda.

27. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** The AC has provided reintegration assistance to approximately 1,500 ex-combatants to date on an ad hoc basis.
- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** There is no special project as defined in the MDRP in existence in Uganda.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The Ugandan Government participated in the Luanda workshop and is interested in learning more from the experiences of other countries. At the same time, the Ugandan Government has hosted several delegations from other countries (e.g., Eritrea) who have sought to learn from the UVAP experience.

- 10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* This was the first joint MDRP mission to Uganda and this is the first joint report reviewing DDR activities in Uganda.

7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

28. The mission's recommendations include the following: (i) the MDRP should support the development of a comprehensive national program in Uganda to address current local and regional security concerns; (ii) the support should build upon the experience gained from UVAP and the Amnesty Commission's efforts to date; (iii) the national program should maximize synergies with the ongoing defense sector review and (iv) where effective donor coordination mechanisms are in place, such as in the case of the DTG in Uganda, they should be drawn upon and regularly consulted during the development of national frameworks.

29. The mission proposes the following next steps:

- (i) The Government should submit a request for MDRP assistance to the MDRP Secretariat as soon as possible.
- (ii) If MDRP partners agreed on support to DDR in Uganda, a joint identification mission could be carried out in early 2003. This mission could, *inter alia*, initiate engage the Government regarding the preparation of a national program document, the letter of demobilization policy, and potential synergies with the ongoing defense sector review.
- (iii) The mission recommends that the World Bank strengthen the dissemination of MDRP information through its Kampala office.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Mr. Ingo Wiederhofer, Operations Officer, World Bank, Washington DC

Mr. Jean Marc Ruiz, European Commission, Kampala

Mr. John J. Oloya, Rural Development Specialist, World Bank, Kampala

Mr. Martin Koper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands, Hague

Attachment 2

Mission Program

September 23, 2002

- 10.00 Mr. Stephen Kagoda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs
- 12.30 Mr. Francisco Mascini, First Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands
- 14.30 Maj. Gen. (ret'd) Emilio Mondo, Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
- 16.00 Hon Justice P.K.K. Onega, Chairman, Amnesty Commission
- 18.30 Mr. Graham Carrington, Department for International Development

September 24, 2002

- 9.30 Mr. Randolph Harris, United States Agency for International Development
- 11.00 Mr. Anyari Jacob, Officer in charge of Defense Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
- 14.30 Donor Technical Group on the North
- 17.00 Col. Pieter Harmse and Mr. Philippe de Bard, MONUC Kampala Office

September 25, 2002

- 8.30 National and international NGOs
- 11.00 Mr. Daniel Augstburger, Senior Emergency Officer, UNOCHA
- 12.00 Mr. Daouda Toure, UNDP Resident Representative

September 26, 2002

- 8.30 Hon. Minister Mbabazi, Minister of Defense
- 9.30 Mr. Thomas Djurhuus, Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of Denmark
- 10.30 Wrap-up with Heads of Missions
- 12.00 Wrap-up with Ministry of Internal Affairs, Amnesty Commission and Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
- 16.00 Ms Mary Muduli, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and Mr. Jacob Anyoli, Desk Officer for Defense, MoFED